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Executive summary 
There is today growing momentum behind proposals for ‘data sharing’ as a remedy for competition 
concerns in digital markets, as well as efforts by the European Commission (including in the 
forthcoming Data Act of 2021) to promote the sharing of data more widely in the European economy. 
However, there is as yet less focus on the practical challenges that will need to be overcome to 
implement data sharing arrangements that effectively promote innovation and competition in or 
preserve the contestability of digital markets. There is also limited experience of regulated data 
sharing in practice. This report aims to address that gap and offers a series of recommendations on 
what authorities will need to do if data sharing by digital platforms is to occur at scale in Europe. The 
report complements another CERRE Report on the role of data for digital market contestability. 
I. Incentives to share data 
Data is already being shared voluntarily under a wide variety of conditions and for a 
variety of reasons. One category of data sharing arrangements is those initiated by 
individuals, which normally involve personal data, and in which the benefits of sharing 
generally accrue to that individual. Examples include digital platforms that allow individuals to 
download their data to better understand what has been collected about them; laws such as the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which allow individuals to initiate a transfer of data from 
one organisation to another to switch service provider or ‘multi-home’ across several providers; other 
regulations such as the Second Payment Services Directive (PSD2) or the Open Banking regime in 
the UK which allow individuals to initiate the continuous sharing of data with providers of 
complementary services; and ‘Personal Data Stores’ who manage data on behalf of individuals and 
provide greater security, convenience or opportunities to monetise data.  
Although there are many such opportunities for an individual to share data today, very few appear 
in fact to do so. Some major governmental initiatives to promote data sharing, such as Midata in 
the UK or the smart energy meter data programmes in Europe, have failed to meet expectations. 
This seems to be because users have a low level of trust in the arrangements, find the process 
complex and time consuming, or find it difficult to evaluate the benefits they might obtain from doing 
so. 
Data can also be shared between organisations voluntarily, normally in bulk and without 
first requiring the consent of individual users. In this case, the benefits of data sharing 
are likely to be enjoyed by a large number of users rather than being confined to a specific 
individual. Organisations such as insurance companies may share data when there is a mutual 
advantage to doing so (to identify fraudulent activity), digital platforms, such as Facebook, may allow 
others to access data they hold to encourage complementary innovation or may provide ‘ancillary’ 
services such as identity management in return for access to the data of those other firms that use 
them. Firms like Bloomberg or Nielsen may collect and sell data, or, like MasterCard, may donate 
data to support research or other causes. Firms may not share the data itself, but may allow others 
to interrogate it through ‘sandboxes’ or ‘trusted intermediaries’. Many public organisations share 
significant volumes of data generally without charge and the Open Data Directive imposes significant 
data sharing obligation of public sector data. 
Although more data is shared between organisations, they encounter similar issues to 
individuals. It can be complex and difficult to agree on the technical standards required for data to 
flow smoothly between them. Firms may be uncertain about the legal status of the data over which 
they exercise control and whether sharing may expose them to unforeseen liabilities. They may also 
be uncertain about the credentials of the intended recipients or their capacity to keep data secure, 
or about the kinds of reputational risks which became apparent, for example, after Cambridge 
Analytica obtained access to data on Facebook users. For these and other reasons, many 
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Some form of regulation may be required to overcome some of the barriers to sharing 
data, even when both parties otherwise have incentives to share data and would benefit 
from doing so. This report is, however, concerned with circumstances in which one of the 
parties has powerful incentives not to share data because it is a significant source of a 
competitive advantage which is difficult or impossible for others to replicate, and which 
therefore allows that platform to preserve its ‘gatekeeper’ position in its core market and 
at the same time to leverage these advantages into other markets. The objective of imposing 
an obligation to share data in these circumstances is therefore to preserve the contestability of 
adjacent markets as well as, more speculatively, to support rivalry in the core market and ultimately, 
to promote data driven innovation in the EU. 
II. EU legal framework for data sharing 
Competition laws may impose data sharing obligation under some strict conditions. If data 
could be considered as essential facilities, the refusal to share such data may be considered as an 
abuse of dominant position prohibited by Article 102 TFEU. However, the conditions of the essential 
facilities, even when they are adapted to take into account the specific characteristics of data, are 
difficult to meet and, to date, very few refusals to share data have been considered as abusive. 
Moreover, when two data-rich firms merge, the competition authority may impose some remedies if 
the combination of previously separate data sets would significantly impede effective competition. 
In such circumstances, the authority may either impose the merging parties to share data with their 
competitors (as has been the case in Thomson/Reuters) or impede the combination of data sets by 
the merging parties (as may be the case in the yet to be decided Google/Fitbit case). 
Alongside competition law, the EU horizontal or sector laws also contain several rules that 
stimulate or impose data sharing and data portability. Concerning horizontal rules applicable 
to all sectors of the economy, the obligations focus mainly on the portability of personal data (with 
the 2016 General Data Protection Regulation and the 2019 Digital Content Directive). The portability 
of non-personal data is encouraged, but not imposed, by the 2018 Free Flow of Data Regulation. 
Although steps in the right direction, these rules have several limits and shortcomings and they do 
not provide for a fully-fledged data sharing framework. The most comprehensive data sharing 
obligation and governance framework is imposed by the 2019 Open Data Directive which applies to 
data owned by public sector bodies and public undertakings in the EU. There are also extensive data 
sharing obligations in several sectoral legislation, for instance in the financial sector (2015 Second 
Payment Services Directive), the automotive sector (2018 Motor Vehicle Regulation), and the energy 
sector (2019 New Electricity Directive). 
Thus, while the EU legal framework contains some rules imposing data sharing, rules are 
in general limited and do not provide for a comprehensive and effective governance 
framework to share data. 
III. Recommendations for an effective governance framework in case data sharing is 
imposed 
This report does not recommend that a particular institution, whether at the national or European 
level, is given the task of regulating data sharing. Whatever the precise institutional arrangements, 
we identify several challenges which a regulator will need to overcome. These include determining 
the identity of the digital platforms that will be obliged to share data; deciding the conditions under 
which data is shared and the obligations of recipients; the user experience (if user consents are 
required); the scope and other characteristics of the data to be shared; arrangements for the 
governance of data sharing and the resolution of disputes and errors; and the commercial or other 
terms under which data is shared. The report presents several conclusions and makes several 
recommendations. 
Regulating recipients as well as donors 
The report concludes that regulation for data sharing should not be viewed as being limited 
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That is because it will also require strict oversight of potentially a very large number of smaller firms 
that might seek access to such data and which may then rely upon it to provide services of various 
kinds. Given the potentially wide range of uses to which data could be applied, and the wide range 
of organisations which may require access to such data, individual users will not consent to the 
sharing of data unless they can be confident that any recipient of the data will keep it secure and 
will adhere to other conditions of sharing, so as to preserve trust in, and the integrity of the overall 
data sharing process. The controllers of commercial data will also be rightly concerned about bulk 
sharing obligations if misuse by others puts their reputation or commercial position at risk. Recipients 
of data may be also putting themselves in a position of acute dependency (since they may rely upon 
uninterrupted data sharing to sustain their services for users) and will not enter into such 
arrangements unless they consider that they have adequate protections and rights of redress in the 
event of any disruption or interruption in supply. A comprehensive system of regulation of both 
donors and recipients of data will be required to guard against misuse and to ensure trust on all 
sides. 
It follows that if regulated data sharing is to be adopted at a significant scale, regulators 
will need to establish an effective regime for overseeing those in receipt of data and for 
enforcing the rules effectively on an ongoing basis. This will need to include rules governing 
the resolution of disputes and determining how liabilities fall if consumers or other firms are harmed.  
Since many of those who share or receive data are unlikely to hold market power or otherwise to be 
guilty of any abuse, we consider that oversight of such arrangements is unlikely to be an appropriate 
task for a competition authority and will instead require a dedicated regulatory body. 
Extensive obligations to adopt common technical standards  
All forms of data sharing will require the adoption of common technical standards by both 
those sharing data and those in receipt of it. The same standards should be adopted for all the 
different forms of data sharing that we propose. We consider that potential recipients of data have 
sufficient incentives to adopt the standards since they would not otherwise obtain access to the data 
they require. Those platforms that have been directed to share data will need to be obliged to adopt 
the relevant standards, such that data can be shared in a form and manner which supports the 
regulatory objectives. In the early stages of regulation, this may impose additional costs on the 
newly regulated entities as they have to restructure the way they manage their existing data assets 
or adopt new external interfaces. This may also contribute to delay in the implementation of new 
data sharing obligations, which will be a particular concern if the objective of data sharing is to 
prevent leveraging into emerging digital markets. In the longer term, we conclude that data sharing 
regulation should promote the very extensive adoption of common technical standards by 
organisations which may not currently have obligations to share data (but which might be required 
to in the future), those who may not currently request access to data (but will want to preserve the 
option to do so in the future), and in relation to forms of data which may not currently be shared 
(but which may be required to be shared in future). This ‘anticipatory’ approach to technical 
standards means that regulators should consider the application of common technical 
standards to data sharing in sectors well beyond the existing scope of large digital 
platforms, as has been proposed in Australia. In short, we recommend regulators should 
decouple requirements to adopt common technical standards from obligations to share 
data in the expectation that the former will be much more extensive than the latter. 
The most important and difficult role for regulators will lie in determining the type and scope of data 
that is to be shared and which organisations should be obliged to share it. We conclude that two 
forms of regulated sharing are likely to dominate. 
Recommendations on sharing of data about individual users 
The first form of sharing – and the one which is likely to be capable of being implemented 
first - will be the sharing or porting of data about individual users. This mode of sharing is 
likely to be appropriate when the individual concerned will benefit directly from the sharing process, 
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value of the data, in this case, lies in its depth and personalised nature, rather than in its volume. 
The process to enable the sharing of the data will generally require that the user consent to the 
transfer, and the process by which these user consents are obtained and authenticated will have a 
significant impact on the effectiveness of this remedy. Technologies such as biometric IDs will have 
a significant role to play.  
The data to be transferred would be data provided by the user to the platform and data 
derived from observations of that individual’s interactions with the platform. It would 
exclude ‘inferred data’ that is created by the platform itself (as well as excluding third party data 
that is purchased from other sources). The presumption should be that all relevant data about an 
individual would be shared. 
The overall competitive impact of these data sharing arrangements will necessarily be limited, given 
the relatively high transaction costs associated with first obtaining individual consents from every 
user and the relatively small volumes of data that will be transferred each time consent is obtained. 
Over time, however, data that is obtained in this way could accumulate and be used for other 
purposes. For this reason, we recommend that obligations to share data about individual 
users in the way we propose should be quite extensive and apply to digital platforms which 
we would describe as meeting the ‘gatekeeper minus’ threshold. This would mean a strong 
presumption that the obligation to share would apply to all platforms which the regulator had 
determined as having ‘gatekeeper’ or equivalent status and to some others as well. However, this 
obligation would not apply to every platform or firm, and so would be less extensive than, for 
example, the ‘data portability’ obligations which apply under the GDPR (which are narrower 
in scope). We do not recommend that the European Commission seek to expand the existing GDPR 
data portability requirements to address the competition concerns we consider in this report and 
conclude that a separate regime, specifically designed for this purpose, is the better approach. 
We consider that there is a case for a regulator to require the sharing of individual user 
data without any form of payment passing between the donor and the recipient. Each party 
would be expected to bear its costs to the transfer. 
It is unclear at this stage how effective the arrangements for the sharing of individual data outlined 
above would prove to be. However, there is a risk that the high transaction costs and uncertain 
benefits continue to deter users and render this approach relatively ineffective in preserving the 
contestability of the markets we are concerned with. In such circumstances, we recommend the 
European institutions should consider more radical approaches, including changes to the 
GDPR which would allow for individual users to ‘opt out’ their data (rather than requiring 
them to ‘opt in’) when transfers of their data are initiated - provided always that the recipients of 
the data comply with the relevant regulatory conditions.  
We recognise that this may represent some loss of consumer sovereignty over their data, but 
consider that such a trade-off may need to be made if data sharing arrangements are to achieve 
their aim of ensuring contestability in digital markets. It is far from clear that the interests of 
European consumers are better served by preserving rights to consent whilst allowing new digital 
markets to be dominated by existing ‘gatekeeper’ platforms. Indeed, in the long run, the privacy 
rights of European consumers may be better served by measures that more effectively promote 
competition. At the very least, the debate should be had and we, therefore, recommend the 
European Commission consider provisions in the forthcoming Data Act to enable the use 
of ‘opt out’ arrangements for the sharing of personal data to preserve market 
contestability under certain prescribed conditions. There is certainly a precedent for such 
arrangements, since control of personal data sets has often changed without individual user ‘opt ins’ 
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Recommendations on the bulk sharing of user data 
The second form of sharing will be the bulk transfer of aggregate user data. As with the first 
category, this would involve sharing data provided by individual users or arising from their 
interactions with the platform but would exclude inferences that are generated by the platform itself. 
This mode of sharing is likely to support entry into adjacent or emerging markets, with such entry 
being supported by insights derived from large data sets. It may even to support competition in 
some or all of the core market activities from which, or by means of which, the data has been derived.  
The overall competitive impact of these data sharing arrangements could be significant – likely more 
significant than for individual user data - since the volume of data to be shared is likely to be very 
substantial and may represent a significant proportion of the donor platform's data assets. In some 
circumstances, it may be necessary for the data to be shared without first anonymising it to allow 
recipients to effectively rival the incumbent platform. Since obtaining individual consents from 
every user would not be feasible in these circumstances, we recommend that regulators 
and policymakers consider other mechanisms to enable the bulk sharing of non-
anonymised user data.  
Alternatively, regulators should consider requiring the platform that controls the data to 
allow third party access to the full data set for training algorithms or otherwise deriving 
the same sorts of insights from the data that are available to the incumbent. The terms 
under which such access is provided would also need to be carefully regulated since those seeking 
access to the data sets would remain dependent upon the owner of the assets providing full and 
unrestricted access. Similar challenges arise even the data is held by a ‘neutral’ intermediary.  Such 
arrangements are therefore likely to require a high degree of regulatory oversight (and associated 
cost), although they also have considerable attractions if non-anonymised data is important to 
preserve contestability or if very large data sets are involved. 
Although we would expect all the relevant data about an individual user to be shared with every 
recipient, there is likely to be much greater heterogeneity of demand amongst potential 
recipients of bulk transfers of aggregate data. Some potential recipients may require (or may 
only be able to handle) relatively small volumes of data, representing only a fraction of that held by 
the donor. Others may require the sharing of much larger data sets. There may also be questions 
about the geographic scope of the data to be shared. This will present two challenges. First, the 
regulator will need to ensure that a suitable menu of data options is developed, preferably 
collaboratively and inclusively, to ensure that the needs of as wide a range of potential recipients as 
possible will be met as far as possible. This is likely to involve a degree of compromise on the part 
of some parties, with the regulator adjudicating between conflicting demands.  
Second,  we consider there is a strong prima facie case for assuming that recipients of 
aggregated data should be required to pay the data, with the payment varying by the 
volume and value of the data being shared (and not simply the costs of implementing the 
data sharing arrangements or storing the data). The primary concern here is to preserve 
incentives for both parties in the sharing arrangement to innovate and invest in existing or new 
digital services to acquire additional data for themselves. We do not want data sharing arrangements 
to crowd out other forms of commercial activity from which users derive significant benefits, 
particularly in many digital markets. 
However, we do not make firm recommendations as to how these prices should be derived because 
we have yet to find a well-developed methodology for doing so. Requiring firms to agree with terms 
on a ‘FRAND’ basis may not be adequate in several circumstances. We recommend that a study 
be undertaken by the Commission to consider how regulators would establish wholesale 
prices for data that was to be shared. The methodologies and the practices which were developed 
for the public open data framework to calculate the marginal costs and to recover costs developed 
for public data may feed this study. We also consider that setting appropriate wholesale prices for 
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incentives to reassess their data requirements as they grow and develop their businesses, allowing 
for the possibility that they would terminate existing data sharing arrangements once they have 
acquired, or are in a position to acquire, sufficient data for themselves from their users. Otherwise, 
extensive data sharing arrangements could likely become a permanent feature of European digital 
markets in the years to come.  
The final question in this context concerns the identity of the platforms that would be obliged to 
share aggregated personal data on a bulk basis. We conclude that this should be a much-limited 
set of entities than we recommend for the porting of individual data and would not 
necessarily be a requirement of every platform that was found to hold ‘gatekeeper’ status under the 
European Commission’s latest proposals, although we think a designation of ‘gatekeeper’ status 
should establish a rebuttable presumption. We, therefore, characterise this sub-set of entities 
as being those that meet a (more demanding) ‘gatekeeper plus’ threshold. The analysis 
required to demonstrate this would need to be undertaken on a case by case basis. 
The challenge ahead 
The recommendations in this report, if adopted, would represent an extensive programme of 
regulatory activity that would need to be undertaken by bodies with responsibilities for implementing 
data sharing which have yet to be assigned in Europe. Establishing the institutional and 
regulatory framework to deliver data sharing at scale will require legislation. Moreover, we 
recommend that the European policymakers consider further legislative changes in the forthcoming 
Data Act to enable the sharing of personal data on an opt out basis under certain narrowly prescribed 
circumstances and to ensure contestability in digital markets.  
Finally, we are mindful that data sharing remedies that we have considered in this report arise from 
the assumption that digital platforms will continue to derive significant market power from their 
centralised control of big data sets which they have accumulated by enabling diffuse groups of users 
to transact with each other through the platform. This may be the case, but regulators and 
policymakers should also keep an eye on (and potentially take steps to promote) new technologies 
and architectures which might in the future enable a much greater degree of 
decentralisation and wider distribution of data, thereby removing the very sources of market 
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1 Introduction1 
1.1 Aim and scope of the report 
This report seeks to engage with the practical challenges which public authorities will face if they 
were to decide to oblige digital platforms to share their data with potential competitors. There is 
today considerable and growing momentum behind proposals for ‘data sharing’ as a remedy for 
competition concerns in digital markets, but as yet little detail as to what they might consist of or 
how they might work. This report can be read alongside other research that has been undertaken by 
colleagues at CERRE2 which has produced detailed case studies of data used by specific types of 
digital platforms (online search, e-commerce, and media platforms) and detailed proposals for how 
data sharing might promote market contestability, competition, and innovation in each case. This 
report complements their work by considering what practical steps public authorities would need to 
take, and what issues they would need to address if the sorts of data sharing arrangements which 
they propose were to be effectively implemented3.    
We start by reviewing how data is shared in other contexts and what might be learned from the 
arrangements that have been instituted to facilitate such sharing. Unsurprisingly, we observe that 
data is shared when parties to the arrangement derive a benefit from doing so. For example, we 
suggest that if the sharing of data is to require the prior consent of a particular user then such 
arrangements are only likely to work if that user perceives a direct benefit (or ‘private value’) from 
the arrangement. If both all parties to the arrangement stand to benefit, then sharing may occur 
voluntarily without the intervention of public authorities, although there may still be significant 
obstacles and transactions costs which explain why, in the view of many, the potential benefits of 
voluntary data sharing are a long way from being fully realised in Europe today. 
If some parties stand to gain from sharing, but others not, then some form of intervention is likely 
to be required before it occurs. We assume such an intervention would be required to oblige a large 
digital platform to share data which it holds with a potential competitor. We, therefore, consider the 
various existing legal instruments which have been or could be, used to require firms (and public 
bodies) to port or share data. Some of these instruments, such as the General Data Protection 
Directive, require data portability to fulfil goals other than the promotion of competition, whereas 
others, such as competition law, clearly have competition as their primary focus. 
From this review, we identify several practical questions that will need to be addressed by any data 
sharing regime which seeking to promote or safeguard market contestability, competition and 
innovation in digital markets. The answers to some of these questions depend upon the form of 
competition which any measures might be intended to promote. In many cases, we would expect 
data sharing to be employed as a means of promoting ‘complementary innovation’ and preventing 
foreclosure in adjacent markets rather than having the more ambitious aim of displacing a dominant 
digital platform from the core market from which it derives its data advantages. Sometimes these 
arrangements might allow data intermediaries or data aggregators to help individual users enjoy 
greater benefits from multi-homing. Sometimes they may instead enable innovation and competition 
in adjacent markets that benefit users in general. 
There are some signs that European policymakers are prepared to incentivise more data sharing. 





1 The authors are grateful to Bruno Liebhaberg, Jan Krämer and Thomas Tombal for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
2 Krämer, Schnurr and Broughton Micova (2020). 
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data amongst themselves or with public bodies4. In February 2020, the Commission adopted  ‘A 
European strategy for data’5 which identified, amongst other things, existing barriers to the sharing 
of data between businesses, including: ‘a lack of economic incentives (including the fear of losing a 
competitive edge), lack of trust between economic operators that the data will be used in line with 
contractual agreements, imbalances in negotiating power, the fear of misappropriation of the data 
by third parties, and a lack of legal clarity on who can do what with the data (for example for co-
created data, in particular, IoT data)’6. Many of these issues are directly relevant to the data 
governance arrangements we discuss in this report and the Commission currently intends to address 
many of them by way of a new Data Act in 2021.7  
In addition to facilitating data sharing more broadly, the Commission also engaged in what it 
describes as ‘broader fact-finding around the high degree of market power of certain platforms and 
also in the context of the Commission’s work on the Digital Services Act package. Based on this fact-
finding, the Commission will consider how best to address more systemic issues related to platforms 
and data, including by ex-ante regulation if appropriate, to ensure that markets stay open and fair.’8 
Recent papers produced by the Commission indicate that relevant cases studies will include 
“situations, where the market does not provide for a market based solution and these platforms are 
unwilling to share their data, it may be necessary to require such platform through ex ante regulatory 
measures to offer access to the required data on reasonable, standardized and non-discriminatory 
terms.”9 The Commission is also consulting on proposals to adopt what it refers to as a ‘new 
competition tool’ and/or an ‘ex-ante regulatory instrument of very large online platforms acting as 
gatekeepers’, either or both of which, if adopted, would be likely to support the imposition of 
obligations to share data10. 
This report discusses the practical challenges that would need to be overcome if these or other 
initiatives are to lead to data sharing remedies that ensure digital markets remain contestable. 
1.2 Types of data 
1.2.1 Personal data 
Before considering the many different types of existing data sharing and portability arrangements 
that can be observed in Europe today, it is important to introduce some of the terminologies we 
employ in this report. There are many different types of data but no comprehensive or authoritative 
taxonomy. For our purposes, a distinction should be drawn between what is commonly referred to 
as ‘personal’ data and ‘non-personal’ data. This is important because (as we explain further in section 
3), under the General Data Protection Directive (GDPR), individual users have certain legal claims 





4 In 2018, the Commission published a Staff Working Document ‘Guidance on sharing private sector data in the European data 
economy, SWD(2018) 124 which provided firms with basic guidance on the contractual issues which typically need to be 
addressed, including the scope and nature of the data to be shared, the use to which it can be put, the parties with which it is to 
be shared, how the data is to be protected, the technical means by which access is to be provided, liabilities if data is of poor 
quality or is false, supply is interrupted or data is destroyed or lost. The guidelines encourage (but clearly cannot oblige) European 
firms to adopt standardised APIs in order to facilitate data transfers. In the same year, the Commission adopted a Communication, 
‘Towards a common European data space’ (COM(2018) 232), in which, amongst other things, it proposed that ‘Support Centre 
for data sharing under the Connecting Europe Facility programme will put in place a set of measures to make it easier to share 
private sector data in addition to public sector data4. It offers know-how and assistance on data sharing by providing best practice 
examples and information on APIs, existing model contracts and other legal and technical aspects’4. The Commission also 
proposed to promote the adoption of common APIs.  
5 Communication from the Commission of 19 February 2020, A European strategy for data, COM(2020) 66. 
6 Ibid p.8 
7 In July 2020, the Commission services consulted on proposals for a regulation governing ‘Common European Data Spaces’, Ares 
(2020)3480073. 
8 Ibid p.14 
9 European Commission, Inception Impact Assessment for Digital Services Act Package: ex ante regulatory instrument 
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defined as ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person’11. This could 
encompass a very wide range of data in the context of a digital platform. It is therefore common to 
sub-divide such personal data into at least four categories (an approach which has been employed 
by, amongst others, the OECD, European data protection authorities, and advisers to the 
Commission12).  
First, there is ‘provided’ data, which is data about an identifiable user that has been provided to 
the platform by the user themselves, often (but not always) at the time when they first sign up for 
a particular digital service. Data may also be provided, for example, every time a user posts new 
photos or comments on their social media service. Such data may have considerable value for digital 
platforms but is commonly regarded as having been provided by, and so remaining under, the control 
of the user who provided it. It is replicable in the sense that if a user can supply data to one digital 
platform then they could, in principle, supply the same data to other platforms as well. However, if 
users have provided a lot of data over a long period, or if they use the digital platform itself as a 
means of storing data, it may be more difficult to replicate provided data unless the user can 
themselves download a copy from the platform in question. Accordingly, the GDPR provides users 
with the rights to download data which they have themselves earlier provided to the platform without 
incurring costs by doing so. 
Second, there is ‘observed data’, which is data that is generated through interactions between an 
identifiable user and the platform. We consider this category of data is often the most important 
when it comes to sources of competitive advantage in digital markets since it is by observing the 
responses and actions of individual users that digital platforms are often able to generate predictions 
about how individual users will interact in future or what might best or more closely fulfil their needs. 
A standard example is the observed propensity of individual users to click on links that are served in 
response to search queries. This data will provide a search engine with information both about the 
likely preferences and needs of that individual user, but also with valuable inferences, when combined 
with observed data from other users, about what all users with similar characteristics might want13.  
Importantly, for our purposes, observed data is difficult to replicate since its creation relies upon 
what is likely to be a very large volume of interactions between the individual user and the digital 
platform itself, often undertaken over an extended period. To replicate this data, a user would not 
only have to switch from one digital platform to another but would then have to engage with the new 
provider for an extended period to allow them to generate a similar profile and data set. However if, 
as is often the case, observed data helps to ensure higher quality interactions with the platform, the 
user may find themselves having to forgo these benefits when they switch to a new provider. 
Moreover, a large number of users may need to co-ordinate their switching to a new provider if they 
are collected to benefit from the insights that a digital platform obtains from being able to analyse 
aggregated sets of observed data. 
In one sense, observed data is co-created by the user and the platform since it cannot arise without 
the presence of both parties. The GDPR considers that users should retain similar rights over 
observed data as they do over provided data, including the right to download it at no cost and to 
require that it be transferred to another platform if technically feasible. The platform’s rights over 
observed data will depend upon the consents it has obtained from users and the contractual 





11 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46 (General Data 
Protection Regulation), OJ [2016] L 199/1, Article 4  
12  See Guidelines of 13 April 2017 of Working Party 29 on the right to data portability, WP242 rev.01. Also Cremer et al.(2019) 
and OECD (2019).  
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Third, there is ‘inferred data’, which is data that is derived from the analysis of other data that is 
undertaken by the platform itself. The creation of inferred data does not, therefore, require any 
further interaction with the user even though the inferences may relate to that user. A digital 
platform’s capacity to generate insightful, innovative, or useful inferences from the data that it has 
accumulated may be an important source of competitive differentiation and advantage in markets 
where such insights can be translated into differentiated services. Inferred data that is valuable may, 
therefore, be difficult to replicate and may reflect genuine innovation on the part of the platform that 
holds it. At the same time, it may be sufficient for a rival platform to obtain access to the underlying 
inputs - the provided and/or observed data from which the inferences are drawn - to be able to 
compete effectively. Inferred data is not, therefore, commonly regarded as being under the control 
of the individual user, although a digital platform may still require their consent if such data were to 
be shared. 
Fourth, a digital platform may be able to acquire personal data from a third party rather than 
obtaining it from the user or their interactions with the user. Data of this kind may be acquired to 
complete profiles of users when they have neglected to provide certain personal details, or for other 
purposes. As we note in the next section, such data is likely to be available for sale from a variety of 
specialist data providers and so easily obtained by rival platforms as well. Interventions by public 
authorities are unlikely to be necessary unless a large digital platform were able to acquire 
competitively valuable data on an exclusive basis. We are not aware of this having been a concern 
to date, and so the sharing of acquired personal data is not considered further in this report. 
1.2.2 Non-personal data 
Having discussed four discrete categories of personal data, the same categories can be applied 
for our purposes to non-personal data, being information that does not relate to an identifiable 
individual. Thus, non-personal provided data may be information that was originally provided by an 
identifiable user but which has subsequently been reconfigured, or anonymised, so that the identity 
of the user who provided it is no longer apparent. Similarly, non-personal observed data will have 
been generated by interactions between the platform and identifiable users, but subsequently 
manipulated so that the identities of those users are removed.  
The issue of anonymisation is a highly technical one and has become a subject to some controversy. 
On the one hand, the anonymisation of data may remove privacy concerns and allow data to be 
shared under less onerous conditions, including without the need to obtain consent from individual 
users before doing so. This should facilitate data sharing. Indeed, by its nature, anonymisation 
requires the aggregation of large volumes of data. On the other hand, anonymisation involves the 
extraction of information that may otherwise have significant value. An anonymised set of data that 
is shared is likely to be less competitively valuable than the source data which is retained by the 
digital platform that obtained it directly from individual users. Anonymisation, therefore, facilitates 
the sharing of data in bulk, but with a necessary loss of valuable information in the process. 
Aside from personal data that has been anonymised, non-personal data may of course also refer to 
data that has not been acquired from or is the result of interactions with, any identifiable users. 
Digital platforms may obtain information from a vast range of sources, including their own and third 
party private and public organisations, to support the provision of relevant services to their users. 
Much of this data (such as weather forecasts or traffic or footfall data) is available from third parties, 
easily replicated by all platforms, and not a key focus in this report. We should, however, note that 
concerns have increasingly been raised about the terms of access to data that is increasingly 
generated by sensors and other Internet of Things devices and which is critical to the provision of 
maintenance, diagnostic, and other ancillary services relating to machinery. We discuss in section 3, 
for example, the European regulation which was introduced to enable independent garages to obtain 
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Similar issues have arisen concerning access to and the ownership of data that is generated by 
tractors in the agricultural sector14. 
1.3 Types of data sharing  
It is also important to explain what we mean by the term ‘sharing’ when we employ it in this report. 
Again, there does not appear to be an authoritative taxonomy but we take ‘sharing’ for our purposes 
to involve the provision by a digital platform of access to specified categories of data to third parties 
continuously. This distinguishes ‘data sharing’ from a process that more often involves the one-off 
transfer of a specified set of data from one firm to another, generally at the initiative of the individual 
user15. The distinction is important because provided data is invariably provided only once by a user, 
which means that a one-off transfer of that data to another platform is sufficient to replicate the 
data. However, as noted earlier, observed data is generally accumulated through the interaction 
between a user and the platform over time, with more recent data likely to be more valuable and 
competitively significant than older interactions. If new entrants seek to compete directly with an 
incumbent digital platform, it seems likely that users will seek to multi-home across both platforms, 
at least until the new competitor has established its credentials. That requires an effective data 
access remedy to allow for the continuous transfer of observed data from the incumbent platform to 
the entrants, at least for some time. However, we have also explained that we consider that data 
sharing remedies are often likely to be used to safeguard or promote competition in adjacent markets 
rather than displacing the incumbent platform altogether. In these circumstances, the user will 
continue to interact with the incumbent platform in the upstream market irrespective of whether 
there is an entry in the downstream or adjacent market. The incumbent platform will therefore 
continue to obtain access to observed data and effective competition in the adjacent markets may 
require that such data continues to be shared. 
Although there are many possible forms of data sharing, we follow our CERRE colleagues in 
considering that two are most likely to be relevant when the objective is the promotion of competition 
in digital markets.  
- The first of these involves the sharing of personal data about an individual user to facilitate 
the provision of services in adjacent markets from which they stand to benefit. In this case, 
arrangements will be needed to obtain appropriate consent from the user. We refer to this 
as (continuous) sharing or portability of individual user data.  
- The second involves the sharing, in bulk, of data about aggregate user behaviour or 
preferences to facilitate the provision of matching and other services that require access to 
such data to compete. We refer to this as (bulk) sharing of aggregate user data. A 
different set of arrangements (and different thresholds for intervention) will be appropriate 
in this case.16 
The sharing arrangements should be informed by the type of data sharing that is required to 
effectively remedy the competition concern. We consider how existing European laws, particularly 
those relating to the safeguarding of rights to privacy, might be accommodated within the 
arrangements we envisage and what might need to change for any measures to be fully effective. 
We also identify other aspects of European law which could and should be improved upon. Some of 





14 OECD (2019), p.99 
15 Cremer et al (2019) p.83 
16 A further (but in our view difficult) distinction might be drawn between data that has been acquired as a by-product of use of 
the platform (such as search queries) and data which forms an integral part of the service itself (such as content posted by users 
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unlikely to achieve their competition objectives in Europe unless policymakers are prepared to 
commit seriously to the effort and to overcome some formidable obstacles.  
1.4 Types of interoperability 
Several other studies also introduce distinctions between different forms of ‘interoperability’.17 One 
important case is what the Commission’s advisers describe as ‘full protocol interoperability’, 
which refers to arrangements under which the services of competing platforms will interwork or 
interoperate with each other. A standard example would involve the users of one digital messaging 
service being able to communicate directly with the users of another, rival messaging service without 
them having to subscribe to the other service. Alternatively, users on a particular social messaging 
platform might be able to post photos or comments on the pages of users on another social 
messaging platform (and vice versa). ‘Full protocol interoperability’ might be required as a 
competition remedy in markets exhibiting strong direct network effects, particularly if users single-
home rather than multi-home. In such markets, new entrants may be otherwise unable to persuade 
users to forgo the benefits of network effects by switching away from the incumbent platform. 
There are many interesting issues associated with the imposition of ‘full protocol interoperability’ 
remedies of this kind, but they are not the focus of this report. Our interest is with the sharing of 
data held by digital platforms rather than the interworking of services that they may provide. As we 
explain in more detail in Section 5.2.1, the effective sharing of data between firms continuously is 
likely to require a significant degree of interoperability, likely facilitated by the provision of various 
standardised technical interfaces and the adoption of common standards for data models 
(which reference how data and meta-data are structured and organised so that it can be analysed, 
manipulated and extracted for relevant purposes). There are various ways in which such 
‘interoperability’ might be accomplished, each involving different costs and benefits, and so we 
envisage the development of technical arrangements as being more of a process than an event. Their 
form will be determined to a large degree by prior decisions about the type of data that is to be 
shared and the terms under which this is to be done. We do not, therefore, consider it necessary to 
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2 Incentives to share data 
Data sharing is undertaken for a wide range of purposes, and has been, or could be, implemented 
under a wide range of different arrangements, some of which involve regulation but many of which 
are entirely voluntary. In this section, we review some of the arrangements that exist and consider 
what might be learned from them. In subsequent sections, we discuss existing examples of European 
rules of data sharing. Later we consider the implications of our findings for the rules and governance 
of regulated data sharing to promote competition. 
As we noted in the introduction, data sharing arrangements are likely to emerge when both parties 
to the arrangement derive some benefits from participating18. Economists often remind us that data 
has certain properties that may make it easy to share. Data is non-rivalrous, meaning that the same 
data can be used by different parties for different purposes without the activities of one party 
affecting the opportunities of others. There also appear to be economies of scope in aggregation, 
meaning that data from different sources can be combined to yield insights and benefits which could 
not have been obtained from either of the sources independently19. This is in addition to the 
additional benefits which might be derived from simply increasing the volume of data that is available 
to different parties. It is these unusual properties of data that may provide strong incentives to share 
data for mutual benefit, but which may equally provide incentives for firms and others to deprive 
potential competitors of access to data.   
Sometimes the beneficiaries of data sharing are particular individuals, sometimes they are 
organisations such as firms or public organisations. In the latter case, individuals who obtain services 
or products from firms or citizens who rely on public organisations are also likely to share in the 
benefits which those organisations derive from having access to data, or from sharing it. Nonetheless, 
we think a useful distinction can be drawn between data sharing which benefits a specific individual 
– and which is therefore generally initiated by that same individual – and data sharing which has 
broader benefits and which is generally initiated by an organisation. The data that is accessed at the 
initiative of a user is generally data about that specific user and is generally required to provide 
services for their benefit20. Data that is accessed at the initiative of an organisation may involve data 
that has been acquired from a large number of users and subsequently anonymised or it may be 
non-personal data that has been derived from other sources (including being created by the 
organisation itself). In these cases, the data is required to provide services from which a large 
number of users, rather than any particular user, are likely to benefit21. 
2.1 Incentives of the individual users to share their data 
In Europe (and increasingly in other parts of the world), individual users are considered to have 
certain rights over data that they have themselves provided to organisations, including both firms 
and public bodies. These rights arise from the conviction that citizens and consumers should exercise 
control over data that relates specifically to them (and by which they can be identified), even if they 
have chosen to share it with other parties. Under the GDPR, control involves rights to require the 
deletion of data which has previously been provided or which has been observed or inferred from 
their interactions with the organisation in question, but also rights to require the return of data back 
to the same user (irrespective of whether or not the data is subsequently deleted by organisation 
that held it) in a standardised format and, ‘where technically feasible’, the direct transfer or ‘porting’ 





18 See Martens et al. (2020). 
19 Krämer et al. (2020), Section 2. 
20 Cremer et al (2019:25) 
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(after 2 years) found that the application of the right to port individual user data by users had been 
very limited22. 
We have identified several reasons why an individual user might wish to obtain access to personal 
data and/or to share it:  
- An individual user may require access to the data that has been accumulated by 
the platform about him to better understand what it is (and perhaps subsequently to 
make changes to what data is collected from them in the future). This may be particularly 
important with observed data that is acquired and accumulated every time the user engages 
with a digital platform, such as data about search terms that have been entered or web sites 
that have been visited. Data access may therefore serve to reduce the information 
asymmetries between users and digital platforms and, potentially, ensure that users can 
then alter their privacy settings to ensure that the data disclosed and retained is the 
minimum necessary to meet their requirements. The OECD (2019:43) refers to this 
motivation as ‘informational self-determination’. The early data access arrangements that 
were developed by digital platforms like Google (‘Google Take Out’) and Facebook appear to 
have been primarily intended to serve this purpose, allowing data to be provided to the user 
on request but not, at least easily, to be transferred to another organisation. Evidence of 
user demand for such capabilities is not publicly disclosed by either Google or Facebook (in 
contrast, Google does disclose the demands it receives from Governments and other 
organisations for their users' data23), although Google referred to ‘millions of users’ having 
downloaded their data in 201624. It is reported that user demand for access to data held by 
Facebook increased significantly following the revelations in 2018 that Facebook had shared 
user data from over 50 million accounts with Cambridge Analytica25. 
- An individual user may require access to the data held about her because she 
wishes to share it with another service provider. As noted earlier, this could be done 
either as a single transfer or continuously into the future. The former could be the case if a 
user wishes to switch from one provider to another (in a ‘single homing’ environment) or if 
the data is confined to the provided data. The latter is more likely to be appropriate if a user 
wishes to ‘multi-home’ with several providers simultaneously26 and if the data included 
observed data. In the former case, the individual user is likely to be switching because they 
perceive some benefit for themselves in doing so. It may be possible for them to switch 
without obtaining access to their data from the existing platform, but they may then incur 
costs in terms of time and effort in replicating the data for their new provider. If the data is 
observed data, then it will take a new platform time to accumulate the data (and the insights 
it derives from it), and the service the user receives from the new provider until sufficient 
data is accumulated may be inferior. Some users may not be willing or able to switch without 
access to the data, and so would be deprived of the service altogether. Individual users 





22 ‘The Staff working Document accompanying the Communication (COM (2020) 264) found ‘The right to data portability is not 
used to its full potential. The European Strategy for Data (hereafter Data Strategy), adopted by the Commission on 19 February 
2020, emphasised the need to facilitate all possible uses of this right (e.g. by mandating technical interfaces and machine-
readably formats allowing portability of data in (near-to) real-time). Operators note that there are sometimes difficulties in 
providing the data in a structured, commonly used machine-readable format (due to the lack of standard). Only organisations in 
particular sectors, such as banking, telecommunications, water and heating meters, report having implemented the necessary 
interfaces . New technological tools have been developed to facilitate the exercise by individuals of their rights under the GDPR, 
not limited to data portability (e.g. personal data spaces and personal information management services).’, SWD (2020) 115 
23 https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/overview  
24 House of Lords (2016), para 245 
25 https://www.vox.com/2018/11/20/18105541/facebook-user-data-request-download-delays-high-volume  
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as the GDPR appears to contemplate27. But in practice, the sharing of data on any scale is 
likely to require the user (or its agent) to initiate a direct and continuous transfer of data 
from one platform to another using APIs. There are several examples of initiatives that are 
intended to help individual users share ‘their’ data in this way: 
o Several Government initiatives have sought to facilitate the sharing of data 
between providers of utility, financial or medical services to facilitate 
switching in markets where users tend to single-home. In Europe, initiatives 
such as the UK Government’s Midata project, launched in 2011 or the French 
Mesinfos programme28 have sought to promote data access voluntarily.  More 
successful have been the so-called Green and Blue Button programmes in the United 
States, launched in 2010 and 2012 respectively, which have allowed, in the Green 
Button case, over 60 million households to download information about their energy 
consumption from 150 energy providers (and to facilitate data access for third 
parties) and, in the Blue Button case, 150 million persons to access their medical 
records from 16,00 organisations29.  
o Several private sector initiatives to facilitate the transfer of data. The most 
relevant of these for our purposes is the Data Transfer Project (DTP) in which Google, 
Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, and several other (mainly large) digital platforms are 
currently developing a set of ‘adaptors’ which would enable the transfer of user data 
via the proprietary APIs of each platform from one to another. The DTP was founded 
in 2018 and is still under ‘active development’. One of the challenges is, as the DTP 
notes, the formats for data in different ‘verticals’ (emails, photos, or music each 
represent a different vertical in this context) ‘have emerged organically in a largely 
disconnected ecosystem’30. This means that each organisation may use a different 
proprietary ‘data model’ to organise the data it acquires, as well as proprietary APIs 
which already allow that data to be shared with third party developers. The DTP aims 
to address these issues by developing ‘adaptors’ which allow data to be converted 
from one proprietary model to another and by encouraging the future development 
and adoption of common data models in the future31. It is unclear at this stage when 
the full DTP functionality will be made available to users, nor what it might comprise 
of, although we know Facebook has adopted DTP functionality to enable the sharing 
of photos with Google32.  
- Individual users may require access to data about them because the sharing of that 
data may allow them to benefit from ‘complementary innovation’ in other (data-
dependent) markets. In this case, the user does not seek access to data to substitute one 
service for another of a similar kind but to obtain a new service. This may arise if data from 
a single organisation is shared with one or more third parties, but it may also arise if the 





27 In addition, Article 16 of the Content Services Directive 2019 (2019/770) allows users to request a digital platform to provide 
any non-personal digital content which they created or provided whilst being provided with services upon the termination of the 
relationship with the service provider. However, there is no obligation for the platform in question to facilitate the transfer of this 
data to another provider. 
28 Crtl-Shift (2018), p.30 
29 OECD (2019), p.126, Ctrl-Shift (2018), p.82-3 
30 https://datatransferproject.dev/documentation 
31 See Gal and Rubenfeld (2019). The authors suggest that interim solutions, such as ‘data translators’ which are ‘algorithms, 
which relate the data attributes of one data set to those of another data set, can (partly) solve some of the data integration 
problems outlined above while significantly reducing intervention in the choices of market player’, p.766 
32 Kramer, Senellart and de Streel (2020) report: ‘A number of import or export connectors have been implemented to interface 
with various platforms, but there are very few public-facing sites that do use the DTP (the most prominent being a specific use 
case on Facebook: users have been able very recently to use it to transfer their photos to Google Photos’,p.47. On Facebook’s 
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single third party that is then able to combine or aggregate the data in ways which the donors 
cannot: 
o Some significant complementary innovation initiatives have been 
undertaken in the financial and payment services industry in recent years. 
One of the most advanced of these is the Open Banking initiative in the United 
Kingdom, where a common set of APIs has been developed under the guidance of a 
new regulatory body (the Open Banking Implementation Entity) to allow third-party 
financial service providers to obtain access, at the initiative of the user, to the 
banking data of accounts held by that user.33 The model is intended to allow third 
parties to develop and offer new types of services, such as advisory or 
recommendation services (including price comparison websites) which analyse user 
data to produce recommendations for appropriate services or ways in which users 
may reduce their charges or otherwise improve their financial health, or for third 
parties to themselves transfer funds between different accounts on the users’ behalf. 
The implementation of Open Banking is expected to proceed in stages, with access 
to new types of data becoming available for transfer (e.g. pensions, investments, 
and other accounts) and new and more complex payment functions being enabled 
over time, although some banks have taken the opportunity to supplement data 
which they supply to fulfil regulatory obligations with ‘premium APIs’ which they offer 
on a purely commercial basis34. The Open Banking APIs were launched in 2018 and 
currently has around 2 million monthly users, with the UK Government also looking 
to adopt a similar approach to other sectors under the ‘Smart Data’ initiative35. The 
European Commission adopted the Second Payment Services Directive in 2015, 
which introduces similar provisions to Open Banking for the rest of Europe36. 
Similarly, the Australian Government introduced a ‘Consumer Data Right’ (CDR) 
under which, initially, accredited financial service providers will have access to both 
product data and, with the user’s consent, account data held by authorised deposit 
takers. Regulations for financial services have been introduced and the first transfers 
are expected to be undertaken in late 202037. Standards for APIs are being developed 
by the Data Standards Body, some of which are expected to be applicable for data 
sharing more widely as the Consumer Data Right is extended to other parts of the 
economy in the future. 
o Data access and interoperability provisions have also been adopted at the 
European level to facilitate access to data about household energy 
consumption in smart electricity38 and gas meters39, which are currently being 
deployed in energy networks throughout Europe. The Commission had initially 
expected around 80% of European households to have a smart electricity meter and 
smart gas meter by 2020. A 2019 report estimated that the Member States would 





33 See CMA Final Report of 9 August 2016 on the Retail Banking Investigation and CMA, pp. 441-460 and CMA Order of 2 February 
2017 on the Retail Banking Investigation, Sect. 10 to 14 and the Associated Explanatory Note, paras.28-39. All documents are 
available at: https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/review-of-banking-for-small-and-medium-sized-businesses-smes-in-the-uk. 
34 Fingleton/ODI (2019) propose that the UK Open Banking programme supports the development of standard APIs which banks 
could use to offer ‘premium services’ for which they could charge, p.36. For a current example, see  
35 UK Government, Smart Data: putting consumers in control of their data and enabling innovation’, June 2019 and ‘Next Steps 
for Smart Data’, September 2020 
36 Directive 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal 
market, OJ [2015] L 337/35. 
37 https://www.accc.gov.au/focus-areas/consumer-data-right-cdr-0 
38 Directive 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for 
electricity and amending Directive 2012/27, OJ [2019] L 158/125, Art 23 and 24 
39 Directive 2009/73 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal 
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by that date40. Implementation of smart metering projects has been beset by various 
delays, most of which relate to the development of the accompanying metering 
infrastructure, technical standards, and the willingness of households to adopt the 
technology. The Commission has taken an increasingly prominent role in specifying 
the functional requirements of smart meters, standardised communications 
interfaces, security, and data protection considerations41. The cost benefit analyses 
undertaken by the Member States42 have attached much greater weight to changes 
in household consumption patterns arising from the direct feedback that the meter 
provides, cost savings for suppliers who no longer need to read meters at premises, 
and revenue protection from obtaining accurate readings. There is, so far as we are 
aware, no research to date on either the volume of user data that has been 
transferred to third parties as a result of the implementation of smart meters or its 
impact on innovation or competition in the provision of energy-related services such 
as smart appliances, ‘smart home’ management services or other forms of 
complementary innovation which might be enabled by the sharing of data. It seems 
likely that further action will be required – as evidenced by the UK Government’s and 
energy regulator’s efforts to extend the Midata programme to the energy sector and 
require energy suppliers to provide access to data via standardised APIs43 – if the 
potential for data access to promote competition in the energy sector is to be 
realised. This would include addressing many of the same issues relating to third 
party data access that we identify later in this report. 
- Individual users may seek access to their data in the expectation that they will be 
able to monetise it and generate an income (even if they have not been able to do 
so to date). This is an idea often associated with ‘Personal Data Stores’ (PDS) or Privacy 
Information Management Systems (PIMS) which operate as intermediaries between users 
who control their data and digital platforms and other organisations who derive value from 
being able to access it and who may therefore be willing to pay to do so. The development 
of such organisations, and users’ motivations for initiating a transfer of data to them, has 
been rather mixed to date44. Some PDS providers emphasise that users benefit from 
enhancing security and protection of their data if it is held by them and provided, at the 
users’ request, to other organisations as and when it is appropriate to do so rather than 
being held in a central repository by a large digital platform, which may be vulnerable to 
hacking or may be regarded as having poor data governance or inappropriate incentives. 
Others refer to the convenience that arises from avoiding having to re-enter data to multiple 
platforms, or the same platform on multiple occasions. Users may also benefit from 
arrangements that allow a third party to obtain relevant information to enable the provision 
of services without disclosure of sensitive information. Other providers emphasise the 
opportunity for users to monetise their data by ‘selling’ it back to the platform45. On this 
view, users themselves may be unable or unwilling to engage in market transactions 
involving their data with digital platforms, given information asymmetries (how much is the 
data worth?) and transactions costs (whom to negotiate with or how to obtain payment?), 
but intermediaries can do so on their behalf and earn a commission in the process. The 





40 Tractebel (2019), p.9 
41 Ibid, p.18 
42 Ibid, p. 34/5. This is mainly so for electricity, since many Member States are yet to undertake a CBA for smart gas meters 
43 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (2018) 
44 See, for example, the study by the Judge Business School (2015). This study also hypothesizes benefits for businesses as well 
as users if PDSs allow then to reduce compliance costs and notes that some PDS generate revenues from payments received 
from businesses rather than commissions from users.  
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challenges of any business engaged in a two-sided platform market. Adoption by users to 
date appears to be very low. A study for the European Commission found that the potential 
market for PIMS/PDS services in Europe depends greatly on the proportion of transfers that 
users would be willing to authorise via a PIMS, with the resulting range (between €1 billion 
p.a. and €90 billion p.a.) reflecting a very high level of uncertainty about its prospects.46  
Some observers have concluded that the PIMs market would be unlikely to develop without 
greater Government involvement to coordinate the development of common standards47.   
The evidence we present here shows that some individual users have perceived tangible benefits 
from being able to share data, with the data shared invariably being personal data that requires the 
user themselves to initiate the process. However, whilst there is little or no empirical evidence as to 
the volumes of data that is shared in this way in Europe today, the evidence points to it being very 
low. The downloading of data from digital platforms by individual users appears to be confined to a 
small minority and the monetisation of personal data by individuals remains more of an aspiration 
than a reality, many years after it was first proposed. Some large government initiatives, such as 
the US Green Button programme have been widely adopted by users, but others, such as the Midata 
and European smart meter programme have fallen well short of expectations or been frustrated by 
the organisations that were involved in delivering them. This suggests that barriers to sharing, such 
as concerns about privacy or security which we discuss later, may cause individual users to decline 
to authorise access to data, even when it seems clear they would otherwise stand to benefit from 
doing so48. 
We note that one study for the UK Government concluded that data sharing to facilitate switching 
between service providers did not appear to be particularly attractive for users (which may account 
for what appears to be relatively low levels of use of existing services such as Google Takeout and 
the limited progress of other Government projects to promote switching). The same report concluded 
that data sharing to enable complementary innovation was of much greater interest to users 
(although it seems to us that significant investments in user education would be required for these 
benefits to be properly understood)49. To date, the most promising recent application of data sharing 
appears to be the Open Banking initiative in the UK, although adoption remains at a relatively early 
stage. 
With this in mind, we now consider arrangements for the provision of access to data that do not 
involve users but instead are undertaken for the benefit of and at the request of other organisations.  
2.2 Incentives of firms to share aggregated user data 
Although our focus in this report is with access to data under conditions in which firms are unlikely 
to volunteer to share data with potential competitors, it is important to acknowledge that there are 
many instances in which organisations do share data voluntarily.50 Examples include: 
- Commercial organisations exchange data when there is mutual commercial benefit 
from doing so. The nature of these benefits should not include restrictions on competition 





46 Judge Business School (2015), p. 35 
47 Crtl-Shift(2018), p.7. Judge Business School (2015) came to a similar conclusion, p.24, as do Kramer, Senellart and de Streel 
(2020), p.66-72 
48 We refer to other cases of ‘data philanthropy’ later in this section, but such philanthropy is generally undertaken by 
organisations rather than by individual users 
49 Ctrl-Shift (2018), ‘However, the net benefits from government encouraging mobility as a means of supplier switching (following 
the model of the current account switch service) were assessed in this economic analysis as low. Such an intervention would be 
unlikely to address the fundamental behavioural issues underlying a lack of switching; cognitive limitations prevent consumers 
from recognising the value of switching’. p.43 
50 See de Streel and Tombal (2020), Expert Group for the Observatory on the Online Platform Economy (2020), Everis (2018), 






Data sharing for digital markets contestability: towards a governance framework 
would otherwise be competitors are often subject to review by competition authorities51. 
Sometimes commercial organisations in the same sector share or pool data on a bi- or multi-
lateral basis, without payments flowing between them, as when data is shared for credit 
reference purposes or to detect fraud (e.g. with insurance claims)52. Other examples include 
Nallian, a third-party platform that facilitates the sharing and analysis of data by suppliers 
of air freight services53, and agrirouter, a platform that was intended to facilitate data for 
precision farming in Germany and elsewhere54.   
- Commercial organisations may provide unilateral access to data, generally on a 
restricted basis via APIs, to promote complementary innovation and grow digital 
‘eco-systems’. This strategy has been extensively studied and is commonly pursued by 
digital platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, Google or Apple, all of whom provide 
applications developers with access to data to facilitate innovation which increases the value 
of the platform to users55 and/or which enable the platform to augment their own ‘first party’ 
data with ‘third party data’ which they obtain via these applications56. In such circumstances, 
the data that can be accessed and the terms on which access is offered are determined by 
the platform itself and can vary over time as the platform’s strategy evolves and/or it 
internalises some applications into its own business (often through the acquisition of other 
service developers).  
- Commercial organisations may provide access to data in return for ‘ancillary 
services’. Krämer, Schnurr, and Broughton Micova (2020) also explain how large platforms 
such as Google and Facebook also offer ‘ancillary services’ such identity management 
services (‘Login with Facebook’), payments services, or tracking technology (‘Google 
Analytics’) to other digital services providers. This may be a valuable service for those 
providers and their users, but it also requires the sharing of valuable data (about user 
engagement and purchase history in the wider digital environment) with the large platform 
that provides the service57. 
- Commercial organisations may provide access to data in return for payment. Data 
brokers such as Bloomberg, Oracle, Acxiom, and Nielsen acquire and aggregate huge 
volumes of data from a wide range of sources, some public and some private, and sell data 
sets to other firms for marketing and other purposes, such as the tracing of persons, 
verification of identity or credit checking58. Data may include personal details, tax, and court 
records, as well as records of purchases and other profiling data, including location data, 
which is relevant to those who engage in targeted advertising. Customers will often combine 
and match such data with other data that they have themselves acquired directly from users. 
Brokers generally compete on the accuracy and quality of the data they supply, its scope, 
and price. Data broking markets are expected to be worth over $10 billion by 202259, but 





51 See Lundqvist (2018).  
52 Data pools of this kind might be viewed as horizontal arrangements. The sharing of a users’ debt repayment history amongst 
organisations might not be considered beneficial for the individual concerned (who may be denied further credit as a result) but 
is generally considered by competition authorities to be justified on the grounds that it removes the information asymmetry that 
otherwise exists between a user and potential lender, and prevents other users from unfairly subsidising bad debtors. There are 
also many vertical sharing arrangements as when data is transferred between airlines and suppliers of aero engines in order to 
improve diagnostics, performance management or predictive maintenance, or data is transferred from farmers to suppliers of 
agricultural machinery. A large number of IoT services are expected to involve the sharing of data between those using the 




56 Krämer, Schnurr and Broughton Micova (2020), p.55 
57 Ibid p.70 
58 Federal Trade Commission (2014) 
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platforms that allow firms to trade their data, without the data market itself engaging in the 
acquisition or supply of data60. Such providers often specialise in the type of data that is 
traded, or the types of firms engaged in doing so.  
- Rather than share underlying data, organisations may restrict access to the 
proprietary data they hold by using it to respond to specific queries in return for 
payment. Microsoft provides syndicated search services to third parties such as Yahoo, 
Ecosia, and DuckDuckGo which produce results (and serve adverts) in response to user 
queries which third parties can then re-present61. Telecoms providers such as Telefonica and 
Orange have developed commercial services that use their location and other data to address 
the queries of third parties without sharing the underlying data itself62, as has Uber63. Such 
arrangements may be motivated by the wish to monetise data without ceding the competitive 
advantage to rivals64 (as might occur if access were provided to the underlying data), but 
they might also allow the provider to obtain benefits for its services by realising economies 
of scale from the additional user interactions. Such arrangements might also arise because 
of privacy concerns, including the risk that anonymised data sets might subsequently be 
reconfigured to reveal personal identities. To address this, several firms provide ‘trusted 
intermediary’ or ‘sandbox’ services (a kind of PDS for business) which are intended to allow 
private organisations to monetise their data assets securely and without sharing the 
underlying data65.  
- Commercial organisations may engage in ‘data philanthropy’, where they provide 
access to data, normally to specific charitable or public organisations, to enable them to 
pursue particular social or economic objectives. Mastercard runs such a programme66. A 
significant number of digital platforms and telecommunications operators are providing 
location data to health authorities during the COVID crisis and have previously provided 
aggregated data about population movement and other aspects of user behaviour to 
statistical offices and planning authorities67. 
- Public organisations account for a significant proportion of data sharing 
initiatives68. The OECD estimate that 65% of all data sharing initiatives were undertaken 
by public sector organisations, either to enable sharing with other public organisations or to 
allow sharing with private organisations. Examples include the sharing of geospatial (maps) 
or transport data to enable complementary innovation or spillovers, such as the development 
of new smartphone apps69, but also the sharing of health and other scientific data on a more 
restricted basis (often in research repositories) between public institutions (often across 
borders) in the pursuit of collaborative research70.  In the former case, data is completely 
‘open’, unencumbered by intellectual property or other rights, and available to any person or 





60 An example is the French firm, DAWEX, see https://www.dawex.com/en/ or Whoapi, see https://whoapi.com/ 
61 https://about.ads.microsoft.com/en-gb/resources/training/syndicated-partner-network 
62 OECD p.39 
63 https://movement.uber.com/?lang=en-GB  
64 In the Microsoft case, the syndication revenues are likely to be less significant than the additional search query data which 
Microsoft can then use to improve its search algorithm. 
65 As example of a firm providing such services is Aircloak, see https://aircloak.com/solutions/how-it-works/ 
66 OECD (2019), p.48 
67 On Covid, see European Parliament Briefing (2020).  
68 Although, as the OECD (2019:28) note, the distinction between ‘public data’ and data held by the private sector is not always 
clear-cut. 
69 See, for example, OECD p.66: ‘a major part of the benefits of open data by TfL [Transport for London] were realised thanks to 
the development of apps that used TfL open data to provide real-time traffic information for more accurate navigation systems 
(Table 3.1). More than 80 data feeds were made available for developers through a free unified application programming interface 
(API),15 which ensured accurate real-time data for over 13 000 registered developers and more than 600 apps. This generated 
a gross value added of GBP 12 million to GBP 15 million per year for businesses and led to the direct creation of more than 500 
jobs and more than 230 indirect jobs across the supply chains and the wider London economy’ 
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charge). In the latter case, data may be sensitive and subject to significant access controls. 
The European Union has adopted the Open Data Directive which promotes the sharing and 
re-use of data held by a wide range of public bodies71.  
2.3 Barriers to data sharing and market failures 
Despite the many motivations that organisations have for sharing data and the many benefits that 
have been identified from doing so, a common theme from the literature is that, as with the sharing 
of data for the benefit of specific individuals, the economic and social benefits from sharing large 
volumes of aggregated data remain unrealised relative to its potential, both with the public and with 
the private sector and both in Europe and elsewhere in the world72.   
There seems to be no doubt that, in an increasingly data driven economy, the potential gains from 
sharing data are large. The OECD finds: 
‘Evidence shows that data access and sharing can generate positive social and economic 
benefits for data providers (direct impact), their suppliers and data users (indirect 
impact), and the wider economy (induced impact).…Recently available studies by sector 
(public vs. private sector) further discussed below provide a rough estimate of the 
magnitude of the relative effects of data access and sharing. They suggest that data 
access and sharing can increase the value of data to holders (direct impact), but it can 
help create 10 to 20 times more value for data users (indirect impact), and 20 to 50 
times more value for the wider economy (induced impact). In some cases, however, data 
access and sharing may also reduce the producer surplus of data holders. Overall, these 
studies suggest that data access and sharing can help generate social and economic 
benefits worth between 0.1% and 1.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the case of 
public-sector data, and between 1% and 2.5% of GDP (in few studies up to 4% of GDP) 
when also including private-sector data’73 
The inability of users and organisations to fully realise benefits from data sharing and the barriers 
that exist to their doing so, ought to yield important insights for any policymaker or regulator that is 
proposing to rely upon data access to promote market contestability. Some of these challenges may 
not be specific to data sharing, such as the failure of markets to discover prices at which data can 
be traded efficiently or the presence of externalities which neither party can capture but which 
represent a gain for society. Others may be specific to the activity of sharing data, although the 
degree of risk may also depend on the type of data that is shared and how data is shared. We focus 
primarily on the supply-side barriers to the sharing of data but recognise that there may also be 
demand-side issues which mean that data which is available nonetheless remains underutilised or 
underexploited. Challenges include:74  
- Co-ordination issues, such as the agreement on common standards and 
infrastructure to facilitate the transfer of data between organisations which are 





71 Directive 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the re-use of public 
sector information, OJ [2019] L 172/56. For further details of data sharing initiatives in the public sector see OECD (2019), p.117-
121 
72 Deloitte (2016) observe ‘These are markets that are still in their infancy, i.e. what is known as an ‘emergence phase’. To be  
entirely active in these markets, EU companies need to be intensive data users, but that is the case of only 6.3% according to a 
study for the European Commission. The fact that most companies have not yet engaged with these markets has been borne out 
by the qualitative assessment of the business models of more than 100 European firms as part of this study. Most companies 
have not yet completely integrated these new realities into their business models and approaches. But for the small number of  
companies which are currently proactively engaged in the data economy, there are genuine uncertainties and barriers to them 
moving forward, and which may well be acting as deterrents to companies want to enter the market.’ 
73 OECD (2019) p. 60 
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being used to promote competition) incentives or objectives that are well aligned. 
Recognising this, most researchers agree that some form of ‘co-ordinating entity’ or regulator 
is required to oversee the development and implementation of new data access 
arrangements75. Much of the rest of the report is devoted to the consideration of the issues 
and challenges which such a body will need to address.  
- Organisations that provide third parties with access to their data may expose 
themselves to a variety of legal risks. This is self-evident with data which, under the 
GDPR, is considered to be personal data and for which user consent is required before 
disclosure. As we explain later, legal uncertainty may also arise with other proprietary data 
which may be subject to various contractual safeguards or over which third parties may also 
claim rights. One of the features of data is that its legal status, and the rights of those in 
possession of it, is often unclear, at least in comparison with many tangible assets.  
- Even if an organisation considers that it has legal authority to share data with third 
parties – or is obliged to do so - it may be concerned about reputational risks or 
fines that may arise from the uses to which it is put by others. Risks may arise because 
a third party uses the data in an unanticipated way or in breach of its contract, as appears 
to have been the case when Cambridge Analytica was given access to data acquired by 
Facebook in 2018 for ‘academic research purposes’ but was subsequently found to have been 
using it to support its political consultancy business which was assisting campaigns in the 
United States and, allegedly, other countries76. They may also arise because a third party is 
using the data for legitimate purposes, but is then subject to a security breach or cyberattack 
which results in the unlawful disclosure of data. A third-party may also sell data to another 
party despite contract provisions which may seek to limit their rights to do so. Alternatively, 
a third-party may fail to delete personal data once it no longer has legitimate grounds for 
retaining it. An inevitable consequence of providing third-party access to data is that, unless 
the terms are highly restricted (e.g. to the provision of responses to queries), the data is 
distributed amongst organisations, each of which is potentially vulnerable to security 
breaches or mismanagement of the data. Organisations may use contracts to avoid legal 
liability in such circumstances, but it is difficult to avoid the reputational consequences of 
errors. Facebook’s market value fell by 17% following the revelations about Cambridge 
Analytica.  
Although different organisations are subject to different motivations, most will only share data if they 
perceive the potential benefits of doing so to exceed the kinds of costs and risks outlined above. 
Many studies of the barriers to data sharing have found that the safety and security of data is the 
primary concern for organisations (as well as for individual users)77. In some cases, the result is that 
data is not shared and there is under-provision of access to data in the economy. In other cases, 
organisations will adopt strategies to minimise risks or costs, or to limit them sufficiently to ensure 
that they are exceeded by the benefits of sharing. One means of doing this is to limit or reduce the 
scope of the data to be shared to avoid the legal risks arising from the GDPR or similar legislation 
elsewhere in the world. This is often done by anonymising data so that it can no longer be associated 





75 For example, Furman et al (2019) propose the establishment of a new ‘Digital Markets Unit’ to, amongst other things, oversee 
the implementation of data access arrangements in the UK. An earlier study by Crtl-Shift came to similar conclusions, Ctrl-Shift 
(2018). See also Gal and Rubensten (2019). 
76 Cadawallar, ‘The Cambridge Analytica Files’, The Guardian, available at https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/cambridge-
analytica-files 
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developed to allow for the recreation or recombination of the data to be able to extract the identities 
of individuals and, thereby, greatly enhance its commercial value78.  
Alternatively, as noted earlier, organisations and individual users may retain control of the underlying 
data but offer answers to queries from third parties by interrogating the data on their behalf. Or they 
may use trusted intermediaries, or intermediary infrastructure, to safeguard their data whilst 
obtaining the benefits of sharing it. The PDS discussed earlier offer such a service for individual 
users, whilst ‘sandboxes’ may allow organisations to share data with intermediaries who then 
manage the risks associated with sharing or onward transfer on their behalf. 
In addition to restricting the scope of the data to which access is granted, organisations may limit 
who they are prepared to share the data with. They may be organisations with a common set of 
interests, as in the case of data shared amongst public health institutions or credit reference 
agencies, or they may be organisations that meet other criteria. To meet this need, initiatives such 
as the Industrial Data Space have been developed to provide accreditation and licensing services for 
organisations who wish to share data79. As we discuss below, most of the regulatory initiatives to 
promote data sharing, such as the Open Banking initiative or the Australian Customer Data Right 
initiative, limit access to organisations that have been accredited and whose activities are overseen 
by some form of regulatory body. 
Since the sharing of data, whether at the initiative of users themselves or organisations, remains 
relatively underdeveloped in relation to the potential benefits which we might expect to obtain from 
it, there are many questions which have yet to be resolved. Before turning to those, we discuss the 
various ways in which regulation has been used to promote data sharing in Europe to date - and 
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3 Competition policy and data sharing80 
Competition law imposes data sharing obligation under very specific conditions, either when the 
refusal to give access to the data could be considered as an abuse of dominant position under the 
so-called essential facilities doctrine or as a remedy to a merger between two data-rich firms that 
could significantly impede effective competition. Conversely, competition law may also limit data 
sharing, either when data sharing would amount to an anti-competitive agreement or when data 
siloing is imposed as remedy to a merger between two data-rich firms.  
3.1 Compulsory access under Article 102 TFEU 
3.1.1 Relevant case-law  
Among the main essential facilities cases decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
three are related to data and information. The first case is Magill. In this case, Radio Telefis Eireann 
(RTE) had a statutory monopoly over television broadcasting in Ireland and BBC and IBA a statutory 
duopoly in the UK (thus including Northern Ireland). RTE and BBC owned the copyright in their 
programme listing (thus some data) for their respective channels and ITP the copyright for the 
listings of IBA. Each of them published a weekly guide for their own programmes but none of them 
published a comprehensive weekly guide with the programmes of the three channels for Ireland. 
They refused to give a licence to Magill which was willing to publish such a comprehensive guide. 
Upon complaint, the Commission81 condemned the channels for abuse of dominant position. This was 
confirmed by the General Court.82 On appeal, the Court of Justice confirmed again the Commission 
decision and judged that, although a refusal to grant a licence in respect of an intellectual property 
right cannot in itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position, the ‘exercise of an exclusive right 
by the proprietor may, in exceptional circumstances, involve abusive conduct.’83 The Court of Justice 
identified three conditions for those circumstances: 
- The dominant firms ‘reserve to themselves the secondary market of weekly television guides 
by excluding all competition in that market (…) since they denied access to the basic 
information which is the raw material indispensable for the compilation of such a guide.’;  
- The refusal to provide basic information by relying on national copyright provisions prevented 
the appearance of a new product, a comprehensive weekly guide to television programmes, 
which the channels did not offer and for which there was a potential consumer demand; 
- There was ‘no justification for such refusal either in the activity of television broadcasting or 
in that of publishing television magazines’.84 
The second case is IMS-Health. In this case, IMS-Health collected pharmaceutical sales information 
from wholesalers in Germany, structured them with the so-called 1860 brick structure (linked to the 
German postal codes) developed with pharmaceutical companies and then provided sales reports to 
those pharmaceutical firms. IMS-Health had an intellectual property right on the 1860 brick structure 
and refused to licence it to NDC-Health which wanted to compete on the downstream pharma sales 
reports. Upon complaint by NDC-Health, the Commission had ordered interim measures forcing IMS 





80 This section is partly based on Graef, Tombal and de Streel (2019). 
81 Decision of the Commission of 21 December 1988, Case IV/31.851, Magill TV Guide v. ITP, BBC and RTE. 
82 Case T-69/89 RTE v. Commission, EU:T:1991:39; Case T-76/89 ITP v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:1991:41. 
83 Joint Cases C-241/91P et C-242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications (ITP) v. Commission, 
EU:C:1995:98, para 50. 
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market.85 In the meantime, a litigation took place before a German Court which made a preliminary 
reference to the Court of Justice. 
In its reply, the Court of Justice decided that the refusal to licence an intellectual property right 
constitutes an abuse of a dominant position where the following conditions are fulfilled: 
- ‘the refusal is such as to reserve to the owner of the intellectual property, the right to market 
for the supply of data on sales of pharmaceutical products in the Member State concerned 
by eliminating all competition on that market; 
- the undertaking which requested the licence intends to offer, on the market for the supply 
of the data in question, new products or services not offered by the owner of the intellectual 
property right and for which there is a potential consumer demand; 
- the refusal is not justified by objective considerations.’86 
Moreover, the Court of Justice decided that: ‘the degree of participation by users in the development 
of that structure and the outlay, particularly in terms of cost, on the part of potential users in order 
to purchase studies on regional sales of pharmaceutical products presented on the basis of an 
alternative structure are factors which must be taken into consideration in order to determine 
whether the protected structure is indispensable to the marketing of studies of that kind.’87 
The third case is Microsoft. In this case, Microsoft had a near monopoly on the PC operating system 
market and was providing interoperability information to the producers of workgroup servers.88 
However, when Microsoft decided to enter the workgroup server market, it stopped giving 
interoperability information. Upon complaint of Sun Microsystems, a workgroup server producer, the 
Commission condemned Microsoft and forced it to resume the provision of interoperability 
information.89 On appeal by Microsoft, the General Court confirmed the Commission’s decision and 
summarised the case-law in the following way: 90 
331. It follows from the case-law cited above that the refusal by an undertaking holding a 
dominant position to license a third party to use a product covered by an intellectual property 
right cannot in itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of [Article 
102 TFEU]. It is only in exceptional circumstances that the exercise of the exclusive right by 
the owner of the intellectual property right may give rise to such an abuse. 
332. It also follows from that case-law that the following circumstances, in particular, must 
be considered to be exceptional: 
- in the first place, the refusal relates to a product or service indispensable to the 
exercise of a particular activity on a neighbouring market;  
- in the second place, the refusal is of such a kind as to exclude any effective 
competition on that neighbouring market;  
- in the third place, the refusal prevents the appearance of a new product for which 





85 Case 38 044. 
86 Case C-418/01, IMS Health v. NDC Health, EU:C:2004:257, para 52 with a re-ordering of the conditions. 
87 Para 30 of the Case. 
88 Work group server operating systems are operating systems running on central network computers that provide services to 
office workers around the world in their day-to-day work such as file and printer sharing, security and user identity management. 
89 Decision of the Commission of 24 March 2004, Case 37.792 Microsoft. 
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333. Once it is established that such circumstances are present, the refusal by the holder of 
a dominant position to grant a licence may infringe [Article 102 TFEU] unless the refusal is 
objectively justified. 
334. The Court notes that the circumstance that the refusal prevents the appearance of a 
new product for which there is potential consumer demand is found only in the case-law on 
the exercise of an intellectual property right. 
Thus, in Magill, the Court of Justice validated the compulsory access to programme listings, 
data for which there was a legal barrier (the copyright), and which was a by-product of 
the main activities of the broadcasters. In IMS-Health, the Court of Justice set the 
conditions to impose access to a structure for data which was a de facto industry standard. 
In Microsoft, the General Court validated the compulsory access to interoperability 
information which was also close to de facto industry standard.  
Next to those EU cases, two non-digital national cases, which are very similar, are interesting. In 
both cases, a firm uses a customer list developed when it enjoyed a legal monopoly to 
promote a new service allowing it to compete unfairly through data cross-subsidisation 
which “un-levels” the playing field between the former monopolist and the new entrants. 
The first case was decided by the French competition authority against the previous gas monopolist 
Gaz de France (now Engie) which was using its customers list to promote a new gas service. In an 
interim decision, the authority forced Gaz de France to share the list with its competitors on the gas 
market as such a database was developed under a legal monopoly and was not easily reproducible 
by new entrants.91 In the final decision, the authority imposed a fine of €100m on GDF.92 The second 
case was decided by the Belgian competition authority against the National Lottery which was using 
its customers lists to send a one-off promotional email to launch its new sports betting product.93 
Given its nature and size, the authority concluded that the contact details could not have been 
reproduced by competitors in the market under reasonable financial conditions and within a 
reasonable period of time.94 
In the digital sector, two American cases are also interesting. In both cases, a small firm was 
relying on the data of a bigger digital platform to provide data analytics services and then, 
at some point, was cut off from the access to that data. In the first case, PeopleBrowsr analysed 
Twitter data to sell information about customer reactions to products or about Twitter influencers in 
certain communities. At some point, Twitter decided that its data will not anymore be accessible 
directly, but should be bought from certified data resellers. Following a complaint by PeopleBrowsr, 
a Californian Court ordered, with interim measures, that Twitter hat to continue to provide its data 
directly. Then the parties settled the case deciding that after a transition period, PeopleBrowser will 
get the data from the certified data resellers.95 In the second case, hiQ analysed LinkedIn public 
available data to provide information to businesses about their workforces. At some point, LinkedIn 
limited access to this data by legal and technical means, because it wanted to provide similar services 
itself. Following a complaint by hiQ, a US federal district judge ordered LinkedIn to resume the supply 





91 Decision 14-MC-02 of 9 September 2014 of the French Competition Authority, Direct Energie and UFC Que Choisir v. Engie. 
This decision is based on the opinion that the French competition authority had adopted in 2010: Opinion 10-A-13 of the French 
Competition Authority of 14 June 2010 on cross-use of customers database. 
92 Decision 17-D-06 of 31 March 2017 of the French Competition Authority, Direct Energie and UFC Que Choisir v. Engie. 
93 Decision 2015-P/K-27 of 22 September 2015 of the Belgian Competition Authority, Stanleybet Belgium/Stanley International 
Betting and Sagevas/World Football Association/Samenwerkende Nevenmaatschappij Belgische PMU v.  Nationale Loterij. 
94 Ibidem, par. 69-70. 
95 http://blog.peoplebrowsr.com/2012/11/peoplebrowsr-wins-temporary-restraining-order-compelling-twitter-to-provide-
firehose-access/ and http://blog.peoplebrowsr.com/2013/04/peoplebrowsr-and-twitter-settle-firehose-dispute/ 






Data sharing for digital markets contestability: towards a governance framework 
Lastly, an ongoing case regarding access to financial data is interesting. In October 2017, the 
Commission ran inspections in several banks and bank association in Poland and in the Netherlands 
because it had concerns that those banks may have engaged in anti-competitive practices aimed at 
excluding non-bank owned providers of financial services by preventing them from gaining access to 
bank customers' account data, despite the fact that the respective customers have given their 
consent to such access.97 As we will explain in the next section, there is no sector specific rules which 
imposes the sharing of such financial account data. 
3.1.2 Conditions of essential facilities and application to data 
The three main conditions of the essential facilities doctrine, which is the test to impose access in EU 
competition law, are summarised in the Commission Guidance on the application of Article 102 TFEU 
to exclusionary abuses of dominant position.  
(i) Condition 1: Indispensability of data 
When access to raw data is requested, assessment of the indispensability condition implies an enquiry 
as to whether an alternative raw dataset is available or could be collected by a firm having the same 
size as the data owner (e.g., assessed by market share in the consumer market). This is an empirical 
analysis that should be examined on a case-by-case basis. The wide availability and the non-rivalry 
of data often do not make them indispensable as the Commission has concluded in several past 
merger cases. However, in some cases, data collection may be subject to legal, technical, and 
economic barriers which may make them indispensable. Besides, many collected data are often 
generated by the users themselves98 which may facilitate the finding of indispensability (as decided 
in IMS-Health). Finally, the fact that the requested data have not already been traded, which is very 
often the case in practice, should not be an obstacle to imposing sharing as it suffices that there is 
demand and that such demand can legally and practically be met (as it has also been decided in 
IMS-Health). 
When access is about data structure, the assessment of the indispensability condition implies an 
enquiry as to whether the same information (not necessarily derived from the same raw data sets) 
is available or could be built by a firm having the same size as the data structure owner. Again, this 
is an empirical issue, but data structuring may show important network effects and become a de 
facto industry standard (as it was the case in IMS-Health). 
(ii) Condition 2: Elimination of effective competition in the downstream market 
The assessment of the elimination of downstream competition is very complex in case of data. First, 
the downstream market is not always known, as one of the main features of big data and AI is to 
experiment, crunch a lot of data without knowing in advance what information or knowledge will be 
found and what action might be taken. Therefore, the refusal to share data may lead to the possible 
elimination of a competitor on a not-yet-defined and future market. This requires a more dynamic 
analysis, better in line with market realities, but is more difficult to do and possibly increasing the 
risks of antitrust errors. 
Second, the data owner is often not (yet) active on the downstream market because, as explained 
by Drexl (2017): “a typical feature of the data economy is that data is collected for one purpose but 
may turn out to be interesting for very different purposes pursued by other firms of very different 
sectors.” The evolution of digital industries is quick and uncertain, and many firms are ‘paranoid’ 





97 Commission Press Release of 6 October 2017 MEMO/17/3761; also Borgogno and Colangelo (2020a). 
98 For instance, in the connected cars, most data are generated by the driver: Kerber (2018).  
99 Andy Grove, the iconic founder of Intel, wrote in 1999 a book that he famously titled: Only the paranoid will survive. On 
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is not (yet) a competitor either because it plans to enter in the downstream market (future offensive 
leverage) or because it fears that the data seeker will disrupt its business (defensive leverage). In 
short, given the characteristics of the data economy, refusal to deal while not being active on the 
downstream market may be anti-competitive exclusionary conduct.  
(iii) Condition 3: New product and consumer harm 
The interpretation of this condition is not very clear. As explained above, the EU Courts link this 
condition to the protection of the facility by an intellectual property right but have applied it more 
strictly in some cases than in others. The Commission integrates this condition into a more general 
consumer harm assessment. Taking the Courts’ interpretation, the first issue is thus to determine 
whether the data to which access is required are protected by intellectual property (IP) rights. If 
there is IP protection, the next issue is whether the product that the access seeker aims to bring on 
the downstream market is sufficiently new or, at least improved, compared to the data owner’s 
products. Drexl (2017) is doubtful that this will often be the case as he considers that the generation 
of new information due to data sharing is often not sufficiently innovative to justify the compulsory 
licensing of the intellectual property right. 
However, more fundamentally, the assessment of this condition faces the same two difficulties 
analysed previously for the second condition, i.e., the product to be offered by the access seeker is 
often still unknown and the facility owner is often not (yet) providing a competing product. Therefore, 
the more general consumer harm approach proposed by the Commission is more appropriate to the 
characteristics of the data economy. Thus, the competition authority will have to examine whether, 
for consumers, the likely negative consequences of the refusal to share data outweigh, over time, 
the negative consequences of imposing data sharing. 
(vi) The adaptation of the essential facilities conditions to the characteristics of data and the digital 
economy 
The key issue is to determine whether the benefits of compulsory data sharing outweigh 
its costs.100 The benefits are created by the entry of the data access seeker that may bring more 
competition, innovation, diversity, and choice to the secondary market. The costs are the reduced 
investment incentives for the facility owner and for the potential access seeker and the operation 
costs of the antitrust enforcers and the dominant firms that have to implement the access obligations. 
Those benefits and costs largely depend on the characteristics of data. The benefits of data sharing 
may be higher than for other (single-purpose) inputs because data are general-purpose and may be 
used and re-used in several contexts to build different information and knowledge.101 Conversely, 
the costs of data sharing on investment incentives may be lower than for other (rival) inputs because 
data are non-rivalrous and the data owner may keep them while sharing them, hence its incentives 
to collect, structure or analyse them remain unchanged. Such incentive costs may even be zero when 
the data were obtained as a by-product of another activity done independently of the data collection, 
as was the case in Magill. 102 In this hypothesis, the value of the data amounts to a windfall gain for 
its owner. The incentive costs will also be reduced when the data were constituted under the 
protection of a legal monopoly as in Gaz de France or in the Belgian National Lottery.103 
The cost and benefit analysis also depends on the competitive dynamics in the data economy. Data 





100 Kerber (2018). 
101 Also Abrahamson (2014:879); Meadows (2015). 
102 Graef (2016), Prufer and Schottmuller (2017), Rubinfeld and Gal (2017:377); Schweitzer et al. (2018). 
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indirect network effects on the demand side.104 This leads the markets to tip more often than in other 
sectors of the economy, which implies that competition enforcement should focus on preserving the 
contestability of those markets for which data sharing may be key. Data markets also show rapid 
and uncertain innovation often after extensive experimentation. This requires a better understanding 
of the firms’ strategies that may, for instance, terminate data sharing to free ride on the 
experimentation costs or refuse to share data to alleviate the risks of future disruption. 
Therefore, applying the same cost-benefit analysis which is at the core of the antitrust case-
law of duty to deal in light of the different characteristics of data and the competitive 
strategies and dynamics of the data economy, leads us to suggest that the threshold for 
imposing data sharing under Article 102 TFEU should be lower than the threshold to 
impose access to other products.105 However, a lower threshold does not mean no threshold, as 
the freedom to contract and the right of propriety still need to be protected in the data economy. As 
in the other sectors of the economy, the antitrust agency should convincingly demonstrate that the 
benefits of sharing data outweigh its costs.   
If the benefits outweigh the costs of data sharing, and if exceptional circumstances thus justify the 
imposition of data sharing, the competition authorities should then determine the quantitative and 
qualitative conditions for such access. The Microsoft Compliance case confirmed that a 
competition authority should not impose a specific price but may rely on more open terms provided 
they are sufficiently precise for the data owner to determine with enough legal certainty the price to 
charge. Thus, as suggested by Rubinfeld and Gal (2017), the authority may require that data should 
be shared on FRAND terms. It would then be up to the data owner to propose a price that complies 
with this obligation, applying the basic principles proposed in the Commission SEP Communication. 
In case of disagreement between parties, the framework for good faith negotiation provided in 
Huawei could be imposed.106 Moreover, the Support Centre for data sharing to be set up by the 
Commission could facilitate those negotiations as this Centre should focus on the ways and means 
by which data are exchanged and provide support to make the exchanges easier, in particular by 
developing model contract terms for B2B data sharing.107 
3.2 Compulsory access under Merger Regulation 
The European Commission has analysed competition concerns relating to the combination of data 
several times in merger decisions. So far, the Commission has not yet blocked a merger on the 
ground that the combination of data would give rise to competition concerns.  
In its 2007 Google/DoubleClick merger decision, the Commission argued that the combination of 
Google’s data on users’ search behaviour with DoubleClick’s data on web-browsing behaviour of 
users would not give the merged entity a competitive advantage that could not be matched by 
competitors.108 According to the Commission, such a combination of information was already 
available to several Google’s competitors, including Microsoft and Yahoo which both ran search 
engines and offered ad serving at that time as well. Besides, the Commission argued that competitors 
could purchase data or targeting services from third parties including portals, other major web 





104 As explained in Bourreau and de Streel (2019), such characteristics of the data markets amplify the pro and anti-competitive 
effects of firms’ behaviours such as refusal to share. 
105 Also calling for lower threshold, Abrahamson (2014), Kerber (2018:328), Meadows (2015); Schweitzer et al. (2018). OECD 
(2015) goes also in the same direction. 
106 Case C-170/13, Huawei v. ZTE, EU:C:2015:477. 
107 Commission Staff Working Document of 25 April 2018, Guidance on sharing private sector data in the European data economy, 
SWD(2018) 125, p.6. 
108 Case COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, par. 366. 
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In 2008, the Commission analysed the Thomson/Reuters merger110 and had concerns that such 
merger would reduce significantly the competition in the markets for the distribution of aftermarket 
broker research reports, of earning estimates, of fundamental financial data of enterprises and of 
time series of economic data. To remove those concerns, the merging parties committed to divest 
copies of the databases containing the content sets of such financial information products, together 
with relevant assets, personnel and customer base as appropriate to allow purchasers of the 
databases and assets to quickly establish themselves as a credible competitive force in the 
marketplace in competition with the merged entity, re-establishing the pre-merger rivalry in the 
respective fields. The parties could also continue to use these databases in the future to 
commercialise the respective data to their own customers. With those data sharing remedies, 
customers of such financial information products therefore would continue to have sufficient 
alternatives post-merger. 
In 2014, the Commission analysed data-related competition concerns in Facebook/WhatsApp. 
According to the Commission, the acquisition of WhatsApp would not increase the amount of data 
potentially available to Facebook for advertising purposes because WhatsApp did not collect data 
valuable for advertising purposes at the time of the merger.111 The Commission also investigated 
possible theories of harm relating to data concentration to the extent that it might strengthen 
Facebook’s position in the market for online advertising. In that regard, the Commission argued that 
the merger would not raise competition concerns even if Facebook would introduce targeted 
advertising on WhatsApp or start collecting data from WhatsApp users to improve the accuracy of 
the targeted ads served on Facebook’s social networking platform.112 In the Commission’s view, 
there would continue to be a sufficient number of alternative providers to Facebook for the supply of 
targeted advertising after the merger, and a large amount of internet user data that are valuable for 
advertising purposes were not within Facebook’s exclusive control. In particular, the Commission 
considered Google, Apple, Amazon, eBay, Microsoft, AOL, Yahoo!, Twitter, IAC, LinkedIn, Adobe, and 
Yelp as market participants that collect user data alongside Facebook.113  
Whereas the Commission in Facebook/WhatsApp did not define a possible market for data or data 
analytics services on the ground that “neither of the Parties is currently active in any such potential 
markets”,114 an evolution is visible in Microsoft/LinkedIn. Under the assumption that such data 
combination is allowed under the applicable data protection legislation, the Commission distinguished 
two main ways in which the Microsoft/LinkedIn merger could raise competition concerns as a result 
of the combination of data. First, the Commission acknowledged that the combination of two datasets 
as a result of a merger may “increase the merged entity’s market power in a hypothetical market for 
the supply of this data or increase barriers to entry/expansion in the market for actual or potential 
competitors, which may need this data to operate on this market”. Second, the Commission made 
clear that, even if there is no intention or technical possibility to combine the two datasets, “it may 
be that pre-merger the two companies were competing with each other based on the data they 





110 Commission Decision of 19 February 2008, Case M.4726 Thomson/Reuters. 
111 Case COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014, par. 166. 
112 In May 2017, the Commission imposed a 110 million euro fine on Facebook for providing misleading information during the 
merger investigation. While Facebook had informed the Commission that it would be unable to establish reliable automated 
matching between Facebook users’ accounts and WhatsApp users’ accounts, WhatsApp announced updates to its terms of service 
in August 2016 including the possibility of linking WhatsApp users’ phone numbers with Facebook users’ identities. However, the 
fact that misleading information was given did not impact the 2014 authorisation of the transaction as the decision was based on 
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assuming user matching as a possibility (Press release European Commission, ‘Mergers: Commission fines Facebook €110 million 
for providing misleading information about WhatsApp takeover’, 18 May 2017, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-1369_en.htm). 
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114 Ibidem, par. 72. 
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Despite this evolution in approach, the Commission nevertheless came to the same conclusion in 
Microsoft/LinkedIn as in Google/DoubleClick and Facebook/WhatsApp, namely that the combination 
of data-enabled did not raise serious doubts as to the merger’s compatibility with the internal market 
concerning online advertising.116 The Commission specified three grounds for this. First, Microsoft 
and LinkedIn did not make available their data to third parties for advertising purposes, with only 
very limited exceptions. Second, the combination of their respective datasets did not appear to result 
in raising the barriers to entry/expansion for other players in this space, as there would continue to 
be a large amount of internet user data that were valuable for advertising purposes and that were 
not within Microsoft’s exclusive control. Third, the merging parties were small market players and 
competed with each other only to a very limited extent in online advertising and its possible 
segments.117  
In its 2018 Apple/Shazam merger decision, the Commission again concluded that the combination 
of the datasets of the two companies would not give rise to competition concerns. This time the focus 
was not on online advertising but on digital music streaming apps where Apple is active with its Apple 
Music service and Shazam offers a leading music recognition application. According to the 
Commission, it would be unlikely that the merged entity would have the ability to foreclose competing 
providers of digital music streaming apps even if Shazam’s data would be integrated into Apple’s 
dataset. Shazam’s data, in the Commission’s view, does not seem to be an important input to 
improve existing functionalities or offer additional functionalities within digital music streaming apps 
and does not appear to be unique based on a comparison with other alternative datasets in relation 
to the metrics associated with the Four V’s of big data, namely the variety of data, the speed at 
which the data is collected (velocity), the size of the dataset (volume), and its economic relevance 
(value).118 
In the ongoing Google/Fitbit case, the Commission opened a Phase II investigation as the merger 
may entrench Google's market position in the online advertising markets by increasing the amount 
of data that Google could use for ads personalisation.119 During the first phase of the investigation, 
Google submitted commitments consisting in the creation of a data silo - which is a virtual storage 
of data - where certain data collected through wearable devices would have been kept separate from 
the other datasets within Google. Hence, the data in the silo would have been restricted from usage 
for Google's advertising purposes. However, the Commission considered that the data silo 
commitment was insufficient as it did not cover all the data that Google would access as a result of 
the merger and would be valuable for advertising purposes. This case is interesting as it shows that 
the Commission may prefer data siloing over data sharing to remedy some competition concerns 
when two data-rich are merging. 
3.3 Limits of data sharing by Article 101 TFEU 
If competition law may impose data sharing to remedy an abuse of dominant position or a merger 
between two data rich firms, competition law may also limit the sharing of commercially sensitive 
information among competitors. Article 101(1) TFEU can limit data sharing in situations where the 





116 The Commission reached the same conclusion in Verizon/Yahoo, see Case M.8180 – Verizon/Yahoo, 21 December 2016, par. 
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competition cannot be justified under Article 101(3) TFEU by showing that the procompetitive effects 
outweigh the anticompetitive effects. 
In Asnef-Equifax, the Court of Justice was asked to assess the compatibility with Article 101 TFEU 
of a register set up by financial institutions in Spain involving the exchange of solvency and credit 
information about their customers to evaluate the risks of engaging in lending and credit activities. 
The Court argued that in order not to restrict competition under Article 101 TFEU: (i) the relevant 
market at stake should not be highly concentrated; (ii) the register should not be capable of revealing 
the identity of the lenders, as this could help to identify the market position or commercial strategy 
of competitors; and (iii) the register should be accessible in a non-discriminatory manner to all 
operators active in the relevant sphere so that some operators are not put at a disadvantage if they 
do not have access to information needed for risk assessment.120 These three conditions could also 
be applied to assess data pooling arrangements where information about individual customers is 
shared among market players. 
The Commission Horizontal Agreements Guidelines pay attention to how certain factors can make 
the exchange of information among competitors more problematic, including the strategic nature of 
the information, the market coverage of the firms involved, the individualised or aggregated nature 
of the company information exchanged, the age of the data, the frequency of the information 
exchange, the public or non-public nature of the information, and whether the exchange of 
information is public or non-public.121  
Most illustrative is the investigation the Commission opened in May 2019 into the data pooling system 
of Insurance Ireland, which is an association bringing together companies active in the insurance 
sector in Ireland. As part of its activities, Insurance Ireland administers a database to which member 
companies contribute insurance claims data on an ongoing basis. According to the Commission’s 
press release, the objective of the system is “to facilitate the detection of potentially fraudulent 
behaviour by insurance claimants and to ensure the accuracy of information provided by potential 
customers to insurance companies and/or their agents”.122 While the Commission acknowledges that 
such a data pooling system may benefit consumers by ensuring more suitable products and 
competitive prices, it is concerned in particular about whether the conditions of access to the system 
of Insurance Ireland restrict competition and thereby reduces Irish drivers’ choice of insurance 
policies.123 
Apart from listing the factual circumstances of the case, the press release also provides a more 
general background as to the Commission’s current thinking about data pooling. The Commission 
states that data pooling arrangements are often pro-competitive: (i) they directly benefit consumers 
by enabling effective competition on the market, as service providers may be able to offer better 
prices and services to consumers by accessing and participating in a data pool; and (ii) access to 
data in a data pool may enable effective market entry, resulting into the improved choice of services 
and suppliers to the benefit of consumers. However, the Commission also points out that data pooling 
arrangements may in some situations lead to restrictions of competition, for instance when: (i) the 
conditions of access to and participation in a data pool result in placing certain market players at a 
competitive disadvantage; or (ii) the data pooling system enables market players to become aware 
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121 Commission Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal 
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Beyond restrictions on access to the pool on which the investigation of the Commission against 
Insurance Ireland focuses, another question is when the existence of data pooling arrangements in 
themselves can breach Article 101 TFEU through the exchange of commercially sensitive information 
among competitors. In this regard, Lundqvist (2018) makes a distinction between three situations. 
Whereas the exchange of technical information for the development of new products or 
interoperability among existing products through a data pool seems largely unproblematic, data 
pooling arrangements where parties share strategic and competitive information regarding prices or 
innovations have to be considered as potentially breaching Article 101 TFEU. Within those two 
extremes lie data pools in which not directly commercially sensitive information is shared but where 
information is exchanged about a large number of customers in a way that may ultimately enable a 
member to the pool to extract competitive insights based on data analytics. In its ongoing revision 
of the Horizontal Guidelines, the Commission is expected to clarify how these existing indicators have 
to be applied to assess the more complicated data pooling arrangements where possible 
anticompetitive effects are less pronounced than in previous cases.  
Cremer et al. (2019) made interesting suggestions as to how the assessment of R&D agreements or 
patent pools could inspire the competition analysis of data pooling. As regards the pooling of inferred 
data, the limits set on coordination in the context of R&D agreements are argued to be relevant 
because the sharing of inferred data may decrease incentives to engage in independent data 
processing and thus reduce competition in the field of data analytics. Concerning possible analogies 
with patent pooling, the point is made that it is much more difficult for data, especially observed 
data, as compared to patents to be categorised as either substitutable/non-substitutable or 
essential/non-essential. Interestingly, reference is also made to mandated access as a remedy to 
prevent data pools with market power from restricting competition. This would mean that data needs 
to be shared with third parties, for instance under FRAND terms. According to the experts, such a 
duty to give others access to the pool should be proportional to the pool’s market power: “a group 
of smaller players pooling their data to gain a competitive advantage should not be forced to give 
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4 Horizontal and sectoral EU laws for data sharing126 
Next to competition law which may impose or limit data sharing under specific circumstances, other 
EU laws complement antitrust rules and impose further data sharing obligation which go beyond 
what is imposed under antitrust law or limit data sharing is a more restrictive manner than what is 
prohibited under antitrust law.127 
4.1 Existing legislations enabling data sharing 
The EU legal framework contains several rules imposing or encouraging the portability and the 
sharing of data.128 The rules imposing data portability tend to be general and apply to all sectors of 
the economy. They are mainly composed of: (i) for persona data, the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR)129 and (ii) for non-personal data, the Digital Content Directive (DCD)130 applicable 
in a B2C relationship and the Free Flow of Data Regulation (FFDR)131 applicable in a B2B relationship. 
The rules imposing data sharing are general for public data and imposed by the Open Data Directive 
(ODD).132 For private data, data sharing rules tend to be sector-specific and are mainly composed of 
the Second Payment Service Directive (PSD2) imposing access to payment account data;133 the new 
Motor Vehicle Regulation imposing access to some vehicle data;134 the new Electricity Directive 
imposing access to some customers data;135 the European Electronic Communications Code (EECC) 
for access to directory data;136 the Postal Services Directive for access to postal address.137 
Table 1: EU legal framework for data portability and sharing 
 Personal data 
 
Non-personal data 
Data portability - GDPR (2016) 
 
- DCD (2019) in B2C 




- Public data: ODD (2019) 
- Financial: PSD2 (2015) and UK Open Banking (2016) 
- Automotive: Motor Vehicle Regulation (MVR) (2018) 
- Energy: Electricity Directive (2019)  
- Electronic Communications: EECC (2018) 






126 This section is partly based on Graef, Tombal and de Streel (2019) and Kramer, Senellart and de Streel (2020). 
127 See also Costa-Cabral and Lynskey (2017). 
128 See Support Centre for Data Sharing (2020). 
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regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46 (General Data 
Protection Regulation), OJ [2016] L 199/1. 
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the supply of digital content and digital services, OJ [2019] L 136/1. 
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4.1.1 EU rules on data portability 
4.1.1.1 GDPR 
Data portability aims to strengthen the data subject empowerment, i.e. the power of control that the 
data subjects have on their data and to re-balance the relationship between data subjects and data 
controllers.138 To do that, two specific rights are given to the data subjects: 
- First, the data subject has the right to receive the personal data concerning him which he 
has provided to a controller (the data giver) and to transmit those data to another controller 
(the data seeker) in a B2C2B relationship (art. 20(1) GDPR). For instance, a data subject can 
receive his current playlist from a music streaming service to find out how many times he 
listened to specific tracks or to check which music he wants to purchase and to port it to 
another platform to listen to music from there.139  
- Second, a data subject has also the right to have his data transmitted directly from one 
controller to another in a more direct B2B relationship (art. 20(2) GDPR). In essence, this 
means that a data seeker can import data directly from the data giver with the consent of 
the data subject. 
The first portability right (B2C2B) is the strongest as it should be exercised without hindrance from 
the data giver. According to the European Data Protection Board (EDBP), such hindrance could be 
‘fees asked for delivering data, lack of interoperability or access to a data format or API or the 
provided format, excessive delay or complexity to retrieve the full dataset, deliberate obfuscation of 
the dataset, or specific and undue or excessive sectorial standardization or accreditation demands’.140 
The second portability right (B2B) is weaker as it can only be exercised when technically feasible, 
which is assessed on a case-by-case basis. Those two (new) portability rights complement and go 
further than the (old) data access right given by Article 15(3) of the GDPR. 
The scope of the portability right is limited to certain categories of personal data. The GDPR 
mentioned the data provided by the data subject. In its interpretative Guidelines, the EDPB 
mentions three categories of data:141 
- The data actively and knowingly provided by the data subject such as name, age, an email 
address; 
- The observed data provided by the data subject by virtue of the use of the service or the 
device, such as search history, traffic and localisation data, the heartbeat tracked by a 
wearable device; 
- The inferred data and derived data created by the data controller based on the data provided 
by the data subject such as the outcome of an assessment regarding the health of a user or 
the profile created in the context of risk management and financial regulations to assign a 
credit score. 
The EDPB notes that the portability right should be interpreted broadly and covered the first two 
categories, i.e. the data that have been actively provided by the data subject but also the observed 
data, and only the third category (the inferred data) should not be covered. However, it remains to 
be seen whether the EU judges will follow such a broad interpretation. 
The scope of the portability right is also limited by the type of processing and covers only personal 





138 Guidelines of 13 April 2017 of Working Party 29 on the right to data portability, WP242 rev.01, p. 4. 
139 Ibid., p. 5. 
140 Guidelines of 13 April 2017 of Working Party 29 on the right to data portability, p.15. 
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portability as it does not apply to processing operations necessary for the performance of a task in 
the public interest vested in the controller, nor to processing operations necessary for the compliance 
with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject. For instance, a financial institution has no 
obligation to respond to a portability request relating to personal data that has been collected in the 
context of compliance with its legal obligation to fight money laundering.142 
Finally, the right to data portability only applies if the data processing is carried out by 
automated means, and therefore does not cover most paper files. 
Article 20 of the GDPR imposes that the data have to be provided in a structured, commonly used, 
and machine-readable format.143 Recital 68 of the GDPR clarifies further that data controllers are 
encouraged to develop interoperable formats that enable data portability. According to the EDBP, 
“the terms structured, commonly used, and machine-readable are a set of minimal requirements 
that should facilitate the interoperability of the data format provided by the data controller. In that 
ways, ‘structured, commonly used and machine-readable’ are specifications for the means, whereas 
interoperability is the desired outcome”. However, such interoperability goals should not go as far as 
imposing technical compatibility, as it is clarified by Recital 68 of the GDPR. 
According to the EDPB, ‘the most appropriate format will differ across sectors and adequate formats 
may already exist, and should always be chosen to achieve the purpose of being interpretable and 
affording the data subject with a large degree of data portability. As such, formats that are subject 
to costly licensing constraints would not be considered an adequate approach’ and ‘where no formats 
are in common use for a given industry or given context, data controllers should provide personal 
data using commonly used open formats (e.g. XML, JSON, CSV,…) along with useful metadata at the 
best possible level of granularity while maintaining a high level of abstraction ‘144  
The EDBP also encourages cooperation between industry stakeholders and trade associations to work 
together on a common set of interoperable standards and formats to deliver the requirements of the 
right to data portability as is done by the European Interoperability Framework (EIF)145 which creates 
an agreed approach to interoperability for organizations that wish to jointly deliver public services.146 
Article 12(3) of the GDPR requires that the data giver provides information on action taken to the 
data subject without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt of the request. 
This one month can be extended to a maximum of three months for complex cases if the data subject 
has been informed about the reasons for such delay within one month of the original request. 
Article 12(5) of the GDPR provides that data should be ported free of charge, unless the data 
controller can demonstrate that the requests are manifestly unfounded or excessive, in particular, 
because of their repetitive character. In this case, the controller may either charge a reasonable fee 
taking into account the administrative costs of porting the data, or refuse to port the data. The EDPB 
notes that: ‘for information society services that specialise in automated processing of personal data, 
implementing automated systems such as Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) can facilitate 
the exchanges with the data subject, hence lessen the potential burden resulting from repetitive 
requests. Therefore, there should be very few cases where the data controller would be able to justify 





142 Ibidem, p. 8. 
143 Machine-readable format is not defined in the GDPR but is defined in the Open Data Directive as ‘a file format structured so 
that software applications can easily identify, recognise and extract specific data, including individual statements of fact, and 
their internal structure’: art.2(13) of the Directive 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on 
open data and the re-use of public sector information, OJ [2019] L 172/56. 
144 Guidelines of 13 April 2017 of Working Party 29 on the right to data portability, p.17-18. 
145 https://ec.europa.eu/isa2/eif_en 
146 Guidelines of 13 April 2017 of Working Party 29 on the right to data portability, p.18. 
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The EDBP also specifies that ‘the overall system implementation costs should neither be charged to 
the data subjects, nor be used to justify a refusal to answer portability requests’.  
4.1.1.2 Digital Content Directive 
Like personal data protection law, consumer law also enables data portability, notably through Article 
16 of the Digital Content Directive (DCD) of May 2019. The Directive applies to all suppliers of digital 
content or services (i.e., virtually any firm in the digital economy that collects data) when dealing 
with a consumer (i.e., any natural person who is acting for purposes which are outside that person's 
trade, business, craft, or profession).148 The DCD grants a form of portability right for the non-
personal data provided or created by the consumer. However, this right for consumers does 
not apply in several situations when the content is of little practical use to the consumer, who 
therefore has a limited interest in the portability of such data, particularly since requiring such a 
mechanism is costly for the trader.149 
The DCD is only an indirect enabler of data sharing as it solely provides the consumer with a right to 
retrieve some of its non-personal data. It does not allow the direct transmission of data between two 
traders. Nevertheless, the underlying idea of the DCD is to allow the consumers to retrieve their data 
to then share this data with other traders. This new right ensure that consumers can easily switch 
content providers, by reducing legal, technical, and practical obstacles, such as the inability to 
recover all the data that the consumer has produced or generated through his use of digital 
content.150 
Unlike the GDPR, the DCD provides that, when the consumer terminates the contract, the trader 
must refrain from using the non-personal data provided or created by the consumer.151 The fate of 
the data held by the original controller/trader, therefore, differs in the two regimes, as the GDPR 
does not prevent the original controller from continuing to use the ported data, while the DCD 
provides that the trader must refrain from using the data in the future unless it has been generated 
jointly by the consumer and others, and other consumers can continue to make use of the content.152 
This difference can be explained by the fact that data can be ported at any time under the GDPR, 
while data portability is only made possible after the termination of the contract by the consumer in 
the DCD. 
While the GDPR applies to personal data that has been provided by or observed on the data subject, 
the DCD applies to any content other than personal data, which was provided or created by 
the consumer when using the digital content or digital service supplied by the trader. The scope of 
application of the DCD is thus complementary to that of the GDPR.153 This is welcome as the 
distinction between personal and non-personal data might be difficult to draw in practice. Indeed, 
given the GDPR's broad definition of personal data and the technological progress in big data and AI 
for identification, the vast majority of the data provided or created by the consumer are likely to be 
considered as personal data. In any case, it should be underlined that the “inferred and derived” 
personal data, which are not considered as data “provided” by the data subject, are neither covered 





148 Art.2(6) DCD.  
149 Recital 71 of the DCD. 
150 Recital 70 of the DCD. 
151 Article 16(3) of the DCD. The only exceptions are if the data has no use outside the context of the content or service; if the 
data only relates to the consumer's activity when using the content or service; if the data has been aggregated with other data 
by the trader and cannot be disaggregated or can only be disaggregated with disproportionate effort; or if the data has been 
generated jointly by the consumer and other persons who continue to use them (Article 16(3) of the DCD). 
152 Article 16(3d) of the DCD. 
153 This is explicitly stated in art. 16(2) of the DCD, which provides that the trader remains bound by the obligations of the GDPR, 
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Using a similar language than the GDPR, the DCD provides that the data must be returned to the 
consumer in a commonly used and machine-readable format. Regarding the deadline to reply 
to the request, the DCD only provides that the data should be given to the consumer within a 
reasonable time after the termination of the contract. While the DCD does not provide any further 
information as to how these terms must be interpreted, the deadline of one month provided for in 
the GDPR could arguably be used to assess this reasonable character. Finally, similar to the GDPR, 
the DCD provides that the consumer shall be entitled to retrieve the data free of charge.154 
4.1.1.3 Free Flow of Data Regulation 
The Free-Flow of Data Regulation (FFDR) of November 2018 applies for the porting of non-personal 
data in B2B relationships. The Regulation instructs the Commission to contribute to the development 
of EU Codes of conduct to facilitate the porting of (non-personal) data in a structured, 
commonly used, and machine-readable format including open standard formats. 
On that basis, SWIPO (Switching cloud service providers and Porting Data), which is one of the Digital 
Single Market (DSM) Cloud Stakeholders Working Groups gathering more than 100 stakeholders, 
adopted in November 2019 two drafts Code of conduct: one on the Infrastructure as a Service 
(IaaS) market, and another on the Software as a Service (SaaS) market.155.  
Those codes of conduct will be assessed by the Commission by the end of 2022.156 In particular, the 
Commission will focus on: “(i) the impact on the free flow of data in Europe; (ii) the application of 
the Free Flow of Data Regulation, especially to mixed datasets; (iii) the extent to which the Member 
States have effectively repealed existing unjustified data localisation restrictions; and (iv) the market 
effectiveness of codes of conduct in the area of porting of data and switching between cloud service 
providers.”157 
The Commission also expects that the codes of conduct will be complemented by model contractual 
clauses allowing “sufficient technical and legal specificity in the practical implementation and 
application of the codes of conduct, which will be of particular importance for SMEs.158 
4.1.2 EU rules on data sharing 
4.1.2.1 Public data: Open Data Directive 
The Open Data Directive (ODD) of June 2019 imposes extensive data sharing obligations to public 
sector bodies and public undertakings and provides the most comprehensive data governance 
framework in EU law. The Directive imposes to Public sector bodies159 and public undertakings 
the obligation to share their documents160 for re-use for commercial or non-commercial 
purposes.161 
Documents should be available in any pre-existing format and, where possible and 
appropriate, by electronic means, in formats that are open, machine-readable, accessible, 
findable, and re-usable, together with their metadata. Where possible, the format and the 





154 Article 16.4 of the DCD. 
155 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/presentation-codes-conduct-cloud-switching-and-data-portability 
156 FFDR, art. 8.  
157 Commission Guidance of 29 May 2019 on the Regulation on a framework for the free flow of non-personal data in the European 
Union, COM (2019) 250, p. 18. 
158 Ibidem, p. 17 and FFDR, recital 30. 
159 Art.2(1) defines public sector body as: ‘the State, regional or local authorities, bodies governed by public law or associations 
formed by one or more such authorities or one or more such bodies governed by public law.’ 
160 Art. 2(6) of the ODD defines document as ‘(a) any content whatever its medium (paper or electronic form or as a sound, visual 
or audiovisual recording); or (b) any part of such content’ 
161 Art.3 of the ODD. 
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are also encouraged to apply an ‘open by design and by default’ policy for their documents. Besides, 
public sector bodies should make dynamic data available for re-use immediately after collection, via 
suitable APIs and, where relevant, as a bulk download.163  
Public sector bodies and public undertakings should also make practical arrangements facilitating the 
search for documents available for re-use, such as asset lists of main documents with relevant 
metadata, accessible where possible, and appropriate online and in a machine-readable format, and 
portal sites that are linked to the asset lists.164 
The ODD also imposes strict non-discrimination requirements. According to this principle, any 
applicable conditions for the re-use of documents should be non-discriminatory for comparable 
categories of re-use. Moreover, if documents are re-used by a public sector body as input for its 
commercial activities that fall outside the scope of its public tasks, the same charges, and other 
conditions should apply to the supply of the documents for those activities as apply to other users.165 
Regarding pricing, the recovery of the marginal costs incurred for the reproduction, provision, and 
dissemination of documents as well as for anonymisation of personal data and measures taken to 
protect commercially confidential information may be allowed.166 In some specific cases foreseen by 
the ODD, a price could be charged provided it is calculated following objective, transparent and 
verifiable criteria.167 The conditions and the actual amount of those charges, including the calculation 
basis for such charges, shall be pre-established and published, through electronic means where 
possible and appropriate.168 
4.1.2.2 Financial sector: Access to payment account data 
To stimulate competition and innovation in financial services, the Second Payment Service Directive 
of November 2015 (PSD2) establishes a framework for new FinTech services to access the payment 
account data – in particular the payment initiative services and the account information services- 
securely and after having obtained the consent of their customers.169  
This sector-specific legislation complements the B2B portability right of the GDPR as it compels the 
banks (original controllers) to allow direct transmission of the data subjects’ personal banking 
information to recipient controllers. PSD2 goes further than the GDPR because, on the one hand, it 
forces the banks to ensure the technical feasibility of this B2B financial account data portability and, 
on the other hand, it makes this portability continuous as data subjects can request personal data 
at each transaction, facilitated by APIs. 
To facilitate and secure such data access and exchange, the Commission adopted regulatory 
technical standards based on a draft submitted by the European Banking Authority.170 Those rules 





163 Art.5(5) ODD. 
164 Art.9(1) ODD. 
165 Art.11 ODD. 
166 Art.6(1) ODD. 
167 Art.6(2-5) ODD. Those cases are: (i) public sector bodies that are required to generate revenue to cover a substantial part of 
their costs relating to the performance of their public tasks; (ii) libraries, including university libraries, museums and archives; 
and (iii) public undertakings. 
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on charging access to data, with methodologies to calculate marginal costs and to recover costs : Commission Guidelines of 17 
July 2014 on recommended standard licences, datasets and charging for the reuse of documents OJ [2014] C240/1, section 4. 
169 PSD2, art.66(4) for payment initiation services and art.67(3) for account information services. See Vezzoso (2018). 
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servicing payment service providers) and the data seekers (the payment initiation service provider 
or the account information service providers). 
The UK went further than the PSD2 with the Open Banking Programme which led to a common 
and open API to access the account information of the customers of the nine biggest banks of the 
country.171 This obligation was imposed by the UK antitrust and consumer protection authority, the 
Competition, and Market Authority, in the context of its Retail Banking market investigation to 
increase competition and innovation in the sector.172  
In practice, the CMA forced those nine biggest banks to fund and cooperate with an independent 
trustee approved by the CMA. This trustee developed, within a fixed (and short) timeframe, read-
only open and common technical and product data standards, and read-and-write open and common 
banking standards for the sharing of transaction data. Those standards ensure that any 
communication is secure and based on the consent of the customers. Their establishment has been 
coordinated with the EU standards developed by the EBA and made compulsory by the European 
Commission. 
As underlined in the Furman Report (2019, p.70), ‘one positive example from Open Banking is the 
effectiveness of requiring at least a subset of firms to implement and deliver the solution. Without 
such powers, progress is likely to be slow, disjointed, and in some cases non-existent. The issue is 
not just the complexity of agreeing on unified standards but, potentially important, misaligned 
incentives between the largest platforms and consumers. Another lesson is that just requiring 
common standards is not sufficient and that an active effort is needed to make this work in practice. 
4.1.2.3 Automotive sector: Access to vehicle diagnostic, repair, and maintenance information 
The Regulation on Motor Vehicles of May 2018 imposes to vehicles manufacturers the obligation 
to share vehicle On-Board Diagnostic (OBD) and vehicle repair and maintenance data with 
independent repairers.173 The data should be provided in a standardised and non-
discriminatory manner and presented in an easily accessible manner in the form of machine-
readable and electronically processable datasets. Manufacturers should provide a standardised, 
secure and remote facility to enable independent repairers to complete operations that involve 
access to the vehicle security system.  
The manufacturer should make available vehicle repair and maintenance information, including 
transactional services such as reprogramming or technical assistance, on an hourly, daily, 
monthly, and yearly basis, with fees for access to such information varying in accordance with the 
respective periods of time for which access is granted. Regarding prices, the manufacturer may 
charge reasonable and proportionate fees for data sharing but those fees could not discourage 
access to the information by failing to take into account the extent to which the independent operator 
uses it.  
Thus this Regulation on Motor Vehicle complements the GRPR and gives sector-specific data access 
right for relevant car data to independent repairs to stimulate competition and innovation on this 
aftermarket. 
4.1.2.4 Energy sector: Access to consumer data 
To stimulate competition and innovation among electricity suppliers, the new Electricity Directive of 





171 See Borgogno and Colangelo (2020b). 
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well as data required for customer switching, demand response, and other services in a non-
discriminatory manner.174 Each Member State should organise the management of data in order 
to ensure efficient and secure data access and exchange, as well as data protection and data security 
and should set the prices for data sharing which should be reasonable and justified. 
Here again, the Electricity Directive complements the GDPR by requiring the Member States to set 
up a specific regime for consumer data sharing and exchange between electricity suppliers. 
4.1.2.5 Electronic Communications sector: Access to directory data 
To ensure access to comprehensive publicly available directory enquiry services and directories, 
providers of number-based interpersonal communications services, which attribute numbers 
from a numbering plan should meet all reasonable requests to give the relevant information 
for the provision of those directory enquiry services and directories.175 The providers cannot 
discriminate according to the place of establishment of the information seeker and should give the 
information also to undertakings which are established in a different Member State.176  
The information must be given in an agreed format and on terms fair, objective, cost-oriented, 
and non-discriminatory.177 The Court of Justice clarified that the data owner can only charge the 
costs associated with the transmission of the information to the provider of directories. It may not 
charge the costs of obtaining such information which must in any event be borne by the provider of 
number-based interpersonal communications services and is already included in the costs and 
revenue of such services.178 
4.1.2.6 Postal sector: Access to address database 
Whenever necessary to promote effective competition, the Postal Services Directive (as amended in 
2008) provides that Member States shall ensure that transparent, non-discriminatory access 
conditions are available to postal infrastructure including the postal address database and 
information on change of address.179 
4.2 Existing legislations limiting data sharing 
The GDPR principles of purpose limitation and data minimisation limit data sharing.180 In practice, 
this means that these two principles have to be considered when implementing data portability and 
data sharing. 
The EDBP recommends that the data seeker should inform the data subjects about the purposes for 
which the ported data will be processed and about the categories of personal data that are adequate, 
relevant, and necessary for these purposes, to prevent a breach of these purpose limitation and data 
minimisation principles.181 Moreover, if the data seeker realises that more than necessary data were 
ported for the purpose pursued, he will have to delete this excessive data as soon as possible, to 





174 Electricity Directive, art.23. 
175 EECC, art.112(1). The relevant information concerns solely the data relating to the subscribers of the undertakings concerned 
and not the subscribers of other operators: Case C-109/03, KPN Telecom v. Onafhankelijke Post en Telecommunicatie 
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This clarifies one of the uncertainties regarding the liability faced by the data givers, namely 
whether there is a risk that they might be found liable for the unlawful processing of the ported data 
made by the data seeker because of a breach of these purpose limitation and data minimisation 
principles. Such a concern has been raised, among others, by Facebook in its White Paper on Data 
Portability and Privacy.182 This uncertainty stems from the fact that the GDPR does not tackle this 
issue. The EDBP has indicated that insofar as the data giver responds to the request for portability, 
it should not be held liable as a result of the processing carried out on the data by the data seeker.183 
Indeed, the data giver acts on behalf of the data subject and should not be responsible for any later 
infringement potentially committed by the data seeker. Nevertheless, according to the EDBP, the 
data giver should still set up certain safeguards, such as internal procedures to ensure that the data 
that is transmitted matches the data whose portability is requested, in light of the purpose limitation 
and data minimisation principles.184  
These two principles will also have to be considered to limit the porting of personal data from 
other data subjects than the one exercising his data portability right. Article 20(4) of the GDPR 
provides that portability right needs to be articulated with the rights and freedoms of others, that it 
shall not affect. Accordingly, when a data subject exercises his right to data portability, it is necessary 
to ensure that the personal data of other data subjects, who have not given their consent to such 
portability, are not transmitted, at the same time, to a data seeker likely to process the personal 
data of such third parties.185 Indeed, while the data subject at the origin of the portability request 
has given his consent to the data seeker or has concluded a contract with him, this is not the case 
for the other data subjects whose data could be ported as a result of the exercise of this right.186 
Given that the third parties in question have not consented to the transfer of their data to the data 
seeker, this transfer can only take place if the purpose for which the transfer is made is compatible 
with the data giver's initial purpose of processing.187 If this is not the case, the data seeker has to 
rely on a new lawful basis for the processing of these third parties’ data, such as the basis of 
legitimate interests.188 
To avoid such an issue, the EDBP suggests that the processing of these other data subjects’ data 
should be authorised only insofar as these data remain under the sole control of the data subject 
requesting the portability and that they should only be processed for the purposes determined by 
this data subject.189 The data seeker could therefore not process these third parties’ data for purposes 
that he has defined himself, such as prospecting purposes. Moreover, the data seeker could not 
process these data for purposes that are not compatible with the purposes of the data giver. While 
being appealing in theory, this suggestion is nevertheless extremely restrictive and provides little 
interest for the data seeker, whose margin of manoeuvre will be severely limited.  
However, the EDBP makes another more interesting suggestion. It invites both the data giver and 
data seeker to implement technical tools allowing the data subject to select the personal data he 
wishes to port while excluding, where possible, the personal data of other data subjects.190 This 
makes it possible to avoid, upstream, potential infringement of the rights of these third parties. 
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Data sharing for digital markets contestability: towards a governance framework 
to be ported. Accordingly, in addition to these technical tools, it must also be reflected in the 
implementation of consent mechanisms for these other data subjects, to facilitate data portability.191 
Once again, the difficulty is the practical implementing of such a mechanism. For example, in the 
banking sector, it would be nearly impossible to obtain the consent of all the persons appearing in a 
list of banking transactions that a data subject would like to port to another bank. 
Moreover, several IP legislations impose some limitations of data sharing to protect the 
investment incentives in data collection, storage, and analysis.192 This is mostly the case of 
the copyright rules193 which apply to the author's own intellectual creation. This includes for computer 
programs.194 Interestingly, to allow the scientific research institutions to seize the potential of big 
data, a new exception for text and data mining for the purposes of scientific research has been 
introduced.195 
The Database Directive protects the copyright of databases which, by reason of the selection or 
arrangement of their contents, constitute the author's own intellectual creation.196 In addition, this 
Directive creates a sui generis rights for 15 years for the maker of a database which shows that there 
has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, 
verification or presentation of the contents to prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or 
of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the contents of that 
database.197 
The Trade secret Directive protects trade secret defined as information (hence data) which meets 
all of the following requirements: (i) it is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise 
configuration and assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to 
persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question; (ii) it has 
commercial value because it is secret; (iii) it has been subject to reasonable steps under the 
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5 Regulatory governance of data sharing 
In this section, we consider how data sharing obligations might be imposed upon a digital platform 
by a regulatory body to ensure that markets remain contestable and contested. We do not consider 
circumstances where a digital platform might volunteer to share data in a way that would promote 
competition and so make regulatory intervention unnecessary. We recognise that digital platforms 
do share data and that initiatives such as the Digital Transfer Project, to which we referred earlier, 
involve voluntary efforts to address some aspects of data sharing which we highlight below. 
Various proposals have been made as to the precise institutional form such a regulator might take199. 
This may differ between the Member States or might involve the creation of a new pan-European 
body, either to co-ordinate the activities of national regulatory bodies or even to act in their place200. 
We consider that form should follow function and that the institutional arrangements should be 
informed by, and aim to address, the issues that any institution seeking to implement data sharing 
arrangements is likely to face. We, therefore, discuss institutional arrangements later in this report, 
after we have introduced the issues that we expect they will need to address. These issues relate to: 
- Defining which organisations should be obliged to provide access to data; 
- Defining which organisations are entitled to obtain access to data (whether at the initiative 
of the user or on their initiative) and the conditions to meet before they can do so; 
- Defining the types of data to be shared, the geographic scope from which it is drawn, and 
the conditions under which sharing can occur; 
- Defining the nature and scope of the technical standards to be adopted, particularly for the 
common use of data models and APIs (including whether such standards should align with 
those being developed to share data in other parts of the European economy), determining 
how they are developed and which organisations should adopt them; 
- Defining other aspects of the data transfer process, including how individual users authorise 
access and what measures incumbent platforms can adopt to protect or win back users who 
may be considering switching; 
- Defining how disputes and harms arising from failures in the data transfer process will be 
resolved; 
- Defining how the financial terms for access to data will be determined, and what those prices 
will be.201 
5.1 The scope of data sharing 
5.1.1 Which digital platforms should be obliged to provide access to data? 
Various proposals have already been made to identify digital platforms which, as envisaged by the 
authors of the Furman Report, have ‘strategic market status’202 or, in the terms of Stigler Centre 





199 As noted previously Furman et al (2019) propose the creation of a ‘Digital Markets Unit’ which might sit within the UK 
Competition and Markets Authority or reside elsewhere. The UK Government has since established a Digital Taskforce that is 
chaired by a senior official from the CMA. Scott-Morton et al (2019) propose the creation of a new Digital Authority.  
200 The Inception Impact Assessment of the European Commission services for ex ante regulation of gatekeeper digital platforms 
(EC 2020d) states that the Commission is considering: ‘ a new ex ante regulatory framework, which would apply to large online  
platforms that benefit from significant network effects and act as gatekeepers supervised and enforced through an enabled 
regulatory function at EU level.’ p.4.. 
201 We note that the UK Government has consulted on a similar list of issues in their Midata for energy consultation, Department 
of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2018) 
202 Furman et al (2019). 
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performing a ‘gatekeeper’ function. We do not adopt or endorse any particular term or concept in 
this report but use the term ‘gatekeeper status’ to represent some (objective) threshold which would 
allow us to distinguish between those digital platforms which could be subjected to more intrusive 
behavioural rules, including data sharing obligations, and those which would not.  
Although there are differences between the proposals in these reports, the basic assumptions are 
broadly similar and would involve: 
- The application of a threshold (‘gatekeeper’) to determine which digital platforms 
would then be subject to, amongst other things, obligations to comply with a Code 
of Conduct or other rules which would govern how they conduct themselves concerning 
both users of the platform and competitors.  
- An obligation on a wider set of platforms than those to which Codes of Conduct or 
other measures might apply (‘gatekeeper minus’) to share data that relates to 
individual users (portability of individual user data). This might be required to promote 
switching between platforms or to facilitate complementary innovation by third parties in 
adjacent markets. The arrangements for Open Banking, discussed earlier, are an example of 
this. We discuss the type of data which might be shared in section 5.1.3 below.   
We noted earlier that the GDPR, which applies to any organisation and not just to digital 
platforms or digital platforms with particular characteristics, already gives individual users 
the right to require the sharing or porting of data relating to them where it is ‘technically 
feasible’ to do so. However, the GDPR’s provisions are likely to insufficient if the purpose of 
the data sharing is to enable competition for several reasons:  
o The scope of the data to be shared, which we discuss further below, may be too 
limited. The Furman report (which is the study which addresses data sharing most 
explicitly) proposes that it might need to include inferred personal data, which not 
currently considered to be within the scope of the porting requirements in the Article 
20 of the GDPR204 (and we later conclude that this would be too expansive).  
o To be effective, it is likely to be essential that the data is transferred, at the users’ 
request, directly from one platform to another rather than being first downloaded to 
the user and then uploaded again.  
It appears, therefore that the form of data portability or ‘mobility’ envisaged by Furman 
would involve regulatory obligations for digital platforms which go some way beyond those 
that are currently provided by the GDPR. If direct transfers are required between firms, 
specific regulation will likely be required to ensure the development of standards and 
common data models to enable the transfer of data specifically between certain digital 
platforms. Digital platforms meeting a certain threshold would be obliged to implement such 





204 The Guidelines of 13 April 2017 of Working Party 29 on the right to data portability, WP242 rev.01 states that the GDPR does 
not provide individual users with rights to port such data, in contrast with the position on observed data: ‘In contrast, inferred 
data and derived data are created by the data controller on the basis of the data “provided by the data subject”. For example, 
the outcome of an assessment regarding the health of a user or the profile created in the context of risk management and 
financial regulations (e.g. to assign a credit score or comply with anti-money laundering rules) cannot in themselves be considered 
as “provided by” the data subject. Even though such data may be part of a profile kept by a data controller and are inferred or 
derived from the analysis of data provided by the data subject (through his actions for example), these data will typically not be 
considered as “provided by the data subject” and thus will not be within scope of this new right’ . We note that the consent of 
the individual user would still be required if inferred personal data were to be included within the scope of a data sharing remedy 
(which, for the reasons explained below, we do not propose).  
205 The Furman Report also cites Open Banking as a potential model, in which a sub-set of the largest UK banks (the so-called 
CMA9) were initially required to develop and implement a common set of APIs, data and security standards so as to enable access 
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- An obligation on a narrower set of platforms (all of whom would have ‘gatekeeper 
status’ as a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition) to bulk sharing of aggregated 
data (‘gatekeeper plus’). The authors of the Furman Report do not specify which types of 
organisations would be obliged to share data (nor under what circumstances) under what 
they refer to as an ‘open data’ initiative, preferring to leave that to consideration by their 
proposed new regulatory body, the Digital Markets Unit. Again, we discuss the type of data 
to be shared in Section 5.1.3 below. 
In our view, it would be reasonable to presume that any platform that has been designated as having 
‘gatekeeper status’ could be obliged to share aggregated data in bulk to ensure that markets are 
both contestable and contested. It would also be reasonable to presume that firms lacking such a 
designation could not be required to share data in bulk. This does not mean that data sharing would 
always be the remedy that is selected or that every platform designated as having ‘gatekeeper status’ 
would be obliged to share aggregated data206. As noted earlier, the precise conditions which a 
platform would need to meet to be designated as a ‘gatekeeper’ are beyond the scope of this report. 
So, also, are the additional conditions that would be required for a platform to meet the proposed 
‘gatekeeper plus’ threshold, or the condition which need not be present for a  platform to meet the 
‘gatekeeper minus’ designation. The relevant conditions are likely to depend on the particular market 
and context that is being considered (as would be the case if for example, the Commission were to 
adopt data-sharing remedies following the application of the New Competition Tool). The terms ‘plus’ 
and ‘minus’ are intended to suggest a hierarchy under which different data sharing remedies might 
be applied, but each would need to be shown to be proportionate and non-discriminatory when 
applied in a specific context. 





selected by the Competition and Market Authority in that case were the largest banks, but were not considered to hold a dominant 
position or to meet any other clearly defined threshold.  
206 Prufer argues that (aggregate) data sharing obligations are appropriate in what he characterizes as ‘data driven markets’ 
which can be easily and quickly foreclosed. He characterizes the problem as follows: ‘This tendency of data-driven markets to tip 
is that the smaller firms, even if they are equipped with a superior idea/production technology, face higher marginal costs of 
innovation because they lack access to the large pile of user information that the dominant firm has access to due to its 
significantly larger user base. Consequently, if a smaller firm were to heavily invest in innovation and roll out its high-quality 
product, the dominant firm could imitate it quickly ---at lower cost of innovation ---and regain its quality lead. The smaller firm 
would find itself once again in the runners-up spot, which entails few users and low revenues, but it would still have to pay the 
large costs involved in attempting a leap in innovation’, p.6. We find this helpful and consider that digital platforms that are found 
to have strategic market status are very likely to operate in markets which have these characteristics. 
207 Mayer-Schönberger and Ramge (2018) also advocate for differentiated data sharing obligation according to the market power 
of the digital platforms. 
 
Gatekeeper plus:  
Sharing of aggregated data 
 
Gatekeeper minus:  
Sharing on data relating to individuals 
 
All platforms:  
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Two important conclusions follow from this: 
- First, the number of digital platforms that might be obliged to share data ought to depend 
upon (a) the type of the data to be shared and mode of sharing and (b) the intended 
competitive purposes to which the data will be applied.  
Obligations might be extended to a wider group of digital platforms concerning the 
sharing of data which: 
o Has been provided to the platform by individual users and/or is observed personal 
data relating to a specific individual user; 
o The intervention is intended to promote complementary innovation in newly 
emerging adjacent markets for the benefit of individual users; 
o Requires the consent of individual users to initiate the sharing of the data. 
This would imply that a wider group of platforms could be required to share individual user 
data continuously. 
Conversely, obligations might be applied to a much narrower group of digital platforms, 
is a sub-set of those with the strategic market status, when the data: 
o Is aggregated observed data resulting from interactions between large numbers of 
users and the platform; 
o Is critical to the delivery of services by the digital platform in its core market and has 
been acquired for this purpose, amongst others; 
o The intervention is intended to promote competition into newly emerging adjacent 
markets (and potentially into the core market), for the benefit of users in general; 
o Does not require the consent of individual users to share the data. 
This would imply that a narrower group of platforms could be required to share aggregate 
user data in bulk. 
- Second, the number of platforms that might be obliged to adopt common standards 
that would enable data sharing obligations to be met should be greater than the 
number of platforms that might be obliged to implement data sharing 
arrangements. We discuss this issue further below. We consider it highly desirable that the 
same technical standards to enable data sharing should be applied both when a wider range 
of digital platforms share data relating to individual users and when a smaller sub-set of 
those platforms share data that has been aggregated. This should reduce duplication and 
costs and would mean that a digital platform which was already sharing data relating to 
individuals would be in a position to comply quickly with an obligation to share aggregated 
data if that were required at a later stage. 
We think it is important to avoid a situation in which a regulator wishes to oblige a digital 
platform to share data but then finds that the practical implementation takes months or years 
to accomplish whilst the platform in question adopts the technical standards and makes the 
changes necessary to enable it to comply with the direction. Since a primary aim of the data 
sharing measures we consider in this report is to avoid the rapid foreclosure of adjacent 
markets by very large digital platforms that can otherwise leverage their data advantages 
from one market to another, the speed at which remedies can be implemented is both a 
critical consideration and a key rationale for establishing a regulatory regime rather than 
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Accordingly, we propose that the obligation to adopt common standards to facilitate 
data sharing should apply independently (and before) consideration of whether the 
digital platform in question has a particular obligation to share a particular type of 
data at a particular time. In other words, an obligation on the part of digital platform to 
adopt a set of common standards should not pre-judge the determination as to whether, or 
when, it should be obliged to share data to remedy competition concerns. We recognise that 
this could mean that some digital platforms incur costs in migrating from proprietary 
standards to common standards, both in terms of direct implementation costs and potentially 
in terms of foregone innovation or other benefits which it derived from its proprietary 
arrangements. The scope of the obligation to adopt common standards should therefore be 
confined to those platforms where there is a reasonable prospect of their being obliged to 
share data, rather than being a universal requirement. On the other hand, we would expect 
that most significant digital platforms will at least have obligations to share data relating to 
individual users in the way we propose (i.e. under the ‘gatekeeper minus’ threshold)  and 
that other digital platforms that were seeking to obtain access to such data could be expected 
to adopt the standards voluntarily to obtain the benefits of doing so. Having adopted common 
standards for the sharing of data relating to individuals, the same arrangements would also 
allow for more restricted forms of sharing of aggregated data to be implemented by a sub-
set of the very largest digital platforms. 
5.1.2 Which organisations are entitled to obtain access to data (and the conditions to meet before 
they can do so)? 
Another issue in determining the impact of data sharing on contestability relates to the question of 
which organisations are entitled to receive the data. If the objective of sharing data is to promote 
contestability and entry, whether in the form of direct replication of services in the core market or, 
more likely, through complementary innovation in adjacent markets, then we might not expect to 
find regulators restricting or predetermining which firms should benefit from having access to the 
data. Regulators themselves are unlikely to be well placed to predict which firms are best placed to 
generate benefits for users as a result of obtaining access to data. 
Thus, it might be argued that no restrictions in terms of access to data are required. For example, 
although firms seeking access to data would need to adopt the same common technical standards 
discussed above, there is no obvious need for a regulator to oblige these firms to do so since, unlike 
the platforms that are required to provide access, those seeking access are likely to expect to benefit 
from doing so. The more relevant question, in this case, is whether the standards themselves are 
developed in such a way that they represent an unnecessary cost or barrier to entry for new entrants. 
That concern ought to be addressed by ensuring adequate representation of their interests in the 
standards-setting process. 
It might also be argued that concerns, which are likely to be held both by policymakers and by those 
platforms being required to share data, about how third party recipients will store and use the data 
they obtain are already addressed by the provisions of the GDPR (at least as regards personal data), 
or might otherwise be addressed via contractual arrangements (as regards other forms of data) 
between the parties. However, we conclude from the evidence presented earlier that both 
organisations and users are likely to require significant additional safeguards and 
assurances if they trust the arrangements that are in place. Without such trust, individual 
users will not initiate transfers and the objectives of data sharing arrangements will not be achieved. 
Numerous studies have concluded that the absence of well-developed mechanisms to build trust 
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trust in recent years - is an important reason why the sharing of data in Europe and elsewhere 
remains so limited, relative to its potential208. 
Open Banking provides an example of what might be required. In this case, organisations which wish 
to obtain access to data (generally new fintech companies) must first be accredited by Open Banking 
Implementation Entity. The accreditation process is intended to ensure that the organisation is viable 
and has adopted the relevant standards and protocols, and to allow the regulator to understand the 
purposes for and manner in which the organisation intends to use the data. Besides, the Furman 
Report proposed that ‘sandboxes’ be employed to allow new firms to conduct trials of data sharing 
within a controlled environment that is overseen by the regulatory body209. The UK Financial Conduct 
Authority has already begun to use sandboxes before approving new products which, in this case, 
are often developed by organisations which are already subject to close supervision under existing 
UK financial service regulation210. 
We consider that any regulatory regime for data access is likely to have to devote as much 
attention to the regulation of those firms that obtain access to the data (through a 
licensing or accreditation regime) as to regulating the firms that are obliged to provide 
access. This is another important reason why regulation rather than competition law remedies is 
preferred for data sharing since the latter tend to be suited to the imposition of obligations on the 
dominant firm but not for the imposition of obligations on other parties, such as the recipients of 
data. Financial service providers are already accustomed to operating under a very detailed and 
extensive set of regulatory obligations (including Know Your Customer, fraud reporting, risk 
management, and other obligations) that are administered by a large and well-established regulatory 
body (in the UK, the Financial Conduct Authority employs a staff of around 4000). In the case of 
digital markets that we are considering, no such regulatory or supervisory regime exists today - 
either in Europe or elsewhere.  
The number of organisations seeking access to data which may require to be regulated is likely to 
be many times greater than the number of platforms that are obliged to provide access to their data. 
They may include existing digital platforms, publishers, or other organisations seeking to enter 
markets. Some of these entrants may have limited resources, in terms of staff that might be 
dedicated to ensuring compliance with regulatory obligations, but may nonetheless have the 
technical capacity to retain and exploit very large volumes of data and may present very significant 
risks if such data is mismanaged. As explained above, we envisage two main forms of data sharing: 
the sharing of data relating to specific individuals, for whom the risks are likely to be of great 
significance to those individuals but not to others, and the sharing of large volumes of aggregated 
data, where the risks are likely to be more diffuse but no less significant. 
Concerns about the integrity and trustworthiness of the organisations that might obtain access to 
data provide one rationale for restricting access to those that are appropriately authorised and 
regulated for that purpose211. However, another concern is that some access seekers may obtain 
access to data and use it for legitimate purposes which do not contribute to the promotion 
of competition in the markets concerning which competition concerns arise. The nature of 





208 ‘The social and economic risks associated with the possible revelation of confidential information (e.g. personal data and trade 
secrets) are often the main rationale for individuals and organisations not sharing their data’, OECD (2019), p.17; 
209 Data sandboxes may support the on-boarding of new organisations seeking access to data, or the testing of new functionality. 
In addition, as the OECD explains, data sandboxes can be a permanent arrangement which ensures the security of very sensitive 
data by ensuring that it remains behind the firewalls of the host organisation, see OECD (2019), p.34 
210 Financial Conduct Authority (2017) 
211 We recall that the Furman Report proposes that platforms with ‘strategic market status’ be required to comply with a Code of 
Conduct or otherwise regulated. This would exclude new entrants and other platforms who we would expect to be the main access 
seekers under the arrangements we are contemplating. In addition, the provisions of such a Code are intended to address other 
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telecommunications or electricity networks which can only be used for a narrow set of purposes. For 
example, if an incumbent search engine were required to provide access to data in the expectation 
that this would remedy concerns about competition in the provision of general or specialised search 
services, then the remedy would be ineffective if the data were instead used to enter markets in 
which the same incumbent was neither present nor ever expected to be (e.g. was used to compete 
in markets credit checking services which were already judged to be functioning well). This appears 
to have been a concern of the Commission’s advisers as regards the application of data sharing 
obligations under European competition law.212 
The counterpart CERRE report by Krämer, Schnurr, and Broughton Micova contains a more extensive 
discussion of the prospects that data sharing remedies might enable entry into the core markets of 
the large digital platforms, such as general search or e-commerce213. They consider it unlikely as 
well as potentially undesirable. They conclude that the primary purpose and objective of data sharing 
measures should instead be to ensure that ‘complementary’ or niche markets, into which the 
incumbent digital platforms might otherwise be able to leverage their data-driven advantages, should 
remain contestable to others. If this policy were successful, they speculate that it may be that the 
niche competitors who have been enabled by these measures may eventually extend the scope and 
scale of their activities to represent a genuine competitive threat in the core market of the regulated 
platform.   
The potential benefits, in terms of the scope of competition and contestability, of any data sharing 
measures are an important matter. Krämer et al explain that if data sharing measures are to be 
intended to preserve the contestability of niche markets then competition law remedies, which focus 
on ‘essential data’, are unlikely to be appropriate or effective214. This is one reason why they favour 
ex ante regulation of data sharing of the kind we are considering in this report. We would add, 
however, that if the benefits are viewed as being relatively narrow, it may be more difficult for 
regulators to justify costly interventions on proportionality grounds. These are matters to assess in 
the light of the specific facts, and so we do not anticipate them here. We do not read Krämer et al 
to be saying that their conclusions as to which data might be shared, or with whom, would vary be 
substantially different if the objective were to enable entry into core rather than niche markets. We 
explain later in this section why the types of data which we propose should be shared would, by their 
nature, also be more likely to enable competition in a niche than in core markets.  
We find it difficult to see how, as a practical matter, a regulator could predefine the 
commercial purposes to which any data, once transferred, should be applied by the 
recipient (as opposed to the type of data to be shared). Nor do we see how a regulator could police 
any such limitations if they were attempted. This is particularly so with new digital markets, where 
the boundaries between one market and another are often unstable and unpredictable. As noted 
above,  this is in stark contrast with more conventional access arrangements that involve tangible 
assets such utility networks, where the purposes for which those assets are used are (a) inherently 
limited to the same or very similar purposes as for the supplier and (b) comparatively straightforward 
to observe and specify215. The value of data arises, in part, because the purposes to which it can be 
applied are both many and unpredictable. As we discuss below, a regulator is likely to be required to 





212 Cremer et al (2019), p.101 ‘‘We have already expressed some hesitation to bring data requests by claimants under Article 
102 TFEU who pursue business purposes that are essentially unrelated to the market served by the dominant firm (see above). 
The main focus, under Article 102 TFEU, should rather be on data requests with the purpose of serving complementary markets 
or aftermarkets – i.e. markets that are part of the broader ecosystem that the data controller serves.’ 
213 Krämer, Schnurr, Broughton Micova (2020), Section 4.2.1 
214 Ibid p.75 
215 Indeed, some regulators have considered ‘end user pricing’ or ‘retail minus’ regimes in which the wholesale price of the 
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the regulator can certainly influence the purposes to which it can then be applied. But we do not 
think it feasible to suggest that a regulator could dictate the purposes to which data should be put. 
5.1.3 The types of data to be shared, the geographic scope from which it is drawn, and the 
conditions under which sharing can occur, including on whose initiative? 
Having determined which platforms are obliged to share data and which to receive it, the next set of 
issues relating to the type of data to be shared. As we explained in our introduction to this report, 
this is an area of some complexity and the potential for confusion, partly arising from ambiguities as 
to the legal treatment of some types of data and partly due to the lack of a generally-accepted 
taxonomy to distinguish between different types of data216. Following Krämer, Schnurr, and 
Broughton Micova, we have found it useful to focus on two broad categories of data when it comes 
to thinking about data sharing to promote contestability in digital markets which, like them, we refer 
to as the sharing or porting of individual user data (relating to specific users) on the one hand 
and the bulk sharing of aggregate user data on the other217.  
5.1.3.1 Data relating to specific individual users 
The first category is what we refer to as data relating to specific individuals, which will generally 
consist of personal data that has been provided by the user and observed data that is then 
generated by the interactions between the user and the platform in question218. Inferred 
data, which we also discussed in the introduction, is also data that relates to specific individuals but 
for which, in our view, there is less likely to be strong arguments on competition grounds to require 
to be shared. This is because: 
- We consider that it is this capacity to derive new insights from data that may have been 
acquired for other purposes is which drives the complementary innovation in adjacent 
markets which we think the sharing of data relating to specific individuals ought to be seeking 
to promote. Allowing access seekers to simply obtain existing insights from the incumbent 
platform by requiring it to share inferred personal data derived from the core market would, 
therefore, undermine the incentives of both parties to the arrangement219.  
- Insights that are derived for another purpose or from interaction in another market may not 
be particularly relevant to the complementary activities which we are seeking to promote 
(but may instead be more relevant to entry and direct competition in the core market from 
which, and for which, those insights have been derived).  
- Restricting the sharing of data relating to specific individuals to provided and observed data 
is consistent with our proposal that the number of platforms that would be obliged to share 
such data should be quite large (i.e. the ‘gatekeeper minus’ group). The more extensive the 





216 ‘“A new taxonomy of data is badly needed. Industry, government and citizens are too frequently in disagreement as to what 
exactly constitutes personal data and what does not – and without an understanding of how data get positioned in each category, 
or flow between them, it is impossible to have a discussion about how to govern and regulate those flows’, OECD 2019, p.28 
217 Krämer, Schnurr and Broughton Micova, ‘we therefore suggest using two types of data access and sharing remedies in concert. 
The first type of remedy is to facilitate access to broad user raw data for third parties. This can only be achieved by bulk sharing 
of sufficiently anonymised raw data. Such data will therefore generally lack depth but is in terms of breadth representative of the 
raw user data that the original data controller has access to. The second type of remedy… is to facilitate access to deep user data. 
This data contains personally identifiable information, or at least allows traceability of an individual. Such data cannot be shared 
in bulk but requires the consent of each individual data subject anytime it is shared with a third party. Thus, the sum of data that 
is shared in this way generally lacks breadth, because it is unlikely that a sufficiently representative sample of users will consent 
to data sharing for a given third party. ‘ p.88 
218 For the reasons given in the introduction, we consider that restricting access to provided data, which the individual user may 
be able to replicate themselves, is unlikely to ever be sufficient as a data sharing measure to promote competition. It is access 
to the observed data, which the individual user cannot replicate, which is of critical importance. 
219 We therefore agree with Prufer (2020), who says: ‘If such data would be required to be shared, it might facilitate free-riding 
of smaller competitors and crowd out the dominant firm’s incentives to invest into analytics in the first place. If only raw data are 
shared, it also incentivizes competitors to develop own analytics techniques, which can lead to a plurality of approaches, 
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be obliged to do so. In this case, the scope of the data is limited both because it consists 
only of provided and observed data and because each transfer will relate only to a specified 
individual. 
However, even if the scope of the data to be shared is confined to provided and observed personal 
data, as we propose, various legal and practical challenges remain220.  
(i) Individual user consents 
As explained earlier, this data may be ‘controlled’ by the organisation concerned but it is not 
considered under current European law to have acquired the data from the user in the way that it 
might acquire other assets and the user is not considered to have relinquished their rights over the 
data simply by sharing it221. Rather, the user is said to have granted the organisation ‘usage rights’ 
to exploit the data for certain purposes, generally on the presumption that the user will benefit from 
it doing so. In this view, if data is now to be shared with another platform, the individual 
user must give their prior consent to the transfer. As explained in section 2, they are only likely 
to do this if they consider that the potential benefits from doing so outweigh the costs. 
The need for individual user consents may be relatively clear concerning data that refers only to the 
individual user in question but soon becomes more challenging in the case of data which relates to 
several identifiable individuals, as with records of banking transactions between different persons, 
address files containing the contacts of many people, or photographs in which several people have 
been tagged. In the first two instances, European privacy regulators, as represented by guidance 
issued by the European Data Protection Board, appear to consider that the consent of the individual 
making or receiving the payment or holding the contacts is sufficient to initiate the transfer. The 
position as regards the latter scenario (and many others) remains less clear and appears to depend 
on whether the interests of the other individuals might be harmed by the transfer222. That might be 
the case in some instances and not in others, but it will be difficult for a regulator, or the platform 
that is providing access to data, to assess these risks in advance (and impractical to do so on a case 
by case basis). ‘Harm’ in this case is also far from straightforward and could, presumably refer to 
losses in privacy but also loss of economic rights that might otherwise be conferred by intellectual 
property law (e.g. in the creation of a picture posted on another user’s account).  
It will therefore be very important for any arrangements involving the sharing of data relating 
to individuals to seek to minimise the potential harms to other individuals which might 
otherwise arise from the sharing of data which is personal to more than one individual 
since it will be impossible to seek or co-ordinate multiple consents before the data is shared223. Some 
of the other issues we discuss in this section – such as rights to redress and security standards – are 
intended to contribute to the minimisation of harm. It will be particularly important that individual 
users who consent to the sharing of their data do not feel exposed to risks that might otherwise arise 
from claims made by other individuals under, for example, the GDPR. Otherwise, there is a significant 





220 We are aware that Krämer, Schnurr and Broughton Micova also suggest that ‘Only data that was created as a by-
product of consumers’ usage of a dominant service may have to be shared (e.g., search queries, likes, clicks, or 
location); but not (volunteered) user data that represents the essence of the service itself (e.g., documents uploaded to a cloud 
storage provider, posts on a social media site, customer reviews on a reviews’ site, or GPS data from a geo-tracking app’ . p.89. 
We recognize the point but prefer to adopt the conventional distinction between volunteered and observed data in our discussion. 
It seems to us that their concerns might be addressed by restricting access to certain types of data, but might also be addressed 
when determining which platforms are obliged to share data, or when determining the prices at which access to data is to be 
provided.  
221 OECD 2019, p.100-3 
222 Egan (2019), p.12 
223 Guidelines of 13 April 2017 of Working Party 29 on the right to data portability, WP242 rev.01 states that: ‘the data controllers 
should implement consent mechanisms for other data subjects involved, to ease data transmission for those cases where such 
parties are willing to consent, e.g. if they also want to move their data to some other data controller. Such a situation might 
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with other organisations and the measures will be rendered ineffective. The experience of personal 
data sharing in Europe to date (or the lack thereof) suggests this could be a significant barrier, 
although we have not seen evidence or research to date which would allow us to fully understand 
precisely what those barriers might be224.  
(ii) Other approaches to consent: opt-out arrangements 
Thus far, we have assumed that the sharing of personal data about a specific individual would require 
the prior consent of that individual, as is required under the current GDPR. This has led us to focus 
on potential barriers to the provision of consents by individuals, such as concerns about liability to 
third parties or other risks that an individual may feel they will be exposed to. Some of these are 
considered further later in this section. 
We should consider the possibility, however, that even if the various other measures that we 
propose to reduce perceptions of risk are taken, individual users will still not be prepared 
to consent to the sharing of their data, even if we could be confident that they would stand 
to benefit from doing so. This may be because individual users will find it very difficult to assess 
and value the potential benefits which they might obtain from sharing data which relates to them or 
may be susceptible to well-known biases such as loss aversion. The innovations which might be 
enabled by data sharing may not be familiar to them or may depend upon their first making their 
data available. Individual users may become more confident once they see other individuals sharing 
their data or once they see the benefits that others are obtaining from doing so. However, there is 
an obvious hold up problem which may mean that any data sharing remedy which relies on prior 
consents from individual users could never achieve sufficient critical mass to justify the costs of 
implementation, or to have meaningful consequences for competition in digital markets. We take 
this possibility seriously. 
This has led us to investigate other approaches to consent for data that relates to individuals, perhaps 
to kick start the data sharing process. One approach, which we discuss below, would involve the 
adoption of an ‘opt out’ mechanism as a basis of obtaining the consent of an individual user, 
or a group of users, for the transfer of data that relates to them. We note that the opt out 
approach could be adopted either in relation to transfers of data which relates only to a specific 
individual, or could be employed for the bulk transfer of large volumes of aggregated data, thereby 
avoiding the need to otherwise anonymise the data. On the other hand, it may also require 
amendment of the GDPR.  We discuss the transfer of aggregated data later in this section. 
There are already instances where personal data has been transferred between 
organisations without every individual user having to provide their consent. For example, 
such arrangements have sometimes been employed by firms that are to be acquired by another 
firm, with the result that very large volumes of personal data are then be transferred in bulk from 
one corporate entity to another225.  This is relevant since, in theory, a digital platform can be thought 
of as having several different means by which it could acquire data relating to individuals:  






224 On whether GDPR promotes or inhibits competition in digital markets more generally (to which they answer in the affirmative), 
see Gal and Aviv (2020). The focus of our report is different, since we presuppose a shortfall in competition and are then consider 
the impact of the GDPR on the type of data access measures which might be adopted to remedy such a shortfall.  
225 Ilan et al (2016) note: ‘In 2001, the French DPA declared (in the context of a merger of three companies) that personal data 
files may only be assigned or made available to a third party on the condition that data subjects be given advance notice as well 
as the right to object to such transfer. In Germany, it is necessary to provide notice of the transfer in the context of the transaction 
with a deadline to object where the transferred data goes beyond so-called “list data” (name and postal address). The Bavaria 
DPA issued fines to a buyer and target in an asset deal in 2015 where customer data was transferred without the parties providing 
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- It could acquire the same data by acquiring another firm which already controls it, or by 
acquiring the data assets of that firm or  
- Under certain conditions, it could acquire the same data using regulated data sharing 
arrangements of the kind we are considering in this report.  
We can see a strong case for requiring ‘opt in’ consents when a user is first asked to provide data 
and to engage with a new service, as in the first case listed above. However, we also see a case for 
applying a different principle when an existing service (including privacy terms) will continue to be 
provided to the individual user, but the shares of the company providing them are to be acquired by 
another entity. In the case of such mergers, European privacy regulators appear to have generally 
accepted either that the transaction can proceed without any prior communication with or consent 
from individual users – presumably on the basis that there is a reasonable expectation that the 
acquiring firm will continue to supply services on the terms to which they have already consented 
and would require further consents if those terms were subsequently to be varied226. Instead, the 
focus of regulators (and the legal advisers to the parties) appears to have been directed towards 
identifying any residual liabilities for past breaches of privacy laws by the acquired firm and we have 
been unable to identify any cases since the adoption of the GDPR in which parties to a merger have 
been prosecuted for failing to obtain appropriate consents from users before the conclusion of the 
transaction227.  
Of greater relevance to our case are those where a firm’s data assets have been separated from 
the rest of the business and sold independently. This is the closest analogy to the regulated 
data sharing arrangements which we are considering in this report and which can be considered as 
attempting to mimic outcomes which might otherwise arise in a competitive market in which data 
assets were being sold by a willing seller (although in practice, it appears that data assets are 
generally sold under a distressed sale or bankruptcy proceeding).  
The Federal Trade Commission has considered several such cases: 
‘The FTC often cites a settlement it reached with internet retailer Toysmart in 2000 (the 
“Toysmart Settlement”) which allowed Toysmart, after it ceased operations, to transfer 
customer personal data to a third party despite its privacy policy stating that such personal 
data would “never be shared with a third party.” The FTC had sued to block Toysmart’s sale 
of its customer database, alleging a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. Under the Toysmart 
Settlement, Toysmart was able to sell the customer data, but: (i) not as a stand-alone asset; 
(ii) only to a purchaser engaged in substantially the same lines of business as Toysmart; and 
(iii) only to a purchaser who agreed to be bound by and adhere to the terms of Toysmart’s 
privacy policy and to obtain affirmative (opt-in) consent from consumers for any material 
changes to the policy that affect information collected under the Toysmart policy (hereinafter, 
the “Toysmart Principles”). As an alternative to the Toysmart Principles, the FTC proposed 
(in the RadioShack and Borders cases, discussed below) requiring the target to obtain 
affirmative (opt-in) consent of the data subjects to the transfer of the data to the purchaser 





226 As Ilan et al note, this became a source of controversy after Facebook acquired Whatsapp in 2014 but subsequently sought 
to change that latter’s privacy policy in 2016. The US FTC subsequently issued guidance that acquiring companies are expected 
to honor the privacy promises that have previously been made to users, see FTC (2015)   
227 The only merger-related fine we have identified in Europe was proposed by the UK Information Commissioner on Marriott 
International in 2019 in relation to pre-merger security breaches by Starwood Group, a hotel chain which it had acquired in 2016. 
Marriott discovered the breach in 2018 and was fined £99 million, see UK Information Commissioner (2019). 
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Although US cases, the principle that data might be transferred from one organisation to another 
without seeking user consent provided that the acquiring party ‘engaged in substantially the same 
lines of business’ and ‘agreed to be bound by and adhere to the terms of Toysmart’s [the acquired 
party] privacy policy’ is potentially a useful one for our proposes.  For example, it might be possible  
to consider arrangements for the sharing of personal data relating to a specific individual 
or group of individuals without requiring their consent provided the access seeker 
concerned was ‘engaged in substantially the same lines of business’ and was required to 
adhere to similar terms concerning privacy. The regulator could presumably require that 
platforms seeking access to data comply with certain common privacy principles or policies to obtain 
the benefit of any such ‘opt out’ provisions.229 On the other hand, we also recognise that there may 
be significant practical difficulties with such arrangements, including the challenges of defining and 
restricting the uses to which data is to be put (which we discussed above) and issues with the 
reconfiguration of data sharing arrangements if individual users were subsequently to exercise their 
right to withdraw their implied consent.  
We conclude that European policymakers should give serious consideration to changes to 
the GDPR that would create a new type of ‘opt out’ regime for the sharing of personal data 
to promote competition under certain (restrictive) conditions. This could have several 
features: 
- ‘Opt out’ consents could be limited to the provision of data about specific individuals for a 
limited period whilst competition in a new adjacent market is ‘seeded’. After this period had 
expired, further transfers of personal data of specific individuals could require their consent 
in each case. 
- ‘Opt out’ consents could be conditional upon the recipients of the data complying with certain 
conditions, both concerning the uses to which they would put the data (whilst noting the 
challenges we identify above) and concerning privacy and other matters. Firms that were 
unwilling to meet such conditions would instead be required to obtain their data after first 
having acquired the consent of each individual. This could provide a strong incentive for 
compliance. 
- ‘Opt out’ arrangements might also be used to facilitate the transfer of large volumes of 
aggregated personal data without the need for individual user consents in those 
circumstances where anonymisation was found to be impractical, risky or would serve to 
inhibit the effective promotion of competition. We consider this alongside other ways in which 
the sharing of aggregated data might be undertaken in the next section 
In its European Data Strategy, the Commission recognises that certain aspects of the GDPR may 
require revision to accommodate the pursuit of other objectives, potentially including the more 
extensive sharing of data to promote competitive markets, something which may not have been fully 
anticipated when the GDPR was being developed before its adoption in 2016. We consider that if 
data sharing measures to promote competition are to realise their potential, policymakers will indeed 
need to revisit some of their assumptions about the circumstances under which opt out arrangements 





229 We note that ‘opt in’ was also the approach adopted by the UK Competition and Markets Authority (after consultation with the 
UK privacy regulator) in transferring data about vulnerable customers of energy suppliers to Ofgem, the energy regulator, who 
would then be expected to transfer the data to rival suppliers at their request, Competition and Markets Authority (2016) para 
11.64.  
230 However, we note that this does not appear on the list of Commission actions arising from the first review of June 2020 of the 
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Incumbent platforms might be expected to emphasise the potential risks to users’ privacy being 
unreasonably compromised if opt out arrangements were to be adopted. This to be a legitimate 
concern,231 but it has to be balanced against the economic and other risks which users may also face 
if digital markets were otherwise to remain uncontested.  
5.1.3.2 Aggregated user data 
The second category of data which we have identified as being of greatest relevance for the 
promotion of competition in digital markets is aggregated data that is derived from observed 
interactions between very large numbers of users and the digital platforms in question. This data is 
very important for the development of new insights about how individual users might respond to new 
services in adjacent markets or to changes to existing services. In general, the capacity of a platform 
to generate such insights will improve as the volume and variety of the data set increases. Such data 
facilitates improvements in product quality and innovations which are likely to benefit all users of the 
platform irrespective of whether data which relates specifically to them has been included in the data 
set or not. 
If aggregated observed is to be shared, several scenarios might be considered: 
- The first would involve the sharing of aggregated personal data, in which the 
identities of individual users are retained in the data. This can be thought of as sharing 
the same data as the incumbent platform itself has access to, and which is, therefore, likely 
to yield the maximum competitive benefit for the other access seekers. However, it will be 
clear that the sharing of such data is problematic, and likely impossible if the consents of 
each user contributing data to the data set were to be required before anything could be 
shared. A potentially more feasible alternative in these circumstances is to rely on ‘opt out’ 
arrangements of the kind described above, although this may still involve significant 
transaction costs if large numbers of users decide to exercise their option to opt out and will 
involve delays whilst users are notified of their rights to do so and given a reasonable 
opportunity to respond (although under the continuous data sharing arrangements that we 
envisage, we assume there would also be a right to opt out at any time thereafter). 
- The second scenario would involve the prior anonymisation of the data before it is 
shared. This also presents some challenges, since it is not always clear that robust legal 
boundaries could be drawn between data that is personal and that which is anonymised232 
(i.e. cannot be reconfigured to reveal the identities of individual persons)233. More 





231 See Egan/Facebook (2019), op cit, or Google (2020) argues, in its submission to the CMA on the digital advertising interim 
report,: ‘aside from the risk of a data breach, the very fact of us sharing query data with third-parties could do irreparable harm 
to our reputation. Users trust us to treat their queries appropriately. Handing over those queries to third parties - especially if 
this is done for money - may cause users to lose confidence in their ability to search privately with us.’, p.20 
232 Cremer et al (2019) note: ‘From a legal perspective, the precise requirements for data use to be qualified as anonymous for 
the purposes of the GDPR have not yet been fully clarified by the EU courts.’, p.87. The Article 29 Working Party published an 
opinion on anonymisation techniques in 2014, concluding: ‘… anonymisation techniques can provide privacy guarantees and may 
be used to generate efficient anonymisation processes, but only if their application is engineered appropriately – which means 
that the prerequisites (context) and the objective(s) of the anonymisation process must be clearly set out in order to achieve the 
targeted anonymisation while producing some useful data. The optimal solution should be decided on a case-by-case basis, 
possibly by using a combination of different techniques, while taking into account the practical recommendations developed in  
this Opinion. Finally, data controllers should consider that an anonymised data set can still present residual risks to data subjects. 
Indeed, on the one hand, anonymisation and re-identification are active fields of research and new discoveries are regularly 
published, and on the other hand even anonymised data, like statistics, may be used to enrich existing profiles of individuals, 
thus creating new data protection issues. Thus, anonymisation should not be regarded as a one-off exercise and the attending 
risks should be reassessed regularly by data controllers’, EDPB (2014), p.3 
233 The OECD (2019) warns: ‘However, developments in data analytics (and AI) combined with the increasing volume and variety 
of available data sets, and the capacity to link these different data sets, have made it easier to infer and relate seemingly non-
personal or anonymised data to an identified or identifiable entity, even if the entity never directly shared this information with 






Data sharing for digital markets contestability: towards a governance framework 
process234. Indeed, one of the primary motivations behind the technological arms race that 
exists between those that seek to anonymise data and those that seek to frustrate such 
efforts arises from the fact that de-anonymised data is likely to have a greater commercial 
(i.e. competitive) value.  
- The third scenario would not involve the transfer of data from one platform to another, but 
would involve the platform instead using the data they retain to answer queries 
from other firms or allowing other firms to train their algorithms on the data set 
(without their obtaining access to the underlying data itself). In earlier sections, we 
provided examples of cases where firms such as Telefonica and Microsoft retain aggregated 
data sets within their organisations, likely for both commercial and privacy related reasons, 
but allow third parties to interrogate that data and derive insights from it. The basis on which 
such access is provided is currently determined by the holder of the data, rather than by a 
regulator. 
There are challenges with each of these approaches. The consequence of an anonymisation 
requirement would be that access seekers obtain access to data that is less competitively 
valuable/more anonymised than the data that is retained by the platform that supplies it, even if 
both parties have access to similar volumes of data. Whether the resulting asymmetry means the 
sharing of anonymous data would prove to be an ineffective remedy to promote competition is 
difficult to predict without examining the specifics of the case. It may be that regulators would start 
by requiring the sharing of anonymous data, but consider the other approaches if that proved to be 
ineffective (although the regulator will also need to be mindful of the risks of strategic behaviour by 
the parties involved)  
We should also consider the possibility that obligations to share anonymous data may introduce 
perverse incentives for the holders of personal data, who may become more reluctant to undertake 
the process of anonymisation even when it might otherwise be appropriate to do so and when this 
would contribute to the privacy of users of the platform. Thus, it may be necessary for regulators to 
require digital platforms to create and retain both original and anonymised versions of the same 
data, with the former being required to fulfil the needs of its users and the latter being required 
solely to fulfil requests for data access from other organisations (although in practice, we would also 
expect that digital platforms may generate multiple data sets with common inputs for different 
purposes of its own)235.  
We discussed the challenges associated with ‘opt out’ arrangements earlier in this section236. The 
third approach, which involves the retention of the data by the incumbent platform but 
the obligation for them to facilitate its interrogation by potential competitors seems in 
many ways the most attractive in theory. However, the ability of the incumbent platform to 
control the interfaces through which the data is interrogated (and to itself have access to the insights 
which its competitors might derive from the interrogation of the data) means that these 





234 Note that this does not imply that non-personal data is of lesser value than personal data. Many forms of non-personal data, 
such as intellectual property, have very great commercial value. The point is rather than data which relates to identifiable persons 
is likely to be more valuable if the identifiers are present in the data, than if they have been removed. 
235 Krämer, Schnurr and Broughton Micova raise a separate concern, namely that de-anonymisation of data that has been properly 
anonymized would then compromise the privacy of individuals. They propose legal sanctions against those who attempt to de-
anonymised shared data sets (without saying whether those sanctions would be applied by the regulator that facilitates the 
sharing of the data, by the data protection authority or by some other body), p.92. This would complement an obligation on the 
part of regulated platform to anonymise aggregated data before it is shared, an obligation which we would expect to be enforced 
by the regulator. 
236 The OECD also note that ‘opt out’ arrangements allow user to retain a degree of control over their data which anonymization 
does not: ‘A bigger concern might be that mandating FRAND access without an opt-out option for users would remove the ability 
of a consumer to exclude other’s from accessing their data and hence reduce the value of a consumer’s data, in effect transferring 






Data sharing for digital markets contestability: towards a governance framework 
access seekers and the provider of access to data. Amongst other things, this is likely to mean that 
the regulatory overheads associated with overseeing such arrangements would also be considerably 
higher. One potential way to reduce this would involve transferring the data to a ‘neutral’ or 
independent entity, with which both the access provider and the access seekers would then interact 
on equal terms237. However, this such ‘structural separation’ of the data assets is likely to be a very 
complex and difficult arrangement to implement and enforce and may encounter the same 
requirements for user consents and other barriers that we have identified with the other 
approaches238.  
5.1.3.3 Other aspects relating to the scope of data to be shared 
(i) Heterogeneity of requirements from potential entrants  
It seems likely that those seeking access to data to support their entry into adjacent markets and/or 
to facilitate innovation are likely to have a wide range of different requirements when it comes to the 
volume and nature of the data to which they seek to access. These requirements may also change 
over time. The arrangements for sharing data will need to reflect this.  
In this report, we have proposed two broad categories of data that might be shared. The first is 
provided and observed data that relates to specific individuals. This data is likely to be relatively 
limited in volume and straightforward to define, although the volume and variety of observed data 
acquired by large digital platforms can still be very considerable indeed. Our initial view is that all 
user data falling within this category would be required to be shared from the outset unless 
the incumbent platform could provide good reasons as to why some data might be withheld or 
provided separately239. We would also anticipate those data sharing arrangements for data relating 
to individuals would likely be implemented before arrangements were fully in place to support the 
sharing of aggregated data (although, as we explain elsewhere, we would expect there to be 
synergies between the two sets of arrangements, particularly as regards common technical 
interfaces, standards, and the physical infrastructure to support sharing). 
The position with aggregated provided and particularly observed data is more complex since 
the volume of data that could potentially share could be overwhelming. Many new entrants would 
likely be unable to store, let alone process, the data sets that have been acquired by the world’s 
largest digital platforms (which may also be a reason to favour the ‘data interrogation’ model for the 
sharing of aggregated data, in which the underlying data is retained on the infrastructure of the 
incumbent platform). Some degree of disaggregation may therefore be required to make the 
data usable for competitors. It is common in other contexts for the access provider to be required 
to develop a menu of options or a ‘reference offer’, often in collaboration with access seekers and 
under the oversight of the regulator, to define the different types of assets that might be shared, 
and the conditions under which each will occur. Although regulators may be tempted to allow 
platforms to themselves come to commercial agreements about the scope and other characteristics 
of the data to which access is to be provided, experience from access arrangements in other sectors 
suggests that agreement will not always be forthcoming240. Data holders and potential competitors 
will have conflicting interests, which are likely to lead to disputes as to what and how assets should 
be shared. But potential competitors are also likely to disagree amongst themselves. It seems likely 





237 This approach is also proposed by Prufer (2020) 
238 For some of the challenges, see Krämer, Schnurr and Broughton Micova, p.91 
239 As noted previously, Krämer, Schnurr and Bourghton Micova argue that data that is volunteered by users such as content or 
GPS data should be withheld. 
240 The fact that the participants in the Data Transfer Project are co-operating to share data suggest to us that the question of 
the scope of data to be shared has already been resolved by the GDPR in that case and/or that the participants do not see the  
arrangements arising from the DTP as having great competitive significance. That said, we have no insights into the extent to 
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that it should be much easier for access providers to serve a wide range of different requirements 
than is often the case when access is being provided to physical assets such as cables or pipes. 
(ii) Geographic scope 
Two further questions arise in this context. First, it would appear unsatisfactory for an incumbent 
digital platform to be obliged by different regulators to supply different types of data in different 
Member States if the same competition concerns were to have been identified in each instance. That 
suggests to us either that the European Commission should either ensure co-ordination amongst 
national regulatory authorities or that the determination of the data to be shared and the menu to 
be offered should rest with the Commission itself, or a designated agency, and should apply on a 
pan-European basis. 
Second, a question arises concerning the sharing of aggregate data by digital platforms which may 
operate both within Europe and beyond, as many do. The data which a platform may be required to 
share at the request of an individual user will be limited to and determined by the identity of that 
individual user. The request of an Italian user of Google to transfer their data under the GDPR cannot 
result in the transfer of data that Google has acquired from its operations in the United States, or 
likely even in another Member State. However, the same considerations may not apply in the case 
of aggregated data, where the geographic scope of the data which may be required to be transferred 
could be: 
- Data acquired from users, or relating to users, to whom services are provided within a specific 
Member State; 
- Data acquired from users, or relating to users, throughout the entirety of the European 
Union;  
- Data acquired from users, or relating to users, to whom services are provided both inside 
and outside of the European Union. 
The broader the geographic scope of the data to be transferred, the greater the volume of data and, 
potentially, the greater the variation in it. We noted earlier that both volume and variation may be 
sources of competitive advantage, and markets may be more contestable if data to which access is 
obtained has been acquired across a wider geographic market or larger population. On the other 
hand, user preferences and behaviour may also vary significantly between the Member States or 
between regions, and more localised data may have a higher value than data derived from elsewhere. 
We have no view on the appropriate geographic scope of the data that a platform might be obliged 
to transfer, but a regulator would need to determine what it is. If this were to include data that was 
acquired from the provision of services to users outside of the European Union (but which was 
necessary to facilitate competition within the European Union), then European policymakers may 
need to consider how such obligations would sit alongside privacy or other regulatory provisions in 
other regions.  
5.2 The conditions of sharing 
There are several other matters where the intervention or the co-ordinating role of a regulator will 
be required. Ctrl-Shift (2019) presents the findings of a series of personal data sharing trials which 
were undertaken in the UK in 2019 provides a useful overview and includes, in addition to the issues 
already discussed: 
- The need for a clear definition of liability when data is transferred from one organisation to 
another;  
- The need for the transfer process to be easy for the user so that the cost – in the time taken 
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- The need for common standards and processes for revoking data sharing so that users can 
be confident data sharing has ceased; 
- The need for education so that users are confident about both their rights and the benefits 
they might obtain from authorising the sharing of data; 
- User-friendly verification, authentication and access control processes – not passwords; 
- The possibility of extending data access between many different sectors of the economy, to 
realise benefits from complementary innovation and synergies. 
Many of these issues are of greater relevance to data relating to individual users than to the sharing 
of aggregated data, but some apply to both. We consider some of them in more detail below.  
5.2.1 Technical standardisation  
As noted earlier, the evidence as to what makes for effective data sharing and what has inhibited 
sharing between organisations in the past241 suggests that collaboration is required amongst a 
significant number of the parties that are likely to be required to provide data access, or which might 
stand to benefit from it, to first develop a common set of standards to govern how it should work. 
‘Standards’ in this context relate both to the external interfaces or APIs which organisations develop 
to transfer data between them, and to the models which govern how data is structured and labelled 






241 Deloitte (2016), Ctrl-Shift (2019) 
242 Benson (2009)  explains: ‘Data is defined as the “symbolic representation of something that depends, in part, on its metadata 
for its meaning.” It follows therefore that the quality of the metadata must play an important part in determining data quality. 
Metadata gives data meaning. For example “50-02-01” is a meaningless string of characters but apply the metadata “Date of 
Birth” and it becomes meaningful data. To make it unambiguous we need to have syntax such as CCYY-MM-DD and the associated 
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As the OECD explains: 
‘Even when commonly used machine-readable formats are used for accessibility, 
interoperability is sometimes not guaranteed. These common formats may enable “syntactic” 
interoperability, i.e. the transfer of “data from a source system to a target system using data 
formats that can be decoded on the target system”. But they do not guarantee “semantic” 
interoperability, “defined as transferring data to a target such that the meaning of the data 
model is understood”. Both, syntactic and semantic interoperability are needed. Besides 
being accessible and interoperable, data need to be findable. This may require that data be 
catalogued and/or searchable.’243 
Without giving thought to these issues, there is a risk that the first digital platform to be obliged to 
transfer data will develop the APIs and other standards to do so without consideration of the interests 
or views of others who may be required to do so subsequently. Faced with an obligation to share 
data, a platform is likely to seek to minimise both its costs and disruption to existing business 
practices by proposing that others adopt the proprietary standards in which it has already invested. 
The incumbent platform would, in doing so, become the standards setter for the rest of the industry, 
both at the time at which data access is provided and likely for subsequent changes to the standards. 
Alternatively, different standards may emerge in different contexts, which could create significant 
entry barriers for firms that seek to obtain access to data from several platforms and raise costs for 
all parties.  
There may be benefits from ensuring that standards develop in a way that will allow for 
their application across a wide range of markets beyond those where there are currently 
concerns about large digital platforms. This is the model being adopted by the Australian 
Government in their implementation of Customer Data Rights, where it is envisaged that technical 
standards which are initially being developed to support access to data held by deposit takers and 
other financial institutions will subsequently be used to support access to data held by utility 
companies and other retail organisations. Such ‘anticipatory’ standards-setting seems 
particularly relevant to large digital platforms, whose breadth of activities may raise concerns that 
require data access remedies is potentially a very wide range of different markets – including those 
involving data acquired by the Internet of Things devices, but also healthcare, financial services and 
many other parts of the economy in ways which are difficult to anticipate today. Digital platforms 
(and regulators) should not find themselves in the position of having to develop a new set of technical 
standards each time data access is required to promote competition in a new market.   
Experience suggests that the development of technical standards is best regarded as a 
process rather than being a discrete event. We would expect any regulator to play an 
important role in convening the technical forum in which common standards for APIs and 
data models would be developed in a manner that fairly balances the interests of all 
parties, and ensuring that there is an appropriate representation of interests without the process 
becoming unmanageable. This process could seek to build upon work that has already been 
undertaken by the Data Transfer Project since this already involves a number of the global digital 
platforms who might be expected to be subject to obligations to share data in the future (although 
the regulator would need to ensure that all interests are properly represented and that the resulting 
outputs do not enable incumbent firms to impose unreasonable costs on others). Standards 
developed for Open Banking or other data access arrangements may be of some relevance, but we 
consider that the variety and volume of the data that could potentially be within scope for data 
sharing by large digital platforms are likely to be orders of magnitude greater than anything that has 
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to consider, such as ODPi, supported by the Linux Foundation, which promotes open-source 
standards to facilitate data sharing and ‘is committed to simplification & standardization of the big 
data ecosystem with common reference specifications and test suites’244, or 0AUTH, which develops 
standardised authorisation protocols245. Regulatory oversight will be required to ensure that 
standards facilitate market entry and contestability and can be readily implemented by new entrants 
as well as incumbent providers.  
Experience also suggests that standards and processes will need to evolve as the scope of data to 
be transferred, and the purposes to which it is applied, develop over time. Participants, particularly 
the large incumbent platforms, will require time to reconfigure their existing proprietary models and 
adapt to and converge upon new industry standard data models and processes. Deadlines will need 
to be set and sanctions applied if they are not met. Regulators will need to assess claims that the 
costs of doing so are prohibitive or should be recovered from access seekers rather than being met 
by the incumbent platform themselves (we consider pricing issues later in this report). Interim 
arrangements may be required, such as extracting data in open formats such as JSON or CSV (i.e. 
without the metadata) until the proprietary data models that are employed by today’s digital 
platforms can be adapted to the new standards, or by using ‘adaptors’ or ‘translators’, as the DTP 
proposes to do246.  Not everything may be possible at the outset, and so the conflicting needs of 
different access seekers may have to prioritised and adjudicated upon.  
We explained earlier why we think the issues of participation in the development and adoption of 
common standards is held separate from the question of whether a particular digital platform is 
subject to obligations to share data. We would expect that all of the digital platforms that participate 
in the development of standards would be required to provide access to data relating to specific 
individuals, and would be required to adopt common technical standards to do so. But the question 
of whether they would be obliged, for example, to share aggregate data, and in what circumstances, 
is one that should be considered separately from the implementation of the standards themselves.  
5.2.2 The data transfer process 
In addition to ensuring that the recipient of data is certified and authorised to do so, it will be 
important to ensure that any transfer of data is properly managed. In the case of transfers of 
aggregate data that are initiated by another digital platform, this should be a relatively 
straightforward matter and, as noted earlier, many platforms will already have robust commercial 
arrangements to ensure that data is shared with authentic third parties securely. However, the 
evidence suggests that in the case of data transfers that require the prior consent of an individual 
user, the process of authentication can be more challenging. 
The case of ‘open banking’ illustrates the point. When Open Banking was initially launched in the UK, 
users were redirected from the organisation seeking access to data to the relevant bank or banks, 
to confirm that they consented to the transfer. The bank or banks required users to authenticate 
themselves in the normal way, by using passwords and other authentication methods then employed. 
If a user wanted to ensure access to multiple accounts or sources of data, then they would often be 
required to re-authenticate themselves on each occasion. Joint accounts might require authentication 
from both signatories. 
In this case, the UK banks appear to have had legitimate concerns to protect their users' interests 
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knowledge, but they also had incentives to frustrate access to user data247. The processes they 
adopted proved so cumbersome that only very determined users were prepared to complete the 
process. Recognising this, the Open Banking Implementation Entity then directed the banks to 
implement ‘app to app’ authentication, which allowed users to consent to transfers by using 
fingerprint or facial recognition technologies on their smartphones. This had a material impact on the 
volume of data transfers that were authorised by users, and hence on the potential impact of the 
data access measures for competition248. However, we also note there are concerns that the 
requirement that users of Open Banking re-consent to the services every 90 days, as required by 
the Second Payment Services Directive, continues to represent a barrier to adoption. 
Digital platforms such as Facebook and Google already offer their authentication services to third 
party platforms (Google Sign In) which allow their users to connect to those platforms without the 
need to re-authenticate249. Two large digital platforms, Google and Apple, supply the operating 
systems for the majority of the world’s smartphones (and Microsoft and Apple for most PCs), and so 
the adoption of fingerprint, eye or facial recognition as a means of authenticating consents for data 
transfers ought, in our view, to be feasible provided these firms are involved in the process. 
Regulatory oversight may be required to ensure that it is implemented in a manner which both 
safeguards the interests of users and achieves the objective of promoting competition. Some 
commentators go further and argue that the ‘digital identities’ of users ought to be administered 
by an independent third party (which, as noted, is a feature of some PDS providers), or even by 
Government bodies, rather than by the platforms themselves250. 
User authentication is one aspect of the process involved in transferring data from one party to 
another, and one which we have seen presents an opportunity for an incumbent digital platform to 
frustrate the implementation of measures to promote competition251. Experience of other measures, 
such as the implementation of number portability between telecommunications operators or 
switching between energy providers suggests that there will be many other opportunities for anti-
competitive conduct. As noted earlier, a prerequisite for the effective implementation of data sharing 
measures, irrespective of the purpose, will be trusted on the part of the users and organisations who 
stand to benefit from it. Actions that create doubt or uncertainty about the reliability of the process, 
or the risks involved, will tend to favour the incumbent platform and reduce the volume of transfers 
that occur.  
We note that several studies of data sharing arrangements that require the consents of individual 
users place emphasis not only on the ease of using the data transfer process itself but also on the 





247 As has otherwise occurred in the past in cases where user authentication was much weaker, as was the case with the 
implementation of carrier selection in the early years of telecommunications liberalisation, particularly in the US. This process of 
transferring users without their consent was known as ‘slamming’, see https://www.fcc.gov/general/slamming-policy 
248 Fingleton/Open Data Institute, op cit p.23: ‘One company we spoke to, Account Technologies, experienced an approximate 
60% increase in customer conversions from one bank’s customers after it implemented the app-to-app standard, telling us: “the 
results were absolutely astounding.” This approach is now mandatory for the CMA9.’ 
249 www.developers.google.com/identity  
250 Experience of digital identities varies significantly between Member States. The UK has tried (and failed) to promote market-
based solutions through the Verify.gov programme, initially assuming that banks would take the lead, see ‘Implementing a21st 
century approach to e-identity’, Computer Weekly, January 2020. In contrast, Estonia has issued every citizen with an e-identity, 
see https://e-estonia.com/solutions/e-identity/id-card/. To date,13 Member States have pre-notified at least one national e-
identity scheme, in accordance with the requirements of the Electronic Identification Regulation (eIDAS), 2014/910. The argument 
for a ‘business line restriction’ for such ‘ancillary services’ is made by Krämer, Schnurr and Broughton Micova, see p.84-5 
251 Fingelton/Open Data Institute note that under the Second Payment Systems Directive, users are required to fully re-authorise 
their permissions every 90 days. Although ostensibly to reaffirm customer consents and retain customer control, this provides an 
incumbent platform with a periodic win back opportunity: ‘The current PSD2 legislation requires a full reauthorisation every 90 
days, which can make Open Banking products cumbersome for users and lead to user attrition for TPPs, increasing costs for 
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doing so252. Even if the benefits to an individual user, in terms of being able to switch between 
platforms or obtain access to complementary services, seem self-evident to regulators, many users 
may not be aware of them (as we discussed earlier when considering the case for ‘opt outs’). 
Regulation may be required to ensure that digital platforms inform users of their rights or even to 
inform potential entrants of the opportunities that are available to them.  
Even if this is done, the requirement that individual users must themselves initiate the transfer of 
certain data provides a potential opportunity for the incumbent platform to introduce incentives that 
would be intended to deter the user from completing the process. It is difficult to anticipate what 
form these inducements might take. Users might, for example, be targeted with offers of premium 
services at no charge or other inducements if they were to cancel the transfer. Or they might be 
presented with pop up notifications by the incumbent platform drawing attention to the risks of 
authorising third party access to their data253. Balancing the interests of users, who may stand to 
benefit from receiving such targeted offers and may consider the threat of initiating a data transfer 
as a means of restoring some power in the other unequal bargaining relationship they have with 
large digital platforms, to facilitate competition more generally will be a challenge. In the case of pop 
ups, the incumbent platform may argue that it has a legitimate responsibility to warn users of the 
risks when they authorise the transfer of data to a third party254. Given the competing interests, this 
may be another instance where a regulator might convene an industry working group, 
composed of representatives of both those platforms with obligations to share data and 
those that hope to acquire access to it, to develop a set of rules and processes to which all 
will then be required to adhere.  
5.2.3 Rights of redress and other contractual matters 
Even if clear rules and processes are governing the transfer of data from one party to another, users 
and organisations will still have concerns about accountability and redress if the process does fail in 
some way. This could involve a failure to comply, either at all or in part, with a request to share data, 
a delay in doing so, or a failure on the part of the data recipient to then manage the data appropriately 
or use it for the purpose for which it was intended. There is a wide range of potential scenarios and 
harms that might result. In complex transactions involving multiple parties, users or organisations 
will worry that failures result in each party assigning responsibility for the error or failure to the 
other. The individual user may find themselves in the middle of a lengthy and complex dispute, in 
which the large platforms will enjoy significant information advantages. Without some assurance that 
their interests will be protected, many will conclude that any benefits from data sharing are 
outweighed by the risks.  
Similar considerations may apply for organisations, particularly new entrants. They may fear that 
they would be unable to obtain appropriate redress for non-performance or they may be uncertain 
about the potential risks and costs they might be exposed to from their users in the event of their 





252 Ctrl-Shift (2018), p.12: ‘Consumers have a lack of know-how and understanding of the digital market, and limited knowledge 
about their data, how it is used, and how they could use it. This makes the individuals vulnerable to abuse and lacking in the 
skills to access the opportunity’. 
253 There have been many disputes about the use of pop ups with ‘security warnings’ being displayed to users seeking to change 
their default browser settings, for example. Similar pop ups could be displayed by incumbent platforms when receiving an 
authentication request from a user to provide data access to a third party, even if the third party had been authorized to obtain 
access by a regulator. Regulators may find themselves having to intervene to address such practices. 
254 Egan/Facebook (2019) argues: ‘Service providers might explore tools to help users understand security risks and protocols 
for their downloaded data. Providers could also consider giving users guidance on how to inspect recipient organizations for 
potential abuse or insufficient security safeguards. For instance, providers could teach users ways to confirm the authenticity of 
the recipient organization (that it is what it says it is); check the website security for recipient organizations (e.g., the difference 
between HTTP and HTTPS); secure their devices when they download data (e.g., not using public Wi-Fi when downloading data); 
and identify whether the recipient organization has appropriate policies in place (e.g., checking privacy policies to determine 
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unexpectedly withdrawn)255. Under conditions in which a large digital platform is obliged to share 
data with potential competitors, there is likely to be an acute information asymmetry and bargaining 
imbalance between the organisation providing access to data and the organisation acquiring it. These 
need to be addressed by a regulatory regime which clarifies the rights which access seekers 
have, and the processes they can pursue, in the event of non-compliance by the incumbent 
platform, but also one which clarifies the risks and potential costs to which the access 
seekers themselves are exposed if they fail to comply with their obligations. 
It seems clear that where a large digital platform is obliged to provide access to data to promote 
competition, the platform itself should not be in a position to dictate the uses to which the data is to 
be put, how it is to be managed or the penalties that might be payable in the event of non-compliance 
with such provisions. These are all issues that would normally be addressed by contract involuntary 
data access arrangements.256 Otherwise, the large digital platform is likely to be able to exploit its 
market power to impose conditions that would be intended to inhibit entry or otherwise restrict 
competition. At the same time, however, the incumbent digital platform may have legitimate 
concerns that data which it has acquired from users may be put to illegitimate or illegal uses for 
which it may incur significant reputational costs257. Some argue that a dominant platform, for 
competition law purposes, might have more onerous obligations concerning safeguarding the rights 
of its users than other firms258.  
Regulators that are independent of the parties to the data transaction and who have strong 
investigative powers can be expected to play an important role in providing the dispute 
resolution processes and means of redress for both individual users and organisations, thereby 
building trust in the measures which are being taken. This will be easier in some cases than others. 
In the Open Banking case, for example, there were already well-developed processes under existing 
financial service regulation for dealing with instances where ‘no fault’ payments are made to 
fraudsters, or where funds need to be recovered. Similar arrangements will need to be devised from 
scratch for cases where data is incorrectly transferred between digital platforms, needs to be 
recovered or deleted, or where there is otherwise a security breach with harmful consequences for 
other parties. These obligations should extend beyond those provided for in the GDPR guidance if 
users and organisations are to be confident in sharing data. At the same time, risks and costs need 
to be appropriately allocated, and should not represent a significant barrier to entry. Having the 
regulator play a central role in the resolution of disputes and the redress of harms also allows the 
regulator to determine where there are improvements to be made in the transfer processes and to 
direct the parties to make improvements to reduce problems in the future. 
A further issue may arise concerning any liabilities arising from certain types of data that may be 
hosted by digital platforms and that are currently subject to the provisions of Articles 12 to 15 of the 





255 Deloitte (2016) identify this issue as a major barrier to (voluntary) data sharing between commercial organisations: ‘Existing 
liability laws are based on the concept of tangible products. Companies cannot be sure whether they can have recourse to this 
legislation for databased products, so prefer to fall back on contractual liability on a case-by-case basis’, although the primary 
focus of their study is data derived from IoT, robotics and autonomous systems. 
256 See the model contracts described in Support Centre for data sharing (2019). 
257 Egan/Facebook (2019) says: ‘In our conversations with stakeholders so far, the general view about these questions has been 
that a transferring entity may—and should—impose some baseline privacy and data protection restrictions around transfers even 
when carrying out the transfer to comply with a portability request. But, as discussed below, questions remain about what kinds 
of conditions are appropriate. Restrictions along the lines of those we impose through Platform strike some as too restrictive to 
be consistent with portability. Our recent settlement with the FTC suggests that some regulators may view Platform-style transfers 
as distinct from portability transfers. Where the line is between these two categories will likely be the line between portability 
and other data transfers’, p.10 
258 Cremer et al say:’ Dominant firms may be subject to a particularly stringent data protection standard under both tests. In 
protecting consumer choice vis-à-vis dominant firms, competition law and data protection law can thus complement each other’, 
op cit, p.80 
259 Directive 2000/31 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society 
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concerning data that is provided by users and which the platform may store or transmit (e.g. photos) 
and would be expected to apply to both the donor of data and any recipient. The European 
Commission proposes to revisit these provisions as part of its proposals for a new Digital Services 
Act. Any amendments would then need to be reflected in the liability and redress provisions for any 
data access arrangements between digital platforms. 
5.2.4 Prices for data access 
5.2.4.1 Prices and incentives 
Any regulatory regime for the provision of access to data is likely to require rules governing the 
monetary terms on which access to data is being provided. The incentives upon an access seeker to 
acquire data through the regulatory process rather than engage in its efforts to acquire data by 
competing in a relevant market (or by acquiring the data assets of another firm) will depend, in part, 
on the respective costs of each activity. Experience suggests that one of the challenges in 
implementing regulatory arrangements that provide for access to valuable assets is that competition 
between firms in the commercial arena can quickly be displaced to competition between firms in the 
regulatory arena and the courts260.  
The question of incentives is a complex one when it comes to data. As noted in the introduction, 
unlike many tangible assets to which regulatory access is required, data is non-rivalrous, meaning 
that its consumption by one party does not diminish the opportunities for others. The marginal costs 
of sharing data are also likely to be very low. Some argue that these considerations would support 
the sharing of large volumes of data at no cost to the recipient since the direct costs of implementing 
sharing arrangements may be very low whilst the potential benefits of sharing data are very high. 
This is why ‘open data’ initiatives, which involve the sharing of data held by Governments and other 
public authorities, are invariably undertaken without their being any charge be levied for the data 
that is being shared. 
Under the GDPR, no charges apply (except in exceptional circumstances) when an individual seeks 
access to data which relates to them and which is held by either a commercial or a public organisation 
because the data in question is not considered to be the exclusive intellectual property of the 
organisation which holds it or something which it can sell, but rather something which remains at all 
times under the control of the user261. 
We think the charging arrangements for data sharing to promote competition and innovation remain 
under-researched but are likely to prove quite complex. The primary concern, as noted above, is to 
ensure that both the incumbent digital platform and potential access seekers maintain incentives to 
engage in beneficial economic activities (for users of platforms) whilst data is being shared between 
them. The acquisition of data may be a by-product of these beneficial activities, as when banks that 
provide current account services acquire data about the spending patterns of users which can be 
used to sell them other financial products. In this case, the banks do not supply current account 
services with the primary aim of acquiring spending data and do not rely upon it to provide current 
account banking services (although of course, they use it when cross-selling other financial products 





260 Aside from acquiring data directly from users themselves, firms may also acquire data by acquiring other firms who have 
acquired data. The OECD (2019) report that ‘Some of the largest M&As motivated by access to big data in the last five years 
include: Monsanto’s acquisition of the Climate Corporation, an agriculture analytic firm, for USD 1.1 billion in 2013; IBM’s 
acquisition of a majority share of the Weather Company, a weather forecasting and analytic company, for over USD 2 billion in 
2015 (Waters, 2015[4]); and Alibaba’s total investment of USD 4 billion between 2016 and 2018 to acquire Lazada, a leading e-
commerce platform founded in 2012 in Singapore. Start-ups specialised in big data are also increasingly the target of acquisitions. 
The annual number of these acquisitions increased from more than 100 acquisitions in 2013 to more than 400 acquisitions in 
2017, with the average price paid exceeding USD 1 billion in some quarters’, p.16 
261 Scassa (2018) notes: ‘Personal information is generally not capable of ownership — at least not by the persons to whom it 
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data primarily to support and improve the provision of targeted digital advertising services to their 
advertising customers and do so by offering a wide range of valuable digital services from which they 
otherwise derive no revenues. If they were unable to acquire the data, it is not clear why they would 
offer services to users for free, or at all. 
In the banking example, an individual user’s spending data is acquired by the bank at negligible 
marginal cost, assuming the bank would provide the current account services in any event and earn 
its revenues from sources other than the data. Thus, requiring the bank to share such data with 
potential competitors in other markets for no charge is unlikely to significantly affect its incentives 
to invest in the provision of current account services. There would appear, in other words, the little 
cost to the sharing of data (beyond the direct costs of implementing the arrangements) in terms of 
investments in the market from which the data is being derived. We understand that no charges are 
levied by the banks for account data under the Open Banking arrangements.  
Conversely, allowing the bank to impose significant charges upon access seekers for the provision of 
data which it has itself acquired at minimal cost will distort competition in the adjacent markets for 
which the spending data is an important input by raising the costs of rivals. The competition that is 
thereby lost may deprive users of significant benefits in terms of innovation, quality, or lower prices. 
In these circumstances, there would seem to be a strong case for requiring the sharing of data at 
little or no charge to the access seekers, since the potential costs of doing so are low and the potential 
benefits high. A similar argument appeared to apply in the case concerning terms of which KPN, the 
Dutch telecoms operator, was required to share name, address, and telephone number data, access 
to which was required for competitors to offer directory enquiry services. In that case, the Court of 
Justice decided that KN could only recover the costs associated with the transmission of the 
information to the provider of directories but not for the costs of acquiring such information, which 
could be considered a by-product of providing telephony services for which KPN was already 
remunerated262. 
In a similar vein, Prufer argues that all data, including aggregated data, should be shared by 
certain digital platforms without charge, on the basis that: 
‘that user information is a free by-product of running a service. Some have claimed that 
because obtaining access to more user information helps to improve the quality of one’s 
service, accumulating it is justified as an end in itself. However, the data gathered in this 
way is certain to be transformed into revenue at some point (for instance, through advertising 
or some other sale of access to one’s user groups), and protecting those indirect revenues is 
not a goal of the policy proposal at hand because, in the long run, they are subject to the 
main market-tipping dynamics characterized by Prüfer and Schottmüller (2017). User 
information, therefore, has the attributes of a public good. It is efficient to share it with every 
party that can (potentially) use it as input into its service and that benefits users in the 
end’.263 
We would not characterise the issue in this way, since the accumulation of user data is the primary 
rationale for many of the investments which digital platforms like Google and Facebook and not a 
‘by product’ of them264. We consider that investments by powerful digital platforms, even if they are 
made in markets which they dominate or if they contribute to the revenues which the platforms earn 
from those markets, generally involve some degree of risk and that changing the commercial 
incentives which these firms face (by imposing data sharing obligations upon them) will have an 





262 See p. XX of this report. 
263 Prufer (2020), p.14 
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does not mean that the interests or incentives of the incumbent platforms should be given priority 
over others or that data should not be shared without charge in some circumstances, rather it means 
that regulators will need to engage in a more complex balancing act than Prufer seems to recognise. 
Thus, in the case of Google, requiring Google to share the data it has acquired from user interactions 
with the Android eco-system with potential entrants into complementary markets at no charge could 
be expected to have significant consequences for Google’s incentives and capacity to invest in 
Android (or other as yet unthought of services by which Google might otherwise expect to expand 
the value and scope of observed data which it can acquire from its users). This is because Google 
invests in Android for the primary purpose of acquiring (or retaining access to) user data that is 
generated when users interact with mobile devices and using it to generate revenues in its digital 
advertising business (which then fund the investments in Android, amongst other activities). 
Although the competitive advantages which Google derives from its user data might take time to 
diminish and Google may continue to invest heavily in the Android operating system (and associated 
applications) in the meantime, the commercial advantages which Google might expect to obtain from 
those investments will have reduced to the extent that it is now, and in the future, obliged to share 
them with potential competitors without being compensated for doing so. In the long run, Google 
could either be expected to evolve its business model to rely upon other sources of revenue to 
support its investments in Android265 or to reduce its level. 
The consequences of competition in adjacent markets are also different. In this case, Google faces 
costs in acquiring the data for itself, but potential competitors who can obtain access to the same 
data without charge can avoid it. Competition may again be distorted, but in this case, because 
prices will not reflect the economic costs associated with the supply of the asset. Competition would 
also be distorted if Google were instead to be required to charge prices which were above the costs 
which Google itself faced, and so in this case the risk of distortion is symmetric. 
The purpose of this brief exposition is to show that, as with many regulated access sharing 
arrangements, different incentives and objectives will need to be balanced. Regulators may, 
for example, conclude that the risks (in terms of investment and innovation incentives) from setting 
an access charge for data that is too low may be more than offset by the risks (in terms of competition 
or foreclosure) from setting an access charge that is too high. The magnitude of the risks arising 
from a failure to provide the correct pricing signals may also depend on the scope or volume of data 
that is to be shared. The important point is that it is too simplistic to assume that all data should 
be shared at prices which would only allow the incumbent platform to recover the direct 
costs of implementing the data sharing arrangements, or which would only contribute to 
some proportion of the costs of storing the data, without also having regard to the 
investments that may have been made to acquire the data.  
5.2.4.2 Pricing of data relating to specific individuals 
Our initial view is that there is likely to be a stronger case for ‘zero price’ arrangements for the 
sharing of data that are related to specific individuals than for aggregated data, which we 
consider further below. We note that the Second Payment Services Directive requires access to 
account services to be provided on terms which are ‘objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate 
basis’266 and that charges are not levied between the parties for access to data or the implementation 





265 We have seen an early indication of this when, in early 2019, Google introduced a fee of $10-40 for OEMs who wished to 
install the Google Mobile Services suite of apps onto android devices (although the underlying Operating System remains royalty-
free). This followed the Commission’s decision to require Google to supply the Andoird operating system and Mobile Services 
Suite without pre-installing the Chrome browser, see ‘Google app suite costs as much as $40 per phone under new EU Android 
deal’, The Verge, 19 October 2018, available at https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/19/17999366/google-eu-android-licensing-
terms 
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individual user under the GDPR would also not attract charges, and so it may create distortions if 
similar remedies for competition purposes were instead to require payments to be made. 
It might be argued that data relating to specific individuals can be expected to involve lower costs of 
acquisition or to be acquired for different purposes than aggregate data. However, the aggregate 
data we propose to be shared would likely be derived from the same provided and observed personal 
data as that which would be shared at the request of specific individuals. The justification for 
having no charges is, therefore, more likely to be based on the assumptions that (a) data relating 
to specific individuals could only be useful for firms that are seeking to engage in complementary 
innovation, rather than competing in the core market of the incumbent platform (where charges 
might be more appropriate) (b) any risk to investment or innovation incentives is likely to be minimal 
given that the high transactions costs of sharing data which requires individual user consent will 
impose a natural limit on the volume of data that will be shared (c) other non-economic 
considerations, such as human or other legal rights.    
5.2.4.3 Pricing of aggregated data 
As discussed earlier, existing European regulations do not provide much guidance as to how charges 
for the sharing of aggregated data might be determined. In the case of the Regulation concerning 
the provision of vehicle data to independent repairers, the relevant provision states that 
manufacturers should charge ‘reasonable and proportionate fees’, without indicating how these might 
be assessed in the event of a dispute267. Advisers to the European Commission have suggested that 
a FRAND framework, similar to that adopted by participants who contribute essential patents to 
the development of new industry standards, might provide a suitable precedent268. It is easy to see 
why - in both cases - a firm with exclusive rights over data needs to be appropriately remunerated 
for providing access to data whilst retaining incentives to invest and innovate. However, the 
application of FRAND in determining the level of charges that can be levied has proved very difficult 
to implement in practice. As one commentator noted concerning a leading European ‘excessive 
pricing’ FRAND case (involving Qualcomm):  
‘there is no “magic formula” that would allow a competition authority or a court to determine 
what “fair and reasonable” royalties are since this determination is context-specific. 
Moreover, while determining whether the fairness and reasonability of the price of a physical 
product are excessive is already difficult, that task is even more complex for non-physical 
constructs, such as intellectual property rights. Although several benchmarks were proposed 
to determine whether Qualcomm’s royalties were “fair and reasonable”, these benchmarks 
suffered from major weaknesses, either because they were theoretically unsound or because 
they would raise complex implementation issues.’269  
The OECD has identified several benchmarks that regulators might employ if trying to set prices for 
individual user data, although all of them have shortcomings270. Similar considerations would likely 
apply to the valuation of aggregated data that was transferred in bulk. The benchmarks considered 
by the OECD include: 
- Market prices, such as the prices paid by organisations when acquiring data from 
data brokers or in bi-lateral transactions with each other. At first sight, this is an 
attractive approach until it is realised that regulatory interventions to oblige firms to share 





267 Regulation 2018/858 on the approval and market surveillance of motor vehicles Article 63(1) 
268 “Also, there may be a need to oversee that data access is granted on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms 
– which need to be specified case by case.”, Cremer et al (2019), p.109 
269 Geradin (2013) p.7/8  
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commercial terms. There are therefore unlikely to be any market prices for the data in which 
regulators are interested. The OECD raises other issues, such as the fact that data, as a non-
rivalrous good, may be traded many times. This would also be the case if a digital platform 
were subject to an obligation to provide access to data to a large number of access seekers 
(in UK Open Banking, over 300 entities have now been authorised). Any regulated prices 
would need to ensure that whatever investments the incumbent platform had made and 
which needed to be recovered were appropriately allocated amongst the population of access 
seekers and that there was no over- or under-recovery in aggregate. The costs for each 
recipient in relation to a given set of data assets might be expected to reduce for all with the 
addition of each new access seeker. However, the total number of access seekers from whom 
any costs are to be recovered may be difficult to predict in advance, which may make it 
difficult for both regulators and access seekers themselves to predict the costs they might 
incur (leading to obvious hold up issues if some potential competitors delay entry until it 
becomes clearer whether others will enter too). 
- The revenues of the digital platforms themselves (or revenue per data record), or 
their market capitalisations. This approach also has many difficulties, including the risk 
that such revenues and valuations may include a significant proportion of supernormal profits 
which the digital platforms in question can earn by virtue of the very lack of contestability 
which the regulator is seeking to address. Besides, aggregate measures such as revenues or 
market value capture a large number of other factors, including non-data related activities 
and other sources of legitimate competitive advantage. 
- Experiments with users to determine the value, in price terms, they ascribe to 
different types of data. This can involve, for example, asking users what they would have 
to be paid to disclose certain data about themselves or how much they might be prepared to 
spend to keep it private. These yields interesting results but have many of the challenges 
associated with consumer surveys of this kind and regulators are unlikely to be prepared to 
rely upon them without other evidence. 
- Evidence from the prices which organisations pay to insure themselves against the 
loss of data, or the costs they report as having incurred when such breaches 
happen. 
The OECD shows that very large variations in data values can be produced depending on the 
valuation methodology adopted and when the valuation is obtained. We do not consider it likely that 
any particular methodology will emerge to dominate in the foreseeable future. However, we do 
recommend that regulators consider ways in which commercial markets for data might be further 
encouraged, particularly concerning personal data of the kind that is retained by PDSs. The benefits 
of such developments may not come only from the widespread adoption of such services by users 
(and the potential for disrupting the source of market power which data access remedies are 
otherwise intended to address, something we discuss further below), but also by their role in 
establishing the market value of different types of data which regulators could then use as a basis 
for setting regulated prices. 
The lack of methodologies for setting regulated prices for data reflects the current dearth of examples 
of such arrangements in the world. However, one potentially interesting area concerns how financial 
exchanges, such as stock exchanges, sell market data to the participants of those 
exchanges. Such data includes bid/offer prices, volumes of transactions, and other data which is 
generated by, and required for, the trading of securities. This data is ‘observed data’ in the sense 
that it is generated through the interactions between users of the trading platform. It is customarily 
sold, on commercial terms, by the exchanges to those who wish to trade. 
In recent years, both the US Securities and Exchange Commission and the UK Financial Conduct 
Authority have expressed concerns about the rising costs of trading and, in the latter case, have now 
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prices charged to traders, not all of which may be feasible271. But, so far as we are aware, no 
regulations have been adopted and no prices have been set. If that happens, we would expect them 
to offer useful insights for any regulator engaged in the setting of prices for data to be transferred 
between digital platforms. 
5.2.5 Promoting disruptive business models 
The preceding discussion has focussed on the issues regulators and policymakers will need to address 
in implementing arrangements to ensure that access is provided to data that is held by large digital 
platforms to promote contestable markets. It proceeds on the assumption that such platforms derive 
significant competitive advantages from their accumulation and management of large volumes of 
valuable data. This appears to have been a reasonable presumption during a period in digital data 
that has come to be stored, organised and manipulated by large commercial organisations running 
the massive centralised computing systems that have historically been required to facilitate billions 
of transactions securely and efficiently. Measures to promote the sharing of data in such 
circumstances then tend to envisage regulators requiring or overseeing the transfer of data from one 
centralised source to another firm employing a similar business and technological model to promote 
competition between them. 
Although not the primary focus of this report, it is important to note that advances in technology, 
particularly concerning cryptography, and changes in the purposes for which data is acquired or 
used, particularly with the growth in the Internet of Things, may mean that data comes to be acquired 
and controlled under different organisational arrangements in the future. As the New York Times 
noted: 
‘The true believers behind blockchain platforms like Ethereum argue that a network of 
distributed trust is one of those advances in software architecture that will prove, in the long 
run, to have historic significance. That promise has helped fuel the huge jump in 
cryptocurrency valuations. But in a way, the Bitcoin bubble may ultimately turn out to be a 
distraction from the true significance of the blockchain. The real promise of these new 
technologies, many of their evangelists believe, lies not in displacing our currencies but in 
replacing much of what we now think of as the internet, while at the same time returning 
the online world to a more decentralized and egalitarian system’272 
The European Commission, in its 2020 data strategy communication, has made a related point: 
‘The volume of data produced in the world is growing rapidly, from 33 zettabytes in 2018 to 
an expected 175 zettabytes in 2025. Each new wave of data represents major opportunities 
for the EU to become a world leader in this area. Furthermore, how data is stored and 
processed will change dramatically over the coming 5 years. Today 80% of the processing 
and analysis of data takes place in data centres and centralised computing facilities, and 
20% in smart connected objects, such as cars, home appliances or manufacturing robots, 
and computing facilities close to the user (‘edge computing’). By 2025 these proportions are 
likely to be inverted’273 
We highlighted earlier the potential role of new organisational models for data management, such 
as PDSs like Solid, a venture established by Sir Tim Berners-Lee which could significantly disrupt the 
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promoting the trails of such models with organisations drawn from across the European Union275. 
Although it is difficult - and well beyond the scope of this report – to assess how these and other 
initiatives might affect the functioning of digital markets in the future, policymakers will need to 
consider them and may wish to consider measures which would be intended to accelerate or 
otherwise promote disruptive innovation of this kind, either in addition to or instead of 
the measures to promote the transfer of data between digital platforms which are the focus 
of this report. For example, the Commission’s latest European Data Strategy Communication referred 
to earlier, indicates that European funding may be allocated to promote such activities.276 
5.2.6 Exiting from data sharing arrangements 
This report has thus far focussed on the issues and obstacles to be addressed by a regulator seeking 
to implement data sharing arrangements to ensure the contestability of digital markets. However, 
we end this section by highlighting challenges that can arise after a regulator has successfully 
introduced access obligations into the market. There is no reason to expect that such arrangements, 
once established, should remain in place in perpetuity. There are also risks that innovation and 
investment will be inhibited or deferred if firms assume a position of ‘regulatory dependency’ from 
which there is no prospect of escape. As noted earlier, there is a tendency in these circumstances 
for the field of competition to shift from competing for the attention of users to lobbying the regulator.   
Equally, however, it is not clear that they should be subject to an arbitrary ‘sunset’ date at which 
point any obligations to share data would cease. Such arrangements might continue voluntarily at 
that point, but if they did not then their withdrawal would be likely to inhibit competition and disrupt 
the provision of services to users in a way which we think would be difficult to justify. The regulator 
cannot predict when the measures are being implemented how markets will develop in the future, 
particularly in fast-moving and unpredictable digital markets, including new markets that may not 
even be discernible at the time. A more flexible approach will therefore be required. 
One approach is for the regulator to undertake a periodic re-assessment of the data sharing 
arrangements and their justification. This could involve, as occurs under the European Electronic 
Communication Code every 5 years, a periodic review of the ‘gatekeeper platform’ designations from 
which obligations to share different types of data will have been derived and which we discussed in 
Section 5.1.1. It may be that the measures that have been taken to promote entry into niche markets 
have been so successful that the regulated platform no longer enjoys a ‘gatekeeper’ position in its 
core market. More likely, the entrants into complementary markets may have acquired sufficient 
scale (in terms of users from whom they can obtain volunteered and observed data independently 
of any sharing arrangements) to mean that they no longer require access to data held by the 
regulated platform. On the other hand, since the main purpose of the data sharing measures is likely 
to be to prevent foreclosure in new but as yet unknown niche markets into which new, but as yet 
unknown competitors might seek to enter, and since the possibility of such markets arising is unlikely 
to have obvious limits, it may be that the data sharing measures we envisage in this report would 
persist for much longer than the needs of any individual access seeker. 
This raises the question of whether individual access seekers should be incentivised to reduce 
their dependency on the data sharing arrangements over time, even if they remain generally 
available to newer entrants. A version of this approach was adopted in the telecommunications sector 
and known as the ‘ladder of investment’. In this view, regulators should, over time, inflate the 
charges payable by those who relied on regulated access to networks, thereby increasing their costs 
relative to the option of investing in their facilities. The analogy for our purposes might involve the 
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to specific individuals, from a price of zero) for those platforms that had already been relying upon 
shared data for some time. As the cost of shared data increased, it might be expected to incentivise 
access seekers to acquire data directly from users instead now that they had the scale to do so. 
Alternatively (or also), the regulator might reduce over time the scope (or quantity) of the data to 
which access is provided. 
There are, however, several significant objections to this concerning data sharing. First, it 
is not clear that such incentives are required with the data sharing measures we propose. New 
platforms will need to acquire as many users as possible if they are to succeed and, by doing so, will 
acquire data. Conversely, if the competing platform already has powerful incentives to acquire its 
users and hence data (given network effects and other features of digital markets277), it is unlikely 
to be able to avoid the additional charges that are applied by the regulator by acquiring more users 
(and hence data) than is already the case. There is a danger in these circumstances that raising the 
costs of data access will simply represent a transfer of rents from one platform to another without 
having any impact on their conduct, or that it might prove counterproductive. Second, it will be clear 
that applying such a policy would be very difficult in practice. We have already noted that the issue 
of determining appropriate charges for access to data is likely to be very challenging, with a high 
possibility of error (in either direction). Adjusting these charges to incentivise some forms of 
competition without excluding others would be no easier. Regulators in the telecommunications 
sector sometimes proved unable, in the face of lobbying from firms who were dependent on access 
to regulated services, to inflate charges in the way that had been originally anticipated and the 
application of the policy produced mixed results.278  
This does not mean that regulators should simply ignore the risk that data sharing 
measures might, over time, distort competition for users and their data. Indeed, this may 
be even more important if, as we anticipate, data sharing measures could, if implemented, 
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6 Policy recommendations 
The sharing of data is a collaborative process, involving an organisation which currently controls 
data, and the intended recipient and, in many cases, a person to whom the data relates and whose 
consent may be required before a transfer can be made. Aligning the interests of these different 
parties and overcoming other barriers to sharing can prove to be a complex and difficult task, as 
evidenced by the low levels of voluntary data sharing that we often observe today. 
Some form of regulatory intervention is likely to be required when control over data is a source of 
market power. In this study, we identify several issues that the regulator will need to address if data 
sharing is to be an effective remedy to concerns about market contestability and the capacity of 
those controlling data to leverage the advantages it confers into new or adjacent markets. Some of 
these issues have already arisen and been addressed in existing regulated data sharing 
arrangements, such as Open Banking, or voluntary arrangements such as the Data Transfer Project. 
Others have yet to be fully considered. 
Regulating recipients as well as donors 
The first conclusion is that regulation for data sharing should not be viewed as being limited 
to the oversight of a small number of large platforms that might be obliged to share data. 
Instead, it will require strict oversight of potentially a very large number of smaller firms 
seeking access to such data. This is particularly important because we conclude that it will not 
be practical or desirable for regulators to seek to restrict the use to which the data is 
subsequently to be put (despite access to the data being required to preserve the contestability 
of adjacent markets into which the incumbent platform might otherwise leverage its data 
advantages). Given the potentially wide range of applications to which data could be used, and the 
wide range of organisations which may require access to such data, individual users will not consent 
to the sharing of data unless they can be confident that any recipient of the data will keep it secure, 
adhere to other conditions of sharing and so preserve trust in, and the integrity of the overall data 
sharing process. The controllers of commercial data will also not comply with sharing obligations if 
misuse by others puts their reputation or commercial position at risk, whilst potential recipients of 
data may be putting themselves in a position of acute dependency (since they may rely upon 
uninterrupted data sharing to sustain their services for users) and will not do so unless they consider 
that they have adequate protections and rights of redress.  
It follows that if regulated data sharing is to be adopted at a significant scale, regulators 
will need to establish an effective regime for overseeing those in receipt of data and for 
enforcing the rules effectively on an ongoing basis. This will need to include rules governing 
the resolution of disputes and determining how liabilities fall if consumers or other firms are harmed.  
Since those who receive data are unlikely to hold market power or otherwise to be guilty of any 
abuse, we consider that oversight of such arrangements is unlikely to be an appropriate task for a 
competition authority and will instead require a dedicated regulatory body. 
Extensive obligations to adopt common technical standards  
Secondly, all forms of data sharing will require the adoption of common technical standards by 
both those sharing data and those in receipt of it. The same standards should be adopted for 
all the different forms of data sharing that we propose. We consider that potential recipients of data 
have sufficient incentives to adopt the standards since they would not otherwise obtain access to the 
data they require. Those platforms that have been directed to share data will need to be obliged to 
adopt the relevant standards, such that data can be shared in a form and manner which supports 
the regulatory objectives. In the early stages of regulation, this may impose additional costs on the 
newly regulated entities as they have to restructure the way they manage their existing data assets 
or adopt new external interfaces. This may also contribute to delay in the implementation of new 
data sharing obligations, which will be a particular concern if the objective of data sharing is to 
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regulation should promote the very extensive adoption of common technical standards, both by 
organisations which may not currently have obligations to share data (but which might be required 
to in the future), those who may not currently request access to data (but will want to preserve the 
option to do in the future), and concerning forms of data which may not currently be shared (but 
which may be required to be shared in future). This ‘anticipatory’ approach to technical 
standards means that regulators should consider the application of common technical 
standards to data sharing in sectors well beyond the existing scope of large digital 
platforms, as has been proposed in Australia. In short, we recommend regulators should 
decouple requirements to adopt common technical standards from obligations to share 
data in the expectation that the former will be much more extensive than the latter. 
Anticipating and policing of anti-competitive conduct 
Thirdly, regulators should anticipate that any data sharing process is likely to vulnerable 
to anti-competitive conduct which is intended to inhibit the effective sharing or use of 
data.  Several aspects should receive particular attention. First, those obliged to share data 
may seek to use their influence over the development of common technical standards to limit the 
scope, delay the implementation, or otherwise raise the costs of data sharing for other parties. These 
firms have a legitimate interest in shaping their development - but so too will potential recipients of 
data. We recognise that several existing data standardisation initiatives could provide useful 
contributions and regulators will want to ensure that industry participants collaborate in further work 
rather than seeking to impose their requirements from the outset. However, regulators will need to 
be prepared to intervene in the development process or if there are disputes that need to be resolved. 
Second, some types of anti-competitive conduct may be presented as being necessary to protect the 
interests of users. For example, it might be argued that ‘pop ups’ that warn a user that they are 
about to consent to the transfer of their data to a third party, and which ask them whether they wish 
to do so, are a legitimate safeguard against unintended or unauthorised transfers. Our first 
recommendation – that recipients of data be strictly regulated – is partly intended to remove the 
justification for such practices. Finally, digital platforms may seek to impose restrictive commercial 
terms in their data sharing agreements, intended to limit the capacity of potential recipients to 
compete with the platform. Experience of applying access arrangements in other contexts suggests 
that different forms of anti-competitive conduct can emerge over time (as some practices are stopped 
but others replace them) and will require constant scrutiny.  
The most important and difficult role for regulators will lie in determining the type and scope of data 
that is to be shared and which organisations should be obliged to share it. We conclude that two 
forms of regulated sharing are likely to dominate. 
Recommendations on sharing of data about individual users 
The first form of sharing – and the one which is likely to be capable of being implemented 
first - will be the sharing or porting of data about individual users. This mode of sharing is 
likely to be appropriate when the individual concerned will benefit directly from the sharing process, 
likely through the provision by the recipients of complimentary services in adjacent markets. The 
value of the data, in this case, lies in its depth and personalised nature, rather than in its volume. 
The process to enable the sharing of the data will generally require that the user consent to the 
transfer and the process by which these user consents are obtained and authenticated will have a 
significant impact on the effectiveness of this remedy. Technologies such as biometric ids will have 
a significant role to play.  
The data to be transferred would be data provided by the user to the platform and data 
derived from observations of that individual’s interactions with the platform. It would 
exclude ‘inferred data’ that is created by the platform itself (as well as excluding third party data 
that is purchased from other sources). The presumption should be that all relevant data about an 
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The overall competitive impact of these data sharing arrangements will necessarily be limited, given 
the relatively high transaction costs associated with first obtaining individual consents from every 
user and the relatively small volumes of data that will be transferred each time consent is obtained. 
Over time, however, data that is obtained in this way could accumulate and be used for other 
purposes. For this reason, we recommend that obligations to share data about individual 
users in the way we propose should be quite extensive and apply to digital platforms which 
we would describe as meeting the ‘gatekeeper minus’ threshold. This would mean a strong 
presumption that the obligation to share would apply to all platforms which the regulator had 
determined as having ‘gatekeeper’ or equivalent status and to some others as well. However, this 
obligation would not apply to every platform or firm, and so would be less extensive than, for 
example, the ‘data portability’ obligations which apply under the GDPR (which are narrower 
in scope). We do not recommend that the European Commission seek to expand the existing GDPR 
data portability requirements to address the competition concerns we consider in this report and 
conclude that a separate regime, specifically designed for this purpose, is the better approach. 
We consider that there is a case for a regulator to require the sharing of individual user 
data without any form of payment passing between the donor and the recipient. Each party 
would be expected to bear its costs concerning the transfer. 
Consideration of ‘opt out’ arrangements 
It is unclear at this stage how effective the arrangements for the sharing of individual data outlined 
above would prove to be. However, there is a risk that the high transaction costs and uncertain 
benefits continue to deter users and would render this approach relatively ineffective in preserving 
the contestability of the markets we are concerned with. In such circumstances, we recommend 
the European Commission should consider more radical approaches, including changes to 
the GDPR which would allow for individual users to ‘opt out’ their personal data (rather 
than requiring them to ‘opt in’) when transfers of their data are initiated - provided always that the 
recipients of the data comply with the relevant regulatory conditions.  
We recognise that this may represent some loss of consumer sovereignty over their data, but 
consider that such a trade-off may need to be made if data sharing arrangements are to achieve 
their aim of ensuring contestability in digital markets. It is far from clear that the interests of 
European consumers are better served by preserving rights to consent whilst allowing new digital 
markets to be dominated by existing ‘gatekeeper’ platforms. Indeed, in the long run, the privacy 
rights of European consumers may be better served by measures that more effectively promote 
competition. We, therefore, recommend the European Commission consider provisions in 
the forthcoming Data Act to enable the use of ‘opt out’ arrangements for the sharing of 
personal data to preserve market contestability under certain prescribed conditions. There 
is certainly no precedent for such arrangements since control of personal data sets has often changed 
without individual user ‘opt ins’ when one firm acquires another firm or when one firm acquires 
another’s data assets.   
Recommendations on the bulk sharing of user data 
The second form of sharing will be the bulk transfer of aggregate user data. As with the first 
category, this would involve sharing data provided by individual users or arising from their 
interactions with the platform but would exclude inferences that are generated by the platform itself. 
This mode of sharing is likely to support entry into adjacent or emerging markets, with such entry 
being supported by insights derived from large data sets, or even to support competition in some or 
all of the core market activities from which or by means of which the data has been derived.  
The overall competitive impact of these data sharing arrangements could be significant – likely more 
significant than for individual user data - since the volume of data to be shared is likely to be very 
substantial and may represent a significant proportion of the donor platform's data assets. In some 
circumstances, it may be necessary for the data to be shared without first anonymising it to allow 
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every user would not be feasible in these circumstances, we recommend that regulators 
and policymakers consider other mechanisms to enable the bulk sharing of non-
anonymised user data.  
Alternatively, regulators should consider requiring the platform that controls the data to 
allow third party access to the full data set for training algorithms or otherwise deriving 
the same sorts of insights from the data that are available to the incumbent. The terms 
under which such access is provided would also need to be carefully regulated since those seeking 
access to the data sets would remain dependent upon the owner of the assets providing full and 
unrestricted access. Similar challenges arise even when the data is held by a ‘neutral’ intermediary.  
Such arrangements are therefore likely to require a high degree of regulatory oversight (and 
associated cost), although they also have considerable advantages if non-anonymised data is 
important to preserve contestability or if very large data sets are involved. 
Although we would expect all the relevant data about an individual user to be shared with every 
recipient, there is likely to be much greater heterogeneity of demand amongst potential 
recipients of bulk transfers of aggregate data. Some potential recipients may require (or may 
only be able to handle) relatively small volumes of data, representing only a fraction of that held by 
the donor. Others may require the sharing of much larger data sets. There may also be questions 
about the geographic scope of the data to be shared. This will present two challenges. First, the 
regulator will need to ensure that a suitable menu of data options is developed, preferably 
collaboratively and inclusively, to ensure that the needs of as wide a range of potential recipients as 
possible will be met as far as possible. This is likely to involve a degree of compromise on the part 
of some parties, with the regulator adjudicating between conflicting demands.  
Second,  we consider there is a strong prima facie case for assuming that recipients of 
aggregated data should be required to pay the data, with the payment varying by the 
volume and value of the data being shared (and not simply the costs of implementing the 
data sharing arrangements or storing the data). The primary concern here is to preserve 
incentives for both parties in the sharing arrangement to innovate and invest in existing or new 
digital services to acquire additional data for themselves. We do not want data sharing arrangements 
to crowd out other forms of commercial activity from which users derive significant benefits, 
particularly in many digital markets. 
However, we do not make firm recommendations as to how these prices should be derived because 
we have yet to find found a well-developed methodology for doing so. Requiring firms to agree with 
terms on a ‘FRAND’ basis may be inadequate. We recommend that a study be undertaken by 
the Commission to consider how regulators would establish wholesale prices for data that 
was to be shared. The methodologies and the practices to calculate the marginal costs and to 
recover costs developed for public data may feed this study. We also consider that setting appropriate 
wholesale prices for the receipt of aggregate data will also be necessary to ensure that recipients 
have appropriate incentives to reassess their data requirements as they grow and develop their 
businesses, allowing for the possibility that they would terminate existing data sharing arrangements 
once they have acquired, or are in a position to acquire, sufficient data for themselves from their 
users. Otherwise, extensive data sharing arrangements could likely become a permanent feature of 
European digital markets in the years to come.  
The final question in this context concerns the identity of the platforms that would be obliged to 
share aggregated personal data on a bulk basis. We conclude that this should be a much-limited 
set of entities than we recommend for the porting of individual data and would not 
necessarily be a requirement of every platform that was found to hold ‘gatekeeper’ status under the 
European Commission’s latest proposals, although we think a designation of ‘gatekeeper’ status 
should establish a rebuttable presumption. We, therefore, characterise this sub-set of entities 
as being those that meet a (more demanding) ‘gatekeeper plus’ threshold. The analysis 
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The challenge ahead 
The recommendations in this report, if adopted, would represent an extensive programme of 
regulatory activity that would need to be undertaken by bodies with responsibilities for implementing 
data sharing which have yet to be assigned in Europe. Establishing the institutional and regulatory 
framework to deliver data sharing at scale will require legislation and, besides, we recommend that 
the European policymakers consider further legislative changes in the forthcoming Data Act to enable 
the sharing of personal data on an opt out basis under certain narrowly prescribed circumstances 
and to ensure contestability in digital markets.  
Finally, we are mindful that data sharing remedies that we have considered in this report arise from 
the assumption that digital platforms will continue to derive significant market power from their 
centralised control of big data sets which they have accumulated by enabling diffuse groups of users 
to transact with each other through the platform. This may be the case, but regulators and 
policymakers should also keep an eye on (and potentially take steps to promote) new technologies 
and architectures which might in the future enable a much greater degree of decentralisation and 
wider distribution of data, thereby removing the very sources of market power which this report has 
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